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1. Introducing REDD+ and the Need to Address Performance
Whilst ‘REDD’ is the acronym for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation, ‘REDD+’ refers to efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation,
foster conservation, promote the sustainablemanagement of forests, and enhance forest carbon stocks [1].
The basic idea behind REDD+ is that more carbon is sequestrated and stocked in tropical forests
by improving their conservation, management, and sustainable use, thus contributing to mitigating
climate change. Developing countries and relevant stakeholders will be financially compensated for
these endeavors, either through public funds or carbon markets.
First known as “Avoided Deforestation” (AD) and discussed as a mitigation option at the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in the early 2000s, AD subsequently
became RED, REDD, and REDD+, with the concept expanding to incorporate forest conservation,
management, and use [2]. Whereas RED was ‘just’ an innovative proposal tabled by Costa Rica and
Papua New Guinea in 2005, REDD activities were outlined in the Bali Action Plan resulting from
the 13th Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 13) in 2007, to become a legally-binding article
in the 2015 Paris Agreement. In between these events, international bodies such as the World Bank,
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and United Nations Environment Program UNEP,
and developed countries (notably Norway, Germany, the UK, Australia, and the US), started REDD+
programs and funds, and developing countries entered into so-called “readiness activities” to prepare
for participation in REDD+. Currently, hundreds of REDD+ projects are being implemented around
the world [3], whilst REDD+ has changed considerably over time, being previously described as “the
world’s largest experiment in Payments for Ecosystem Services” [4], and more recently, as results-based
aid [5]. The performance of REDD+ has been largely measured in terms of emission reductions
calculated on the basis of forest reference (emission) levels (National or subnational reference levels
expressed as tonnes of CO2 equivalent per year for a reference period against which emissions and
removals from a results period are compared, serving as benchmarks for assessing the national
performance in terms of implementing REDD+ activities). This reduction of expected results is
then assumed to have been compensated for by results-based finance (RBF), as was the case for
Brazil, through payments from the Green Climate Fund in early 2019. The Bali Action Plan requires
REDD+ projects to measure changes in net carbon emissions resulting from project activities. In 2013,
the COP19 adopted the Warsaw Framework for REDD+, where results-based payments can be made
once safeguards have been addressed and respected. The Measurement, Reporting, and Verification
(MRV) of RBF were elaborated at COP24 in Katowice, Poland, December 2018, with MRV capacities
being reported as increasing [6].
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However, many observers, stakeholders, and scholars are critical. Carbon markets have not
developed as was envisioned in 2005, and the efficiency and effectiveness of REDD+ to mitigate
climate change have been questioned, with projects’ impacts being unclear. As Angelsen et al. [7]
state, “As an idea, REDD+ is a success story (...).Yet a decade after being launched in the Bali Action
Plan (UNFCCC 2007), broad consensus is that—in practice—REDD+ has not met the world’s high
expectations”. While some studies have reported positive impacts of REDD+ in terms of forest
carbon [8–13], the expected transformational change away from business as usual of deforestation and
forest degradation has not taken place thus far. Forest cover loss and tropical deforestation mainly
driven by agricultural and forestry commodities trade continue [14–17]. The results of REDD+ in terms
of sharing the burdens, costs, and benefits have been questioned [18]. The progress of policy reforms
seen as underpinning REDD+, such as tenure reform, has also been questioned [19]. For some, the lack
of performance is a result of major flaws in the design of the instrument itself (as a market-based
payment-for-ecosystem-services scheme (PES) and has led to the claim that “REDD+ is dead” [20].
Others argue that rather than blaming the instrument itself, there is a need to consider the wider
environment in which REDD+ was supposed to perform and deformations of the initial PES idea
this environment created, with powerful actors interested in maintaining the status quo, leading to
inefficiency [21]. However, as Angelsen et al. [7,21] suggest, REDD+, as both an innovative governance
mechanism and a political process, will finally perform, as climate change becomes more pressing,
carbon markets improve, and technical issues related to the efficiency and effectiveness of REDD+ are
solved. Nonetheless, as Wong et al. [22] pointed out, a performance or results-based payment approach
is no guarantee for an effective and transparent REDD+. Their analysis of narratives underlying
REDD+ benefit sharing mechanisms highlights the importance of linking payments for performance
to the contexts in which the results are defined and agreed upon, along with the conditions enabling
social and political acceptance [22].
Given this context, this special issue is timely in addressing the need to assess the political and
socio-economic dimensions of the performance of REDD+, which are of relevance for policy-makers,
practitioners, and scholars. This implies taking into account the various levels (from the global to the
local) and dimensions (e.g., results-based payments, MRV, co-benefits, and community engagement),
as well as different (disciplinary) connotations of performance. We therefore pose the following
question: what does performance mean? In answering it, we provide examples of assessments of
performance. In our conclusion, we reflect on the representativeness of these examples and their
limitations when looking at the current range of REDD initiatives, along with what is missing in terms
of evaluating the performance of REDD+. We finish by concluding why performance assessment
remains so relevant today.
2. ‘Performance’ Means Different Things
‘Performance’ refers to the act or process of executing a task or function. Hence, the concept of
performance moves beyond an account of results and related payments, and includes the process
leading to the result, even though performance and results are often used interchangeably. In this
Special Issue, performance means whether a public policy, program, or project ‘works’; delivers its
promises; or achieves its previously set objectives [23]. As a wider concept, performance can be
understood and evaluated differently [24]. As the following subsections—and the individual papers in
this special issue—show in greater detail, it can refer to (i) the economic (cost)effectiveness of policies;
(ii) multi-criteria achievements; or (iii) evaluation models based on the notions of output, outcome,
and impact. Alternative ways of evaluating performance, presented in the last two subsections below,
assess how (iv) impacts are ‘performed’ or ‘staged’ by stakeholders, independently of what’s happening
on the ground, or how (v) certain policy discourses ‘produce’ certain implementation and evaluation
practices, and not others, which is referred to as ‘performativity’ [25].
2
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2.1. Policy Effectiveness
Economics has dominated policy evaluation, where performance is equated with (cost)
effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, and sustainability based on the objectives of a policy [26–28].
In the REDD+ literature, the distinction between cost-efficiency and outcome effectiveness is prominent
(see, for example, [1,29,30]). Two evaluation methods are commonly used: ex-post, often qualitative or
mixed methods assessments of the degree to which policy objectives are attained within the policy’s
timeframe, and ex-ante, often the quantitative, statistical analysis of future costs and benefits of policy
measures, measured against current and future values, based on discount rates [31].
For REDD+, this implies comparing result-based payments from carbon funds and markets
for forest managers at the end of the policy’s time frame, compared to the costs incurred, by using
a cost–benefit analysis of REDD+ initiatives. Correa et al. [32] detail the allocation of financial
resources from the USD 667 million Brazilian Amazon fund across different stakeholders for
scientific and technological development, sustainable production, monitoring and control, and land
tenure regularization. However, in terms of the forest conservation effectiveness, as well as
emissions reductions from deforestation, they found that deforestation rates had risen since 2013,
despite increased fund disbursements. Samndong and Vatn [33] took a qualitative approach to
show the lack of effectiveness and legitimacy of REDD+ projects in the Équateur province in the
DR Congo. Umunay et al. [34] hypothesized ex-ante the run of three policy mechanisms to reduce
commodity-driven deforestation. They examined 19 cases where REDD+ programs, jurisdictional
approaches (JAs), and private sector commitments intersect, evaluating potential options against
established criteria. They found that most were located in countries with high deforestation
rates—attracting REDD+ program, JA, and private sector commitment activities. These policies
alone did not appear effective in countering tree cover loss; however, when operating together,
these efforts were seen to have potential to reduce commodity-driven deforestation, enhancing
and complementing each other. Overman et al.’s [35] economic analysis of the impact of national
REDD+ programs in Guyana suggests that indigenous communities with legal forest tenure benefited
financially in terms of cash income. However, there were modest benefits from commercial forest
uses, and extremely skewed private-public sharing of net revenue from forest-based resources and
inhibitive forest damage costs at rising carbon prices. Moreover, carbon stocks were substantially
lower in locally-managed forests.
2.2. Multi-Criteria Policy Achievements
Alongside the economic view on policy performance are juridical, administrative, and political
perspectives, with scholars andpractitioners increasingly using a combination of criteria and approaches
from different traditions. An example is the JEP Triangle, which uses Juridical, Economic and Political
indicators for policy performance [36]. Besides efficiency, criteria such as legitimacy, justice, legality,
democracy, and participation, are also considered important. Ex-post and ex-ante evaluations and
ex-nunc (often legal-based) approaches may be used. The latter evaluate policy processes “from now
on” rather than (projected) impacts.
For REDD+, this, for example, implies the assessment of community participation in projects,
not only to evaluate the degree of democracy in project implementation, but also the effectiveness
of community achievements towards the ‘triple-win’ of climate change mitigation, biodiversity
conservation, and community development. Millbank et al.’s [37] review of 25 sub-national REDD+
projects across the world that adhere to Climate, Community, and Biodiversity Alliance (CCB) REDD+
certification standards embraced a much broader set of objectives than just REDD+. However, a gap
was found, with few projects actively monitoring the impact against these goals and progress, and only
a third of the sustainable development goals targeted by REDD+ projects showing ‘improvement’.
Samndong and Vatn [33] examined the DR Congo REDD+ program in terms of its effectiveness
in protecting forests for carbon storage and alleviating rural poverty, and its appropriateness as
a governance tool. They found that the lack of harmonization between REDD+ as an instrument
3
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promoted by the international community created a competition between state and customary
authorities. This allowed powerful actors to ‘shop’ between systems and legitimize their increased use
and control of forest resources. Weatherley-Singh and Gupta [38] discuss the implications of European
Union policies on “embodied deforestation” targeting EU agricultural commodity imports as drivers
of deforestation. They find that despite substantial debate, policy measures for reducing the impact
of the EU’s consumption of agricultural commodities associated with multiple drivers of tropical
deforestation have not been developed. However, they see potential for a more integrated EU policy
approach to tackling tropical deforestation.
2.3. Policy Outputs, Outcomes, and Impacts
Policy performance is also equated with ‘impact’ [39]. The concept of impact arguably derives
from Easton’s [40] political system approach, with the output-outcome-impact model common in
impact evaluation and impact assessment widely used in organization studies, conflict studies,
international relations, and development studies [41]. The model is based on the notion that policies
lead to interventions (on a macro, meso, or micro level) that aim to have a positive societal impact.
Interventions result in outputs, tangible actions, reports, products, and/or commitments expressed
in projects, programs, law, funds, etc. Outputs ideally result in behavioural changes, in outcomes,
manifested at a (usually short-term) temporal scale and at different spatial scales, such as on a national
macro-economic, ecosystem or landscape, sector, firm, community, household, and individual level.
Outcomes can be influenced by contextual factors, such as cultural, political, and the business
environment factors. The ultimate effects of policies and outcomes are impacts: the actual contributions
to intended problem solving and opportunity seeking. Often, evidence on the counterfactual (what
would have happened without the intervention) is gathered to provide a comparison in evaluations.
A theory of change is used to articulate assumptions about the process through which such impacts
will occur and accompanying assumptions envisaged in an impact pathway, often with verifiable and
measurable indicators of the output, outcome, and impact.
For REDD+, this implies the analysis of outputs (such as a single REDD+ project), outcomes
(for example, behavioral changes of forest managers due to REDD+ initiatives), and/or impacts (such
as an increase of carbon sequestration and carbon stocks in a forest) in a specific landscape. Correa
et al. [32] attribute the apparent lack of effectiveness to the distribution mechanism of the Brazilian
Amazon fund that prioritized diverse organizations rather than a strategic selection of projects due
to its predetermined theory of change. Rosa da Conceição et al. [42] looked at REDD+ in Ecuador
and Peru and the pathways of two government-led, incentive-based forest conservation and poverty
reduction programs for forest-based populations. They found that political interests affected policy
design, resulting in trade-offs for longer-term societal efficiency in favor of short-term administrative
goals. Non-environmental outcomes were often prioritized, due to perceptions of political feasibility,
the influence of non-environmental government agencies, and beliefs in specific government roles or
public responses. Overman et al.’s [35] evaluation of the performance of REDD+ in Guyana map out
an economic foundation for a national REDD+ low-emissions impact pathway towards changing forest
governance. They suggest that REDD+ can provide the incentives needed for governments to counter
the drivers that threaten forest-dependent people because concessions, or land grabs allowed by the
government (as often observed in other countries), are costly. In this specific context, maintaining the
forest, and hence its management by forest-dependent people, results in low emissions and incomes
from REDD+, in contrast to higher emissions due to conversion or forest concessions.
2.4. The Way to Success is ‘Performed’ by Stakeholders
One of the main challenges in the evaluation of programs and projects relates to the credibility of
what is reported, what was measured and how, and the overall policy relevance of the evaluation itself.
Relevance here refers to the relevance of the overall goals of the policies vis a vis the key problems [28],
and hence focuses on the assessment of policy documents and matches between the policy problem at
4
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hand and the goals stated. The policy relevance of an evaluation itself can also refer to the relevance of
the measures selected to assess impacts, asking if what is assessed is actually of policy relevance and
useful for identifying appropriate policies and measures to tackle the overall problem. While methods
used to assess and monitor impacts can increase rigor and robustness [26,43], some of the factors that
can undermine the credibility and legitimacy in REDD+ assessments are the often cited issues of poor
documentation, costs, time, and technical capacities [44,45]. Beyond these, credibility and legitimacy
are jeopardized by a strong inclination to frame results as overly positive, whatever the ‘real’ effects on
the ground [46]. Therefore, there are (implicit) biases in any evaluation method to produce positive
results, which affects their credibility. In addition, many stakeholders engaged in evaluations may
be biased: evaluators paid to assess projects; project participants hoping for an extension and new
resources; politicians with political motives and careers; and scientists with a bias for publication
impact. In other words, many interests converge towards performing or staging projects as ‘successes’.
The papers in this issue highlight that REDD+ evaluations indeed encounter risks of positive
framing in practice. This appears as not necessarily deliberate, but emerges from the interests and
sympathies of those involved. For REDD+, this implies that a critical assessment is needed of how and
why project evaluations are biased towards success stories, or how some stakeholders tell positive
stories to evaluators, while the situation on the ground is rather different. Another emerging aspect is
how local actors express agency in (re)framing and changing the narratives of performance according
to their own interests, beyond those paying for a ”good performance”. These experiences highlight the
importance of both local context and culture, as well as subnational, national, and international interests,
in understanding performance narratives. Correa et al. [32] recount the significant investments in the
Brazilian Amazon fund, widely seen as successful. However, when dissected, the funds’ performance
reflects the arbitrary support of different projects adopting highly different theories of change, many of
which are not chiefly interested in reducing deforestation, but based on the stakeholder’s own
preferences and activities. In the DR Congo, a study on the performance of the REDD+ program [33]
highlights the exclusion of some timber and charcoal actors, which has detrimental effects on the
effectiveness and legitimacy of REDD+, butwhich is not reported back to the program [47]. Additionally,
Millbank et al. [18] find a marked gap in 25 subnational, CCB-certified REDD+ projects between
aspirations on paper and the monitoring of progress.
2.5. The ‘Performativity’ of Policy Discourse
Where classical evaluation studies examine how policy performs after implementation, they often
take policy discourses for granted and use external yardsticks (such as effectiveness, efficiency,
and/or legitimacy) to assess their performance. This approach is problematized by ‘performativity’
scholars [25,48], who argue that performance is not only a function of the (un)intended effects of
implementing policy, but also of the policy discourse itself. Discourses ‘make’ certain objects and
subjects, whilst (un)intentionally excluding others, and so constitute certain implementation and
evaluation practices. This has implications for the representation and inclusiveness of such policies.
For REDD+, this implies the analysis of how certain types of stakeholders are pre-defined in
REDD+ project narratives, while others are implicitly or explicitly excluded. It could also imply
the problematization of the use of certain benchmarks to assess the success and failure of REDD+,
because these produce their own assessment realities, while excluding others, for example, those of
local practitioners. Skutsch and Turnhout [49] illustrate this performative aspect of REDD+ policies,
which frame communities as both beneficiaries and implementation agents. They note that international
policies generally do not clarify who or what communities actually are. Their analysis of international
and national policy documents on REDD+ worldwide demonstrates the unreality and disconnection
between scales and the heterogeneity of communities targeted in national REDD+ policies. They close
on a note of warning (p. 13), expressing that the attachment within policy discourses to the “community
myth” could catalyze positive change, but “may also cause blindness in terms of the practical
implications for communities, thatwill ultimately do them a disservice”. At the same time, communities
5
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are not passive, docile receivers of REDD+. Den Besten and colleagues [50] portray the on-the ground
practices between global policymaking and local implementation in Ghana. Whilst global actors led
the implementation of REDD+ in a cocoa production landscape in the high forest area, they depended
on local actors to make REDD+ work. Consequently, it was integrated into existing community-based
conservation, forest restoration, and agro-forestry practices, thus transforming REDD+ to resemble
these local practices.
3. Conclusions
This special issue aims to take stock of the current state of REDD+ performances. The papers
reflect the diverse understandings of what constitutes performance and performativity. They also
show a broad range of methods used to assess performance, from qualitative in-depth studies to
quantified, statistically rigorous approaches, with most papers reflecting on a relatively small number
of comparative cases; thus, the representativeness of these examples is limited. Systematic reviews
and studies assessing large numbers of cases and employing a counterfactual approach are notably
absent among the papers in this issue and can be seen as missing in the suite of approaches which
can be used to evaluate performance. Taking all papers together, an overall conclusion about the
performance of REDD+ remains challenging, with most papers providing a rather bleak outlook,
and some being somewhat more optimistic in their assessment. REDD+ exhibits potential to bring
about change: it can contribute to achieving international objectives and targets (Paris Agreement,
SDGs); bring substantial income to communities who sustainably manage their forests against the
trend of forest conversion; it can reduce deforestation once various approaches are smartly combined
(private sector and juridical approach); and it appears to re-energize ‘old-fashioned’ forest management
approaches (such as community forestry and forest restoration). At the same time, the papers also show
that the rhetoric is stronger than the evidence of practices on the ground; that short-term, administrative
interests overshadow long-term environmental ones; that REDD+ rules adversely interact with state
and customary institutions; and that REDD+ lacks local legitimacy by excluding non-elites.
These different, partly contradicting conclusions can, in our view, be particularly attributed to the
nature of this special issue: namely, that we invited scholars applying different interpretations and
methods of performance assessment to contribute. Some of approaches are more critical than others
towards policy evaluations in general and REDD+ evaluations in particular, for example, the ‘staging
performance’ and ‘performativity’ approaches. It is thus no wonder that these come up with less
favorable assessments of REDD+ performance; this can be attributed to the nature of these approaches.
What we also see, however, is that mainstream performance evaluation methodologies also result in
different outcomes; for example, economic versus public administration evaluations, due to data and
assessment choices, as well as due to the different cases evaluated. Moreover, the papers highlight that
the subject of performance itself is understudied: it is a difficult beast to measure, and as a research
topic, is subject to selective narratives, values, and interests. The case studies in these papers also
reflect the challenges of understanding, defining, and measuring performance, so the publication
serves wider societal interests rather than selected ones.
Finally, REDD+ is still in an early phase of implementation, and one cannot expect its
performance—the delivering of its perceived potential—to have fully materialized yet. Experiences of
policy evaluations also highlight that we need to be realistic in our expectation that policies have not
only positive, but also negative, direct and indirect, and intended and unintended, effects. In addition,
we can neither expect that all policy evaluation traditions and approaches produce similar outcomes,
nor that their conclusions will ‘automatically’ converge over time; that would be naïve. However,
time is pressing, as impacts of REDD+ occur, whilst payments for results are being requested and issued.
Therefore, we strongly encourage further REDD+ performance assessments and call for innovative yet
rigorous analyses, and for comparative evaluations using different approaches to judge performance,
in order to help develop our understanding of REDD+ performance.
6
Forests 2019, 10, 837
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interests.
References
1. Angelsen, A.; Brockhaus, M.; Sunderlin, W.D.; Verchot, L.V. (Eds.) Analysing REDD+: Challenges and Choices;
Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR): Bogor, Indonesia, 2012.
2. Den Besten, J.W.; Arts, B.J.M.; Verkooijen, P. The evolution of REDD+: An analysis of discursive-institutional
dynamics. Environ. Sci. Policy 2014, 35, 40–48. [CrossRef]
3. International Database on REDD+ projects and programmes. Available online: http://www.
reddprojectsdatabase.org/view/countries.php (accessed on 18 September 2019).
4. Corbera, E. Problematizing REDD+ as an experiment in payments for ecosystem services. Curr. Opin.
Environ. Sustain. 2012, 4, 612–619. [CrossRef]
5. Angelsen, A. REDD+ as result-based aid: General lessons and bilateral agreements of Norway. Rev. Dev.
Econ. 2017, 21, 237–264. [CrossRef]
6. Romijn, E.; Lantican, C.B.; Herold, M.; Lindquist, E.; Ochieng, R.; Wijaya, A.; Murdiyarso, D.; Verchot, L.
Assessing change in national forest monitoring capacities of 99 tropical countries. For. Ecol. Manag. 2015,
352, 109–123. [CrossRef]
7. Angelsen, A.; Martius, C.; De Sy, V.; Duchelle, A.E.; Larson, A.M.; Thuy, P.T. REDD+ enters its second decade.
In Transforming REDD+: Lessons and New Directions; Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR):
Bogor, Indonesia, 2018.
8. Poffenberger, M. Restoring and conserving Khasi forests: A community-based REDD strategy from northeast
India. Forests 2015, 6, 4477–4494. [CrossRef]
9. Pandey, S.S.; Cockfield, G.; Maraseni, T.N. Assessing the roles of community forestry in climate change
mitigation and adaptation: A case study from Nepal. For. Ecol. Manag. 2016, 360, 400–407. [CrossRef]
10. Bos, A.B.; Duchelle, A.E.; Angelsen, A.; Avitabile, V.; Sy, V.D.; Herold, M.; Joseph, S.; Sassi, C.; Sills, E.O.;
Sunderlin, W.D.; et al. Comparing methods for assessing the effectiveness of subnational REDD+ initiatives.
Environ. Res. Lett. 2017, 12, 074007. [CrossRef]
11. Börner, J.; Wunder, S.; Reimer, F.; Kim Bakkegaard, R.; Viana, V.; Tezza, J.; Pinto, T.; Lima, L.; Marostica, S.
Promoting Forest Stewardship in the Bolsa Floresta Programme: Local Livelihood Strategies and Preliminary Impacts;
Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR): Bogor, Indonesia; Fundação Amazonas Sustentável
(FAS): Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Zentrum für Entwicklungsforschung (ZEF): Manaus, Brazil; University of Bonn:
Bonn, Germany, 2013.
12. Duchelle, A.E.; de Sassi, C.; Jagger, P.; Cromberg, M.; Larson, A.M.; Sunderlin, W.D.; Atmadja, S.S.;
Resosudarmo, I.A.P.; Pratama, C.D. Balancing carrots and sticks in REDD+: Implications for social safeguards.
Ecol. Soc. 2017, 22. [CrossRef]
13. Simonet, G.; Bos, A.B.; Duchelle, A.E.; Resosudarmo, I.A.P.; Subervie, J.; Wunder, S. Forests and carbon:
The impacts of local REDD+ initiatives. In Transforming REDD+: Lessons and New Directions; Center for
International Forestry Research (CIFOR): Bogor, Indonesia, 2018.
14. Curtis, P.G.; Slay, C.M.; Harris, N.L.; Tyukavina, A.; Hansen, M.C. Classifying drivers of global forest loss.
Science 2018, 361, 1108–1111. [CrossRef]
15. Pendrill, F.; Persson, U.M.; Godar, J.; Kastner, T.; Moran, D.; Schmidt, S.; Wood, R. Agricultural and forestry
trade drives large share of tropical deforestation emissions. Glob. Environ. Chang. 2019, 56, 1–10. [CrossRef]
16. Brockhaus, M.; Korhonen-Kurki, K.; Sehring, J.; Di Gregorio, M.; Assembe-Mvondo, S.; Babon, A.;
Sitoe, A. REDD+, transformational change and the promise of performance-based payments: A qualitative
comparative analysis. Clim. Policy 2017, 17, 708–730. [CrossRef]
17. Milne, S.; Mahanty, S.; To, P.; Dressler, W.; Kanowski, P.; Thavat, M. Learning from ‘Actually Existing’REDD+
A Synthesis of Ethnographic Findings. Conserv. Soc. 2019, 17, 84–95.
18. Luttrell, C.; Sills, E.; Aryani, R.; Ekaputri, A.D.; Evinke, M.F. Beyond opportunity costs: Who bears the
implementation costs of reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation? Mitig. Adapt. Strateg. Glob.
Chang. 2018, 23, 291–310. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
19. Ravikumar, A.; Larson, A.M.; Duchelle, A.E.; Myers, R.; Tovar, J.G. Multilevel governance challenges in
transitioning towards a national approach for REDD+ evidence from 23 subnational REDD+ initiatives.
Int. J. Commons 2015, 9, 909–931. [CrossRef]
7
Forests 2019, 10, 837
20. Fletcher, R.; Dressler, W.; Büscher, B.; Anderson, Z.R. Questioning REDD+ and the future of market-based
conservation. Conserv. Biol. 2016, 30, 673–675. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
21. Angelsen, A.; Brockhaus, M.; Duchelle, A.E.; Larson, A.M.; Martius, C.; Sunderlin, W.D.; Verchot, L.V.;
Wong, G.; Wunder, S. Learning from REDD+: A response to Fletcher et al. Conserv. Biol. 2017, 3, 718–720.
[CrossRef] [PubMed]
22. Wong, G.Y.; Luttrell, C.; Loft, L.; Yang, A.; Pham, T.T.; Naito, D.; Brockhaus, M. Narratives in REDD+
benefit sharing: Examining evidence within and beyond the forest sector. Clim. Policy 2019, 19, 1038–1051.
[CrossRef]
23. Ramos, T.B.; Alves, I.; Subtil, R.; de Melo, J.J. Environmental performance policy indicators for the public
sector: The case of the defence sector. J. Environ. Manag. 2007, 82, 410–432. [CrossRef]
24. Crabb, A.; Leroy, P. The Handbook of Environmental Policy Evaluation; Taylor and Francis Group: Routledge,
London, 2012.
25. Arts, B.; Behagel, J.; Turnhout, E.; de Koning, J.; van Bommel, S. A practice based approach to forest
governance. For. Policy Econ. 2014, 49, 4–11. [CrossRef]
26. Ton, G. The mixing of methods: A three-step process for improving rigour in impact evaluations. Evaluation
2012, 18, 5–25. [CrossRef]
27. Bamberger, M. Introduction to mixed methods in impact evaluation. Impact Eval. Notes 2012, 3, 1–38.
28. OECD. Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance D.A. Committee; OECD: Paris, France, 1991.
29. Angelsen, A.; Brockhaus, M.; Kanninen, M.; Sills, E.; Sunderlin, W.D.; Wertz-Kanounnikoff, S. (Eds.) Realising
REDD+: National Strategy and Policy Options; Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR): Bogor,
Indonesia, 2009.
30. Pasgaard, M.; Sun, Z.; Müller, D.; Mertz, O. Challenges and opportunities for REDD+: A reality check from
perspectives of effectiveness, efficiency and equity. Environ. Sci. Policy 2016, 63, 161–169. [CrossRef]
31. Börner, J.; Thales, A.P.W.; Blackman, A.; Miteva, D.A.; Sims, K.R.E.; Wunder, S. National and subnational
forest conservation policies What works, what doesn’t. In Transforming REDD+: Lessons and New Directions;
Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR): Bogor, Indonesia, 2018.
32. Correa, J.; van der Hoff, R.; Rajão, R. Amazon Fund 10 Years Later: Lessons from the World’s Largest REDD+
Program. Forests 2019, 10, 272. [CrossRef]
33. Samndong, R.A.; Vatn, A. Competing Tenures: Implications for REDD+ in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Forests 2018, 9, 662. [CrossRef]
34. Umunay, P.; Lujan, B.; Meyer, C.; Cobián, J. Trifecta of Success for Reducing Commodity-Driven Deforestation:
Assessing the Intersection of REDD+ Programs, Jurisdictional Approaches, and Private Sector Commitments.
Forests 2018, 9, 609. [CrossRef]
35. Overman, H.; Butt, N.; Cummings, A.R.; Luzar, J.B.; Fragoso, J.M.V. National REDD+ Implications for
Tenured Indigenous Communities in Guyana, and Communities’ Impact on Forest Carbon Stocks. Forests
2018, 9, 231. [CrossRef]
36. Nelissen, N. The administrative capacity of new types of governance. Public Organ. Rev. 2002, 2, 5–22.
[CrossRef]
37. Milbank, C.; Coomes, D.; Vira, B. Assessing the Progress of REDD+ Projects towards the Sustainable
Development Goals. Forests 2018, 9, 589. [CrossRef]
38. Weatherley-Singh, J.; Gupta, A. Embodied Deforestation as a New EU Policy Debate to Tackle Tropical Forest
Loss: Assessing Implications for REDD+ Performance. Forests 2018, 9, 751. [CrossRef]
39. Vincent, J.R. Impact evaluation of forest conservation programs: Benefit-cost analysis, without the economics.
Environ. Resour. Econ. 2016, 63, 395–408. [CrossRef]
40. Easton, D. An approach to the analysis of political systems. World Politics 1957, 9, 383–400. [CrossRef]
41. Gertler, P.J.; Martinez, S.; Premand, P.; Rawlings, L.B.; Vermeersch, C.M. Impact Evaluation in Practice;
The World Bank: Washington, DC, USA, 2016.
42. Rosa da Conceição, H.; Börner, J.; Wunder, S. REDD+ as a Public Policy Dilemma: Understanding Conflict
and Cooperation in the Design of Conservation Incentives. Forests 2018, 9, 725. [CrossRef]
43. Duchelle, A.E.; Herold, M.; de Sassi, C. Monitoring REDD+ impacts: Cross scale coordination and
interdisciplinary integration. In Sustainability Indicators in Practice; De Gruyter: Berlin, Germany, 2015;
pp. 55–79.
8
Forests 2019, 10, 837
44. Bayrak, M.; Marafa, L. Ten years of REDD+: A critical review of the impact of REDD+ on forest-dependent
communities. Sustainability 2016, 8, 620. [CrossRef]
45. Krause, T.; Nielsen, T.D. The legitimacy of incentive-based conservation and a critical account of social
safeguards. Environ. Sci. Policy 2014, 41, 44–51. [CrossRef]
46. Mosse, D. Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice (Anthropology, Culture and Society);
Pluto Press: London, UK, 2005.
47. UN-REDD. The Democratic Republic of the Congo. Available online: https://www.unredd.net/regions-and-
countries/africa/democratic-republic-of-the-congo-the.html (accessed on 30 April 2019).
48. Ball, S.J. The teacher’s soul and the terrors of performativity. J. Educ. Policy 2003, 2, 215–228. [CrossRef]
49. Skutsch, M.; Turnhout, E. How REDD+ Is Performing Communities. Forests 2018, 9, 638. [CrossRef]
50. Den Besten, J.W.; Arts, B.; Behagel, J. Spiders in the Web: Understanding the Evolution of REDD+ in
Southwest Ghana. Forests 2019, 10, 117. [CrossRef]
© 2019 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
9

Article
Amazon Fund 10 Years Later: Lessons from the
World’s Largest REDD+ Program
Juliano Correa 1,*, Richard van der Hoff 2,3 and Raoni Rajão 3
1 Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA
2 Nijmegen School of Management, Radboud Universiteit, Nijmegen 6525 AJ, The Netherlands;
richard.vanderhoff@gmail.com
3 Department of Production Engineering, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte,
MG 30161-010, Brazil; rajao@ufmg.br
* Correspondence: juliano.correa@duke.edu; Tel.: +1-919-904-6453
Received: 27 December 2018; Accepted: 26 February 2019; Published: 19 March 2019
Abstract: Results-Based Funding (RBF) for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation (REDD+) has become an important instrument for channeling financial resources to
forest conservation activities. At the same time, much literature on conservation funding is ambiguous
about the effectiveness of existing RBF schemes. Many effectiveness evaluations follow a simplified
version of the principal-agent model, but in practice, the relation between aid providers and funding
recipients is much more complex. As a consequence, intermediary steps of conservation funding
are often not accounted for in effectiveness studies. This research paper aims to provide a nuanced
understanding of conservation funding by analyzing the allocation of financial resources for one of
the largest RBF schemes for REDD+ in the world: the Brazilian Amazon Fund. As part of this analysis,
this study has built a dataset of information, with unprecedented detail, on Amazon Fund projects,
in order to accurately reconstruct the allocation of financial resources across different stakeholders
(i.e., governments, NGOs, research institutions), geographies, and activities. The results show that
that the distribution of resources of the Amazon Fund lack a clear strategy that could maximize
the results of the fund in terms of deforestation reduction. First, there are evidences that in some
cases governmental organizations lack financial additionality for their projects, which renders the
growing share of funding to this type of stakeholder particularly worrisome. Second, the Amazon
Fund allocations did also not systematically have privileged the municipalities that showed the
recent highest deforestation rates. rom the 10 municipalities with the higher deforestation rates in
2017, only 2 are amongst the top 100 receiving per/Ha considering the 775 municipalities from Legal
Amazon. Third, the allocation of the financial resources from the Amazon Fund reflects the support
of different projects that adopt significantly diverging theories of change, many of which are not
primarily concerned with attaining further deforestation reductions. These results reflect the current
approach adopted by the Amazon Fund, that do not actively seek areas for intervention, but instead
wait for project submissions from proponents. As a consequence, project owners exert much influence
on to the type of activities that they support how deforestation reduction is expected to be attained.
The article concludes that the Amazon Fund as well as other RBF programs, should evolve over time
in order to develop a more targeted funding strategy to maximize the long-term impact in reducing
emissions from deforestation.
Keywords: REDD+; Amazon Fund; Results-Based Funding; benefit distribution; resource allocation;
climate change funding; effectiveness; forest conservation funding
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1. Introduction
The international allocation of funds to activities intended to funding forest conservation—directly
or indirectly—is said to be a “highly cost-effective way of reducing greenhouse gas emissions on climate
change” [1]. Among many types of financial mechanisms for pursuing this approach, Results-Based
Funding (RBF) for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD, or REDD+
for a broader suite of activities) has become an important instrument for channeling financial resources
to forest conservation activities [2,3]. RBF can be defined as the “transfer of money or material goods
conditional upon taking a measurable action or achieving a predetermined performance target” [4–7].
The success of RBF instruments for REDD+ stems from political controversies related to initial REDD+
proposals that favored offset-based markets [8]. Brazilian government, in particular, has been known
to challenge the use of markets on the basis of sovereignty concerns [6,9]. Instead, Brazil created the
Amazon Fund in 2008 in order to receive results-based payments for achievements in deforestation
reductions [10], which plummeted between 2004 and 2012 [11–13]. Similar developments have
also occurred in international forest governance debates, as the Green Climate Fund became the
central financial instrument for REDD+ [14], testifing the growing prevalence of RBF approaches
in forest governance. Despite this dominance, the effectiveness of RBF has been challenged by
scholars [5,7,15–18], while others have showed that donor and receiving countries and stakeholders
often disagree on how to best evaluate these schemes and distribute the resources [19,20].
This research paper aims to enhance the understanding of intermediary stages of RBF for forest
conservation by reconstructing the allocation of financial resources from the Brazilian Amazon Fund
to individual projects and analyzing the underlying rationales behind this allocation. Between 2008
and 2017, the Amazon Fund has received more than USD 1.2 billion in donations, committed USD
667.3 million for the financial support of 96 approved projects, and thereby represents the largest and
most longstanding RBF initiatives in forest governance worldwide [10,13,21]. An analysis of financial
resource allocation could, therefore, provide important lessons on the intermediary stages of RBF
(as Amazon Fund) to REDD+ and other conservation purposes. Our analysis exposes the underlying
intervention logic (or ‘theory of change’) adopted for redistributing financial resources, which is useful
for identifying the main factors for successful or failing forest conservation funding. The remainder
of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on related resource allocations,
including the theories of change, criteria for resource allocation, benefit-sharing mechanisms, and
impacts. Section 3 then outlines our approach and Section 4 presents data about the distribution of
Amazon Fund resources. Section 5 concludes with our main findings and their implications for impact
and policy making.
2. Aid Effectiveness and the Complex Relations between Service Providers and Service Users
Deforestation reduction [17,22] is a relatively recent trend in the broader context of development
aid that has usually targeted health, education, or biodiversity conservation [16,23]. Although using
the same model, the literature generally refers to aid as funding for REDD+ initiatives, since the former
seems to be charity while the last is close to the climate change concepts, where developed countries
should fund initiatives of forest conservation to offset their historical emissions [2].
Although this aid could come in many forms, RBF has become an increasingly appealing approach
due to its simplicity from both the donor and receiver sides. On the donor side, the payments are done
based on the measurement of a result already achieved, reducing substantially the transactional risk.
On the receiver side, RBF promises the transfer of resources with “no strings attached” as countries
are able to decide how best to invest the payments. Since receiving countries would want to receive
an increasing volume of resources, they would be incentivized to invest the RBF proceedings in a
way that reduces deforestation the most. A closer look, however, reveals that many of the issues that
have plagued REDD+ and development aid more in general are still present in RBF, namely: benefit
distribution, intervention design, and effectiveness.
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One of the key design choices around REDD+ programs concerns the definition of “who needs to
be involved, whose interests are at stake, and the expected co-benefits and required safeguards” [19].
Moreover, their discussion of approaches to reducing tropical forest degradation highlights the
importance of contextualizing local realities, responding to new knowledge and experience, and
incorporating the full complexity of forest loss and degradation, among others [24,25]. Many scholars
have highlighted the issues of equitable sharing of net benefits from REDD+ projects (e.g., [26,27]).
For instance, Luttrell, Loft, Fernanda Gebara, Kweka, Brockhaus, Angelsen, and Sunderlin [27]
distinguish a number of possible rationales for the distribution of REDD+ benefits. They have
emphasized: (1) actors with legal rights; (2) actors achieving reductions in emissions; (3) low-emitting
forest stewards; (4) actors incurring the costs of REDD+ implementation; (5) effective facilitators of
REDD+ implementation; and (6) the poorest actors. They note great variation in how implementing
countries apply these rationales, implying that this is a function of context, project design and the
beneficiaries (see also [8]). Some scholars find that “equity can have significant positive feedback on
program outcomes and legitimacy over the longer term” [26,28,29]. According to Vatn and Vedeld [30],
market-based approaches were found to be the most problematic among governance structures, since
they do not address equity. These observations suggest a theme of providing equal opportunities to
stakeholders. Yet rigorous analysis, and even comprehensive evaluations of net benefits and their
distribution, are scarce, in part because of the way decisions are made about distributions of resources
within and across REDD+ projects [19].
Another key aspect of RBF is the choice, by the receiving country, of the interventions that
will be supported by the program. [27,31]. Weatherley-Singh and Gupta [32], for example, find that
REDD+ activities must directly target the drivers of deforestation, such as forest fires and illegal
logging, as well as structural drivers, such as changes in land tenure and land-use planning. However,
they argue that not all drivers are considered, as most schemes do not address cattle ranching,
corruption, roadbuilding, and/or commodity demands, among others (see also [9,33]). As important
as the choice of the type of intervention is, the definition of the territories that will be prioritized
by REDD+. Wolosin, Breitfeller, and Schaap [10] show that the geographical distribution of REDD+
finance can be largely explained by priorities on tree cover, tree-cover loss, and carbon emissions at
national (70%–94%) and subnational (58%–72%) levels, though institutional capacity and political
commitments have also been influential. Other work highlights significant gaps for specific priority
areas. Some scholars point to areas in the Amazon region facing high deforestation pressure that are
important for emissions and biodiversity [33–35]. Other scholars argue for additional investments in
the network of protected areas, given their importance to date in curbing deforestation and the risks
from deforestation dynamics [36,37]. Still others argue that support should also consolidate pristine or
intact or stable forests to ensure long-term conservation (e.g., [35]). While the majority of available
literature strongly emphasizes improved protection of high-risk areas, at the least for prioritizing
additional impacts in the short run, various goals play parts within comprehensive approaches to
forest conservation.
Finally, different studies have pointed out that it is not clear that RBF leads to the efficient use
of resources, as initially assumed. The proponents of RBF expected that, since receiving countries
have a direct financial incentive to reduce deforestation, they would strive to support actions on
the ground that contribute directly to that aim. However, a closer look suggests that that empirical
evidence on the effectiveness of RBF schemes is either lacking or points to contradictory effects [5],
a problem already well known in relation to development aid [38]. On the one hand, authors such
as Restivo, Shandra, and Sommer [17] argue that more bilateral aid from the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID) has a lowering effect on forest loss. On the other hand,
studies such as Hermanrud and de Soysa [22] report that forest conservation funding from Norway’s
International Forest and Climate Initiative (NICFI), one of the largest aid initiatives in the world and
the main donor to the Amazon Fund, has had no effect in halting forest area loss. In a similar way,
Bare, Kauffman, and Miller [18], for example, argue that forest conservation funding in sub-Saharan
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Africa “is not associated with reduced deforestation rates at the national scale” and even claim that
short-term impacts had negative effects. Both studies have strong limitations, since they do not
control for other drivers of deforestation, such as agricultural prices, and they assume that relatively
small-scale programs (as a percentage of the country’s Gross National Product), are going to show
effects at national level [39]. Nevertheless, these studies show that there is a growing concern with the
effectiveness of RBF, in general and NICFI in particular.
The problem with evaluating the effectiveness of RBF initiatives is that the relations between
service users (aid providers) and service providers (aid users) are much more complex than a
simplified reading of the principal-agent model found in the studies cited above. According to
Paul [7], the contracted agency relationship is often one between the donor organization and a recipient
organization or ministry, whereas results may come from other organizations that ultimately spend
the financial resources from these donations but have no direct relation with the donor organization
(i.e., non-contracted agency relation). In this respect, for example, the UN-REDD+ programme from the
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) supports 94 projects in Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Panama,
Paraguay, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Nigeria. However, UNDP are directly related only
to the governmental focal point of each country, relating only indirectly with the local beneficiary [40].
According to Van der Hoff, Rajão and Leroy [19], the indirect relations between financial donations,
‘project performance’, and deforestation rates underlie discursive tensions between donor and
recipient countries. While formally all parties agree that RPF should be based solely on deforestation
reductions already achieved, donors are also increasingly concerned with the lack of evidence of
efficiency of funded projects in driving additional reductions, and in this way fueling a virtuous circle.
These tensions and conflicts suggest that the intermediary processes of forest conservation funding are
poorly understood, particularly with respect to how they affect aid effectiveness. Some authors have
suggested that addressing these conflicts requires new approaches to aid effectiveness evaluations
that account for the complex relations of RBF for REDD+, particularly the intermediary stages of
forest conservation funding. This could imply, for instance, that transfers should be conditional upon
desired results, as within well-implemented payments for ecosystem services (PES) approaches [28].
Such conditions could also require environmental additionality—that is, providing more ecosystem
services than they would provide in the non-existence of such payments [41,42]. In addition, REDD+
should be ‘financially additional’, beyond already planned funding [43]. While attractive, the idea of
adding specific demands of additionality to RBF goes against the simplicity and ‘hands off’ approach
that made RBF popular in the first place. Furthermore, this approach would entail a return of many
elements of the project-based model defined by Verified Carbon Standard among others, which have
also proven to be highly problematic [44]
The growing body of literature presented above presents valuable insights on how RBF should
be designed and presents some of its dilemmas and contradictory results. But while allot has been
said about how large RBF programs should look like, until recently we lacked a strong record of
largescale schemes to look back and draw lessons from concrete experiences. This study provides
the first comprehensive analysis of the first decade of the Amazon Fund, the world largest REDD+
RBF program [45,46]. Our study aims to reveal the design choices adopted by the Fund by analyzing
its resource distribution across beneficiaries, activities, and geographies. While this study does not
provide a quantitative impact analysis of the fund, it allows us to understand how the allocation
of financial resources corresponds with various REDD+ design choices, as reflected in the available
literature on REDD+, and the extent to which this may affect its long-term effectiveness. From this,
this study draws lessons that could be used to improve the Amazon Fund in Brazil and other large
RBF programs.
3. Research Approach and Methodology
This research paper conceptualizes the Amazon Fund as an intermediary organization that
links the forest conservation funding provided by donor organizations to the individual projects
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(see Figure 1). Created in 2008, the Amazon Fund was the first large scale RBF program to be
implemented. As such, the fund played an important role in shaping the discussions around REDD+
at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). For this reason, the
UNFCCC’s Warsaw Framework for REDD+ adopted, to a large degree, the modus operandi pioneered
by Brazil. Financial donations to the Amazon Fund mainly come from Norway’s International
Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI) and the German Development Bank (KfW). The Amazon Fund
consists of a steering committee (COFA), which is responsible for establishing allocation guidelines,
and a technical committee (CTFA), which is responsible for approving results in terms of reducing
emissions from deforestation. The managing organization of the Amazon Fund is the Brazilian
Development Bank (BNDES) and is responsible for the approval (or rejection) of submitted project
proposals according to predefined guidelines, as well as for the receipt and allocation of financial
resources. Since 2015, BNDES has also become eligible to receive financial resources from the Green
Climate Fund (decree 8.576/15), whereas other organizations like the government-owned bank Caixa
Econômica Federal (CEF) and the Brazilian Biodiversity Fund (FUNBIO) may also become recipients.
Financial resources are allocated to a wide variety of organizations. Federal government organizations
include the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA), the Brazilian Institute for
Space Research (INPE), the Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources
(IBAMA) and the National Police Force (FNSP). Non-governmental organizations also abound and
include the Sustainable Amazon Foundation (FAS), the Amazon Institute for Human and Environment
(IMAZON), Amazon Environmental Research Institute (IPAM), and The Nature Conservancy (TNC),
among others. State government organizations are mostly represented by the environmental or
agricultural secretariats of the nine Brazilian states in the Legal Amazon, while some state secretariats
outside this region were also recipients. Finally, municipal government secretariats and federal
universities were also supported financially by the Amazon Fund.
Understanding how forest conservation funding to the Amazon Fund contributes to the effective
reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation involves connecting the project
activities (each with a specific shared benefit), geographies, and supported activities, to the overall
objective of emissions reduction. The Amazon Fund already provides an annual report that divides
the funding distribution according to four broad categories: (1) monitoring and control, (2) land
tenure regularization, (3) sustainable production, and (4) scientific and technological development [13].
However, to understand the allocation of financial resources in light of the design outlined above, it is
necessary to further refine the available information from the Amazon Fund. For this purpose, we have
built a project database with detailed information on the beneficiaries, activities and geographies that
received financial resources from the Amazon Fund (see Figure S8 in Supplementary Materials).
Our primary data source is the Amazon Fund´s website, as well as its annual activity reports
(see Figures S3 and S6 in Supplementary Materials). We collected all data available on all of the
96 projects that received support between 2008 and 2017. This data includes project objectives,
beneficiaries, implementing organization, territorial scope, committed and disbursed amounts, and
activities conducted, among other information. Websites of project owners provided additional
information. To refine the data for providing geographical information, we used the municipality as
the entity. In Brazil, municipalities reflect the smallest geographical unit for monitoring deforestation,
applying public policies, allocating government resources, and evaluating (see Tables S1 and S2 in
Supplementary Materials).
One of the main challenges of generating data at the municipal level is the variation of project
target areas, which may involve biomes, river basins, protected areas, or indigenous territories.
Based on the available literature, we designed rules to determine the municipalities encompassed
by each project (see Figure S5 and Tables S3 and S4 in Supplementary Materials). When project
disbursements covered multiple municipalities, we used a weight factor in order to determine
the share of financial support that each municipality received (see Figure S7 in Supplementary
Materials). After the geographical allocation of financial resources, we further categorized the dataset
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by main-component, which reflects the Amazon Fund´s theory of change. As projects may contribute
to multiple main-components, we conducted one interview by email with a BNDES manager, the
managing organization of the Amazon Fund, who replied with a spreadsheet including data dividing
the investments of each Amazon Fund project by main-component. Finally, we further categorized
the dataset by activity (also called specific-components). As a main-component can be composed
by multiple activities, if more than one activity by main-component was verified, then the amounts
were equally divided across them. The assumptions in response at divergences or limitations of
data collected are presented at Figure S6 in Supplementary Materials. The final database contains
10,493 lines of information structured by project, location, main-component, and specific-component
(see Figures S1, S4 and S8 in Supplementary Materials). The procedures for collecting and interpreting
data, and constructing the database, are detailed in the supplements outcomes (see Figure S2 in
SupplementaryMaterials). The Amazon Fund accountability is in Brazilian Reais currency. All financial
data were converted from Brazilian reais to US dollars by using the rate for the day they were received,
which corresponds with the methodology used for the English publications of the Amazon Fund.
To evaluate the additionality of the Brazilian governmental agencies budgets (accountable in Brazilian
reais) with the Amazon Fund disbursements, we used an average exchange rate between 2009 and
2017, in order to reduce the effects of exchange rate fluctuation.
 
Figure 1. The Flows of Amazon Fund. Redd, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation; CEF, Caixa Econômica Federal; FUNBIO, Brazilian Biodiversity Fund; IBAMA, Brazilian
Institute for the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources; EMBRAPA, Brazilian Agricultural
Research Corporation; FNSP, National Police Force; INPE, Brazilian Institute for Space Research;
CENSIPAM, Center for the Management of the Amazon Protection System.
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4. Results: Resource Allocations by the Amazon Fund
Currently, the approval of projects and disbursements are made on the basis of criteria and
guidelines updated biannually by COFA. The 2017–2018 document lists 14 minimum requirements
that potential projects must meet, some (i.e., items B4, B5, B6, B7, and B14) determining conceptual
boundaries of project activities. Projects also must demonstrate coherence with environmental and
forest policies, most notably the national Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation
in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAm), including its manifestations in state governments (PPCDs), and the
national policy for Regenerating Native Vegetation (ProVeg) [13]. Projects are also evaluated with
respect to coherence with Brazil’s National REDD+ Strategy (ENREDD+), which in turn incorporates
implementation of PPCDAm and compliance with the Brazilian Forest Code. Finally, projects are
expected to be financially additional, i.e., to go beyond existing public environmental budgets and
other forms of finance.
The Amazon Fund maintains an open channel for submissions indicating that 80% for the
resources should be invested in the Amazon biome (an area that encompasses 40% of the country).
In addition to that, the fund also has made public calls aiming at fostering specific activities, such
as sustainable production, inclusive value chains and the management of indigenous lands. These
calls account for 8.4% of the resources committed by the fund by December 2017. A recent call for
forest restauration from 2017 added a spatial priority criteria that provides up to 12 points (from a total
of 100) if the project is located in a high priority water basin within a municipality blacklisted as a top
priority for deforestation control by the Ministry of Environment [47]. In both the calls and the open
submission channel, however, the Amazon Fund adopts largely a passive approach, waiting for project
owners to send proposals, rather than actively identifying areas under high risk of deforestation where
the impact of the resources would be maximized in terms of deforestation reduction.
4.1. Benefit Distribution Across Stakeholders
The distribution of financial commitments across stakeholders shows some variation across years
(Figure 2, left panel). In 2017, over 95% of a total of USD 667.3 million went to state governments
(USD 256.6 million) or NGOs (USD 241.1 million) or federal governments (USD 140.6 million), with
their shares varying considerably per year. Of a total of USD 140.4 million in 2013, about 70% (or USD
102.9 million) went to projects of state governments that received almost no such commitments either
two years earlier or two years later. This peak took place as a consequence of a change in the rule of
the Amazon Fund that allowed the approval of larger “structural projects”, as the implementation of
the Rural Environmental Register (CAR). By contrast, commitments to NGOs projects were relatively
stable over time, averaging USD 22 million until 2016, though rising to USD 44.5 million in 2017
(implying variation in the NGOs’ share). Commitments to federal government projects were also
uneven, with slight peaks in 2012 and 2017 (USD 31.7 million, 41.2 million).
 
Figure 2. Annual committed (L) and disbursed (R) amounts per stakeholder (in million USD).
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However, the ability of different stakeholders to approve projects with the Amazon Fund did not
match their implementation capabilities. In the last decade, only USD 405.3 of 667.3 million (i.e., 60.7%)
has been transferred to project owners. Average annual disbursements to state governments have
hovered between USD 16 and 21 million in most years, with a sudden peak of USD 47.6 million in 2014
and then a sharp drop to USD 4.8 million in 2015. Disbursements to federal government increased
exponentially from a small base of only USD 2.4 million even in 2014 to USD 37.7 million in 2017.
Finally, disbursements to NGOs steadily increased from USD 6.4 million in 2010 to USD 30.7 million in
2017. From these three groups of beneficiaries, the Federal Government has been demonstrated the
largest implementation gap, starting with a very low implementation rate and reaching the execution
of only 47% of the committed values by 2017. This was followed by the State Governments, whose
spending rates stayed below 50%. Municipalities, Universities, and NGOs, in contrast, presented a
better implementation capacity, being able to invest most of the resources obtained from the Fund.
To understand these variations in disbursements, we must also consider the characteristics of
the projects supported by the Fund. Federal government projects, for instance, were concentrated
within eight projects involving six recipient agencies. Of the total amounts in this category, USD
64.3 million (i.e., 47.2%) went to organizations that develop satellite-based monitoring systems and
provide information on deforestation trends, namely INPE and CENSIPAM. Another USD 35.9 million
(i.e., 26.7%) went to organizations responsible for enforcing environmental laws and policies, namely
IBAMA and FNSP. The remaining USD 40.5 million (i.e., 25.9%) went to EMBRAPA units to disseminate
knowledge about sustainable production and the recovery of degraded areas throughout Brazil, and
to the Brazilian Forest Service (SFB) for the collection of information aiming to increase the forest data
available (see Section 4.3). While the IBAMA manage to invest 17.5% of the funds received, by 2017,
INPE and CENSIPAM used only 58.6%, implying that the development of a radar-based monitoring
system is lagging behind schedule.
The committed and disbursed peaks for state government projects in 2013 and 2014 (Figure 3)
correspond with contextual factors as well, including a surge in state government projects toward
development and implementation of the Rural Environmental Register (CAR). CAR is a federal
policy instrument introduced in 2012, with the adoption of the new Forest Code (law 12.651/2012),
to enhance law enforcement capacity. However, despite the federal law and a centralized national
system, the registers must be executed at state or municipal level (art 29, §1). CAR implementation
has, therefore, become a major concern for state governments, especially after the system went live
in 2014 [48]. This can be seen in both spending and appeals to the Amazon Fund [13]. Within the
13 states that have approved projects, 85% of disbursements went to seven of the nine inside the
Amazon Biome.
The linear increase in disbursements to NGOs reflects yet another set of contextual factors, in this
case related to Amazon Fund process adjustments over time. Disbursements to projects were slow,
to start, due to rigid assessment procedures intended to show professionalism; in the eyes of donor
organizations and BNDES management, that slowness also reflected some lack of understanding
of project owners [13,19]. Minutes of COFA meetings indicate that, in response to these challenges,
the Amazon Fund adopted a number of measures in order to facilitate and accelerate the disbursement
process, including public calls for submitting project proposals. While the consequences of these
responses are reflected in the linear increase in approved projects and disbursements to NGOs, 80% of
the financial resources were concentrated in half of the NGOs that received support from the Amazon
Fund. While the Amazon Fund does include distributional equity amongst its performance criteria,
this concentration reveals that usually only high-capacity and professional civil society organizations,
such as FAS, IMAZON, and TNC, are able to access the fund (see Figure S9 in Supplementary Materials).
In addition to exposing the implementation capability of different governmental agencies,
a comparison between the disbursement of the Amazon Fund with the yearly government budget
also reveals the ability of the Fund to foster additional actions. One of the key principles of the first
donation contract signed in 2008 between Norway and Brazil was the warrant that the Amazon Fund
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would not replace but supplement tax payer funds [2,20,22,49]. However, it is possible to observe
that the increases in disbursements to federal agencies coincided with their decreasing governmental
budgets, particularly after 2014 (Figure 4). This suggests the occurrence of a partial substitution for
the agency expenditure of taxpayer-funded budgets using the Amazon Fund. For instance, IBAMA’s
committed budgets to reduce deforestation, combat fires, and conduct environmental inspections have
been reducing since 2012, with a strong reduction from USD 50.64 million in 2014 to USD 29.07 million
in 2017. These reductions have been partially offset by Amazon Fund disbursements starting in 2015.
Similarly, INPE´s budget fell from USD 84.5 million in 2010 to USD 43.63 million in 2017, 2017, and
CENSIPAM has also lost more than 70% of its governmental funding from 2009 and 2017. In those
three cases, the Amazon Fund played an important role offsetting those budgetary losses from 2015
onwards, in the case of CENSIPAM even outmatching governmental funds. Those trends include
rising implementation rates for turning federal commitments into disbursements, which increased
from 3.7% in 2014 to 26.8% in 2017.
 
Figure 3. Implementation rates as disbursed, divided by committed (consolidated amounts), by
Stakeholder.
These observations cannot, by themselves, confirm a direct causal relationship between the
increasing financial disbursements from the Amazon Fund and the decreasing budgets of the recipient
federal agencies. Furthermore, it should be highlighted that the period following 2015 witnessed one of
the worst political, economic, and fiscal crises in Brazil’s history. At the same time, however, contextual
factors seem to correspond with an interpretation that the forest conservation funding provided
through the Amazon Fund lacks in some instances financial additionality, particularly considering
the unfavorable political climate for environmental protection [50], the greater flexibility within forest
19
Forests 2019, 10, 272
legislation since 2012 [51], multiple bills for reducing environmental protection during election year
2018, and, as a consequence of all these factors, rising deforestation rates since 2012 [52].
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Figure 4. Comparison of Federal Committed Budgets with the Amazon Fund disbursements for INPE,
IBAMA and CENSIPAM (used average 2009–2017 exchange rate: 2.434). Committed amounts represent
the Portuguese term, ‘Empenhado’, an act that guarantees that there is an amount necessary to pay for
an assumed commitment and creates a payment obligation for the government.
4.2. Geographical Distribution
Spatially, Amazon Fund allocations display a large concentration (Figure 5a) in 64 municipalities
along the (Figure 5a) region stretching from the southeast of Pará towards the western regions in
the Mato Grosso, Rondônia and Acre states, municipalities that contain, since 2000, the highest
consolidated deforestation rates in Brazil. NGO and state projects explain much of this concentration
(Figure 5b,c), whereas federal projects had no significant contribution, mainly due to their nationwide
focus (Figure 5c,d). Federal government projects are the most evenly distributed across the landscape,
averaging below 26 USD/ha, which could be due to the all-encompassing nature of the geographic
information systems (GIS—Geographic Information Systems) and remote sensing activities that
these projects tend to promote. At the same time, disbursements to larger federal agencies, such as
EMBRAPA, tend to concentrate in eight cities in the Legal Amazon, including Rio Branco, Manaus,
Boa Vista and Macapá, where these agencies are located (Figure 5d). Finally, while municipalities
benefit indirectly from various types of support, direct support only went to 6 of the 772 municipalities
in the Legal Amazon and amounted to only USD 7.8 million. Most of these resources (65.2%) went to
the municipal government of Alta Floresta, in northern Mato Grosso. In addition, the Amazon Fund
had also financed research of the state universities of Pará (in Belem) and Amazonas (in Manaus) as
well as to the development of satellite-based monitoring systems by INPE in Manaus (Figure 5g).
State government projects are mostly responsible for monitoring and control (Figure 5c),
particularly through activities, as the structuring of environmental secretariats, CAR implementation,
and training of firefighters (see Section 4.3 for details). State governments that more actively sought the
support of Amazon Fund for monitoring and control were Acre, Maranhão, Tocantins, and Rondônia.
Particularly, Acre has a strong presence in investments in sustainable production, spread throughout
its territory (Figure 5e,f). The distribution of resources also portrays low intensity towards Land
Tenure Regularization activities, independent of the region or stakeholder (Figure 5h), However, the
Amazon Fund allocations did not systematically privilege the municipalities that showed the recent
highest deforestation rates. For instance, from the 10 municipalities with the highest deforestation
rates in 2017, only two were amongst the top 100 receiving per/Ha, considering the 775 municipalities
from Legal Amazon. Furthermore, the support from the Amazon Fund tend to arrive in a context in
which clearings have already been reduced substantially due to other factors or the depletion of forests
(see Table S5 and Figure S10 in Supplementary Materials). This spatial pattern of project distribution
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confirms the apparent lack of strategy of the Amazon Fund, as a consequence of a largely passive
approach that waits for proposals rather than actively seeking opportunities for fostering projects in
areas with high deforestation risk.
a            b 
c            d 
e             f 
g            h 
Figure 5. Spatial distribution of Amazon Fund investments per municipality by Stakeholder and
by main-component.
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4.3. Distribution Across Activities
Almost half of the total commitments (USD 667.3million) has gone tomonitoring and control (USD
326.7 million), while one third (USD 201.9 million) has gone to sustainable production (see Figure 6
and Table 1). The latter category has been relatively steady over time, as have the small land tenure
commitments. By contrast, the large investment monitoring and control have been uneven over time:
starting slow with an average of USD 20.3 million in the first four years, peaking in 2013 at USD
94.0 million, and then settling at an average of USD 30.6 million from 2015 on (Figure 6, left panel).
Finally, nearly all commitments for scientific and technological development occurred in 2012 (USD
40.7 million).
  
A B 
Figure 6. Annual committed (A) and disbursed (B) amounts per main-component (in millions USD).
Although slightly slower than noted above, actual disbursements to individual projects have
corresponded to commitments, with most disbursements going to monitoring and control (49.6%) and
sustainable production (31.9%). Monitoring and Control was responsible for most of the variation
(see right graph of Figure 6), peaking in 2014 (USD 43.1 million) and 2017 (USD 53.5 million). Notably,
disbursements for scientific and technological development have never gotten much traction, slightly
peaking only in 2013 and 2014, and also presents the lowest implementation rate up to 2017 (Figure 7).
Monitoring and control efforts involved mostly state and federal government projects (USD 187.1
million and USD 100.1 million, respectively). It was the only category, though, that included the
unique international project supported by the Amazon Fund, aiming to help develop the capacity
to monitor deforestation in eight neighboring countries that also contain the Amazon biome (USD
11.8 million). However, most of the monitoring and control investments (USD 113.0 million) was
allocated to CAR implementation. A large share of the funds provided for this activity (USD 102.5
million) was used by state governments to acquire equipment (GPS, computers, software) and provide
training for effective processing of CAR proposals. Another share (USD 52 million) was invested in
the capacity-building of environmental secretariats for CAR implementation and other environmental
policies, including the creation of municipal secretariats, the acquisition of cars and buildings, the
hiring of employees and training in-monitoring deforestation, landscape analysis, sustainable supply
chains, and measurement. In addition, some resources were used to promote CAR among landowners
and to provide georeferencing services for landowners. A small amount went to development of a
state system for granting environmental licensing to new businesses and companies. Therefore, in
total, 18% of the resources committed by the fund have been invested in the implementation of CAR.
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Figure 7. Implementation rates as disbursed divided by committed (consolidated amounts),
by main-component.
Monitoring activities that were exclusively promoted by federal government organizations
involved the improvement of satellite-based monitoring systems for fighting deforestation (PRODES—
Annual Deforestation System and DETER—Real Time Deforestation System, USD 76.1 million) and
forest fires (PREVFOGO-Fire Prevention System, USD 6.3 million). State governments also invested in
forest fire combat (USD 32.5 million), but emphasized control activities (e.g., the creation of firefighter
units), rather than monitoring activities. Other investments by federal government organizations
targeted the strengthening of law enforcement (USD 29.6 million) in two projects by IBAMA and FNSP;
this funding was mostly spent on the acquisition of vehicles, helicopters, equipment, and buildings.
While NGOs received much financial support from the Amazon Fund (USD 241.1 million), their
support for monitoring and control activities was relatively small (USD 11.6 million) and only involved
CAR implementation.
In the category of sustainable production, resources mostly went to NGOs (USD 154.7 million)
and state government organizations (USD 42.1 million) (see Table 1). Nearly all state government
investments went to the promotion of sustainable forest activities, the acquisition of equipment
(tanks, driers, processing units’ machines, warehouses), and the provision of professional training and
technical assistance (in pisciculture and aquaculture, nut and Açaí extraction, pasture management,
as well as forestry and agroforestry systems). This result suggests that the social benefits from the
Amazon Fund in terms of rural poverty reduction and sustainable farming were carried out mostly by
NGOs and state governments.
Investments in regularizing land tenure, notably spending on territorial zoning and protected-area
management and indigenous lands, came almost exclusively from state governments (USD 23.8 million)
and NGOs (USD 46.6 million). This investment provides indirect benefits for indigenous peoples,
quilombos (descendants from fugitive slaves), riverine people, smallholders, and settlements. No such
investments were federal. Federal governments did invest substantially in scientific and technological
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development, which involved field data collection by the Brazilian Forest Service (SFB) for building
the National Forest Inventory (USD 31.7 million).
Universities, by contrast, invested the most financial resources in scientific research (USD 4.7
million) and development of the research infrastructure (USD 3.9 million). For instance, one project
from the Federal University of Pará conducted research for the development of new products from
bioactive compounds of plants typical of the Amazon Biome (USD 0.7 million), and invested in the
development of new forest products, such as herbal medicines, cosmetics, and food products, among
others. Natura, a private cosmetics company from Brazil, announced in 2016 an investment of more
than USD 70 million in biodiversity inputs as part of its Amazon Program that aims to develop a new
line of products with origins in Amazon Biodiversity.
5. Amazon Fund Design Choices and Effectiveness
The findings of our analysis of the recipient projects in the Brazilian Amazon Fund reflect a broad
variety of stakeholders and activities. Following the categorization of Luttrell, Loft, Fernanda Gebara,
Kweka, Brockhaus, Angelsen, and Sunderlin [27], the recipient projects of the financial resources
from the Amazon Fund often involve the largely indirect contributions of effective facilitators, legal
rights holders, cost-incurring groups, forest stewards, or poor communities. Moreover, the Amazon
Fund’s financial resources were channeled towards the direct and structural drivers of deforestation,
but this distribution was not proportional to the importance of addressing these drivers, as argued
by some scholars (e.g., [32]). Investment patterns tend to reflect specific relations between specific
stakeholder groups and project activities. Although activities also vary considerably, there are some
general patterns. Federal government organizations tend to invest in development of monitoring
systems (45.7%) and inventory data (22.6%), which reflects a main concern with gaining control over
deforestation dynamics. State government organizations tend to invest mostly in CAR implementation
(40.1%) and capacity-building for state and municipal organizations (20.3%), thereby incurring many
of the costs of federal policies. Finally, investments by NGOs have mainly benefited local communities
who aim to adopt sustainable production activities (64.2%), but NGOs have also supported (more than
federal or state government organizations) land tenure regularization projects (19.3%).
The geographical distribution of financial resources seemed to follow a more focused rationale.
We found that many project organizations were located in municipalities with the highest consolidated
deforestation rater of Brazil. For instance, NGO projects for territorial and ecological zoning,
strengthening of PA and IT management, as well sustainable production, represent 30% of the total
disbursements from the Amazon Fund and were largely located in this region. Disbursements from the
Amazon Fund to the three main recipient categories have generally benefited municipalities located
in areas where deforestation threats are highest [53]. This observation only partially corresponds
with the findings by Wolosin, Breitfeller, and Schaap [10], as we found no evidence of substantial
contributions to areas with high tree cover, which are more commonly found in remote areas of the
Amazon biome [35].
Within the pre-established main-components of the Amazon Fund, we also found variation
in the activities that compose these categories. For instance, while most financial resources were
channeled to the strengthening of monitoring and control activities by federal and state governments
(USD 287.2 million), their investments have focused on monitoring activities like satellite imaging
(USD 70.6 million) and CAR implementation (USD 102.5 million). This result contrasts with the
substantially smaller investments in control activities like combating forest fires (USD 32.5 million) or
law enforcement (USD 29.6 million). This trend is representative of the broader resource allocation
within the monitoring and control category. Similarly, investments in land regularization were mainly
directed at indigenous territories and protected areas (USD 66.0 million), whereas smallholders
(USD 4.3 million) received much less support.
Based on our findings on the variations in financial resource distribution, we argue that the project
owners impose a substantial influence on the nature of activities that forest conservation funding
25
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ultimately supports. The current approach adopted by the fund incentivize project submissions in
activities and geographies where they may be most successful in reducing deforestation had a limited
effect. Corresponding with the study by Weatherley-Singh and Gupta [32], for example, the Amazon
Fund restricts financial resource allocation to the four main-components of its theory of change,
while not addressing alternative factors, such as the impacts of cattle ranching, road construction,
international demand for agricultural products, or corruption. However, any project proposal that
adheres to the project quality criteria and guidelines of the Amazon Fund [13] may become eligible for
financial support. In other words, the Amazon Fund takes a more passive stance towards resource
allocation after the criteria and guidelines are in place. This view accounts for the great variety of
stakeholders, activities, and geographies, as described above, since each stakeholder category seems to
prefer a different investment strategy. Such behavior may ultimately undermine the effectiveness of
conservation funding provided by Norwegian and German donor organizations, at least in terms of
emissions reductions.
As already argued in Section 2, the Amazon Fund´s theory of change is generally geared
towards deforestation reduction, but the design choices of individual projects are primarily directed at
contributing to one or more main components. The evaluation of a completed project in northern Mato
Grosso [46], for instance, indicates that the project geared its intervention logic upon its contribution
to the main-components “sustainable development” and “monitoring and control”, and stated that
the main contribution to emissions reductions came from “the restoration of native vegetation and
pastures and the planting of native species in permanent protection areas”. The extent to which such
projects achieved emissions reductions was not stated in the report and would admittedly be a complex
methodological endeavor. The leeway that projects have in contributing to these main-components,
although important for attracting project proposals, accounts (at least partially) for the imbalanced
allocation of financial resources discussed above and may, to some extent, undermine the Amazon
Fund’s contribution to deforestation reduction.
It is important to note that this undermining of the Amazon Fund´s overall contribution is
by no means intentional. At the same time, there are also indications that some projects require a
more in-depth evaluation and a longitudinal approach in order to observe their outcomes come to
fruition. Particularly but not exclusively, projects from governmental organizations are under greater
pressure from critical considerations of their contribution to emissions reductions. One may argue
that investments in CAR implementation, for example, support more structural improvements of a
nation-wide instrument to enhancemonitoring capacity, but some studies point out that it is still unclear
whether and to what extent this instrument, indeed, contributes to reducing deforestation [48,54].
In addition, our analysis indicates that federal government organizations (i.e., CENSIPAM, INPE and
IBAMA) tend to lack financial additionality. Particularly, the substitutive nature of the Amazon Fund
financial resources of IBAMA projects is worrying, because these investments often involve more
direct contributions to reducing deforestation, most notably the enhancement of (the capacity for)
environmental inspections and fire combat. While the lack of funding for law enforcement may have
led to an even higher spike on deforestation rates, a country with a mature enough environmental
governance should be able to grant a stable source of public funding by giving priority to this agenda.
6. Conclusions
Our analysis also helps to understand why empirical studies seem ambiguous about the
effectiveness of forest conservation funding. As explained in Section 3, BNDES’ approach to
distributing financial resources from the Amazon Fund to individual projects occurs based on the
evaluation of project proposals based on the funds widely encompassing guidelines rather than a
strategic selection of projects based on the need to reduce deforestation in areas under threat. As a
consequence, our findings show that disbursements by the Amazon Fund to individual projects adhere
to very diverging theories of change within a broader REDD+ and RBF strategy. The contribution of
each individual project for deforestation reduction are complex to be measured and require additional
26
Forests 2019, 10, 272
studies [17,18,22]. Nevertheless, our results suggest that the lack of strategic focus of disbursements
may compromise the ability of the fund to obtain further deforestation reductions on the short term.
It is particularly concerning the observation that the resources provided by the Amazon Fund
have offset budgetary losses from the Brazilian government in some areas, putting into question the
financial additionality of the fund. At the same time, deforestation rates have been on the rise since
2012, the same period during which the fund has started to take place more steadily [19]. It should
be emphasized that the fund is not expected to influence deforestation rates for the whole biome,
and the lack of additionality in some years can be explained by the economic and fiscal crisis in
Brazil. However, these trends taken jointly may weaken the credibility of financial support from the
Amazon Fund and other RBF programs on the long term. The sustainable development activities in
NGO projects seem to incite less critique, but these projects require much closer scrutiny in order to
understand the extent to which they indeed reduce deforestation. Our analysis confirms the argument
by Van der Hoff, Rajão, and Leroy [19] that the “demands for demonstrating the results of the Amazon
Fund in a scientifically rigorous manner are likely to become an important topic for donor countries”.
Alternatively, the Amazon Fund could adopt a more active approach to the allocation of financial
resources, for example, by prioritizing a smaller set of activities, with a strong geographical focus.
Most importantly, the Amazon Fund should actively identify potential locations and project owners
and assist them in constructing high impact proposals. Likewise, the fund should also improve its
impact monitoring capabilities and provide incentives to projects that deliver deforestation reductions
within the timeframe of the project. This is especially important, as the political climate in Brazil,
United States and other countries has become more hostile to environmental interests [52,53,55].
Supplementary Materials: The following are available online at http://www.mdpi.com/1999-4907/10/3/272/s1,
Figure S1: Model for Database Structuration, Figure S2: Steps to collect the variables, Figure S3: Individual Project
Page on Amazon Fund website, Figure S4: Database structured at Level I—Projects, Figure S5: Diagram of rules to
determine municipalities encompassed by projects, Figure S6: Project Tree, Figure S7: Municipalities weighted by
project, Figure S8: Final Database Structure, Figure S9: Pareto graft for NGO’s and State projects (USD left bar and
% of committed amounts right side, Figure S10: Deforestation in Legal Amazon, PRODES-INPE (2017), Table S1:
Municipalities geospatial information sources, Table S2: Municipalities Data Source, Table S3: Variables included
in the main-component level, Table S4: Weight calculations per main-component, Table S5: 10 Municipalities with
the higher deforestation rates between 2016 to 2017. PRODES-INPE (2017), Table S6: Research assumptions in
response at divergences/limitations of data collection.
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, J.C., R.v.d.H. and R.R.; Data curation, J.C.; Formal analysis, R.v.d.H.
and R.R.; Investigation, J.C. and R.v.d.H.; Methodology: J.C. and R.R.; Visualization, R.R.; Writing—Review &
Editing, J.C., R.v.d.H. and R.R.
Funding: This research was supported by the Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, through the Pro-Rectory of
Research-PRPq/UFMG. Also was financed by CAPES–Brazilian Federal Agency for Support and Evaluation of
Graduate Education within the Ministry of Education of Brazil.
Acknowledgments: We thank Alexander Pfaff from Duke University for the inspiration and academic support,
and Centro de Inteligência Territorial (CIT), PRPQ/UFMG and CAPES for providing funding for this research.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
References
1. Stern, N. Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2006.
2. Angelsen, A. REDD+ as Result-based Aid: General Lessons and Bilateral Agreements of Norway. Rev. Dev. Econ.
2017, 21, 237–264. [CrossRef]
3. Turnhout, E.; Gupta, A.; Weatherley-Singh, J.; Vijge, M.J.; de Koning, J.; Visseren-Hamakers, I.J.; Herold, M.;
Lederer, M. Envisioning REDD+ in a post-Paris era: Between evolving expectations and current practice.
Wiley Interdiscip. Rev. Clim. Chang. 2016. [CrossRef]
4. Eichler, R. Can “Pay-for-Performance” Increase Ultilization by the Poor and Improve the Quality of Health Services?
Discussion Paper for the First Meeting of the Working Group on Performance-Based Incentives; Center for Global
Development: Washington, DC, USA, 2006.
27
Forests 2019, 10, 272
5. Eldridge, C.; Palmer, N. Performance-based payment: Some reflections on the discourse, evidence and
unanswered questions. Health Policy Plan. 2009, 24, 160–166. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
6. Van der Hoff, R.; Rajão, R.; Leroy, P.; Boezeman, D. The parallel materialization of REDD+ implementation
discourses in Brazil. For. Policy Econ. 2015, 55, 37–45. [CrossRef]
7. Paul, E. Performance-Based Aid: Why It Will Probably Not Meet Its Promises. Dev. Policy Rev. 2015,
33, 313–323. [CrossRef]
8. Den Besten, J.W.; Arts, B.; Verkooijen, P. The evolution of REDD+: An analysis of discursive-institutional
dynamics. Environ. Sci. Policy 2014, 35, 40–48. [CrossRef]
9. Carvalho, F.V.d. The Brazilian position on forests and climate change from 1997 to 2012: From veto to
proposition. Rev. Bras. De Política Int. 2012, 55, 144–169. [CrossRef]
10. Wolosin, M.; Breitfeller, J.; Schaap, B. The Geography of REDD+ Finance: Deforestation, Emissions and the
Targeting of Forest Conservation Finance; Forest Trends: Washington, DC, USA, 2016.
11. Cunha, F.A.F.d.S.; Börner, J.; Wunder, S.; Cosenza, C.A.N.; Lucena, A.F.P. The implementation costs of forest
conservation policies in Brazil. Ecol. Econ. 2016, 130, 209–220. [CrossRef]
12. Boucher, D.; Roquemore, S.; Fitzhugh, E.J.T.C.S. Brazil’s success in reducing deforestation. Trop. Conserv. Sci.
2013, 6, 426–445. [CrossRef]
13. BNDES. Amazon Fund Activity Report 2017; BNDES: Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2018.
14. Voigt, C.; Ferreira, F. The Warsaw Framework for REDD+: Implications for National Implementation and
Access to Results-based Finance. Carbon Clim. Law Rev. 2015, 9, 113–129.
15. Oxman, A.D.; Fretheim, A. Can paying for results help to achieve the Millennium Development Goals?
Overview of the effectiveness of results-based financing. J. Evid. -Based Med. 2009, 2, 70–83. [CrossRef]
[PubMed]
16. Miller, D.C.; Agrawal, A.; Roberts, J.T. Biodiversity, Governance, and the Allocation of International Aid for
Conservation. Conserv. Lett. 2013, 6, 12–20. [CrossRef]
17. Restivo, M.; Shandra, J.M.; Sommer, J.M. The United States Agency for International Development and forest
loss: A cross-national analysis of environmental aid. Soc. Sci. J. 2018, 55, 171–181. [CrossRef]
18. Bare, M.; Kauffman, C.; Miller, D.C. Assessing the impact of international conservation aid on deforestation
in sub-Saharan Africa. Environ. Res. Lett. 2015, 10, 125010. [CrossRef]
19. Van der Hoff, R.; Rajão, R.; Leroy, P. Clashing interpretations of REDD+ “results” in the Amazon Fund.
Clim. Chang. 2018. [CrossRef]
20. Birdsall, N.; Savedoff, W.; Seymour, F. The Brazil-Norway Agreement with Performance-Based Payments for
Forest Conservation: Successes, Challenges, and Lessons. 2014. Available online: https://www.cgdev.org/
publication/ft/brazilnorway-agreement-performance-based-payments-forest-conservation-successes (accessed
on 14 March 2019).
21. Dalene, E. An Assessment of the Brazilian REDD+ Governance System. A Case Study of the Amazon Fund;
Norwegian University of Life Sciences: Ås, Norway, 2011.
22. Hermanrud, K.; de Soysa, I. Lazy thinking, lazy giving? Examining the effects of Norwegian aid on forests
in developing countries. Int. Area Stud. Rev. 2017, 20, 19–41. [CrossRef]
23. Miller, D.C. Explaining Global Patterns of International Aid for Linked Biodiversity Conservation and
Development. World Dev. 2014, 59, 341–359. [CrossRef]
24. Brockhaus, M.; Korhonen-Kurki, K.; Sehring, J.; Di Gregorio, M.; Assembe-Mvondo, S.; Babon, A.; Bekele, M.;
Gebara, M.F.; Khatri, D.B.; Kambire, H.; et al. REDD+, transformational change and the promise of
performance-based payments: A qualitative comparative analysis. Clim. Policy 2017, 17, 708–730. [CrossRef]
25. Korhonen-Kurki, K.; Brockhaus, M.; Sehring, J.; Di Gregorio, M.; Assembe-Mvondo, S.; Babon, A.; Bekele, M.;
Benn, V.; Gebara, M.F.; Kambire, H.W.; et al. What drives policy change for REDD+? A qualitative
comparative analysis of the interplay between institutional and policy arena factors. Clim. Policy 2018.
[CrossRef]
26. Wong, G.Y.; Loft, L.; Brockhaus, M.; Yang, A.L.; Pham, T.T.; Assembe-Mvondo, S.; Luttrell, C. An Assessment
Framework for Benefit Sharing Mechanisms to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
within a Forest Policy Mix. Environ. Policy Gov. 2017, 27, 436–452. [CrossRef]
27. Luttrell, C.; Loft, L.; Fernanda Gebara, M.; Kweka, D.; Brockhaus, M.; Angelsen, A.; Sunderlin, W.D. Who
Should Benefit from REDD+? Rationales and Realities. Ecol. Soc. 2013, 18. [CrossRef]
28
Forests 2019, 10, 272
28. Pham, T.T.; Brockhaus, M.; Wong, G.Y.; Le, N.D.; Tjajadi, J.S.; Loft, L.; Luttrell, C.; Assembe Mvondo, S.
Approaches to Benefit Sharing: A Preliminary Comparative Analysis of 13 REDD+ Countries; Center for
International Forestry Research (CIFOR): Bogor, Indonesia, 2013.
29. Dunlop, T.; Corbera, E. Incentivizing REDD+: How developing countries are laying the groundwork for
benefit-sharing. Environ. Sci. Policy 2016, 63, 44–54. [CrossRef]
30. Vatn, A.; Vedeld, P.O. National governance structures for REDD+. Glob. Environ. Chang. 2013, 23, 422–432.
[CrossRef]
31. Simonet, G.; Subervie, J.; Ezzine-de-Blas, D.; Cromberg, M.; Duchelle, A.E. Effectiveness of a REDD+ Project
in Reducing Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. Am. J. Agric. Econ. 2018, 101, 211–229. [CrossRef]
32. Weatherley-Singh, J.; Gupta, A. Drivers of deforestation and REDD+ benefit-sharing: A meta-analysis of the
(missing) link. Environ. Sci. Policy 2015, 54, 97–105. [CrossRef]
33. Busch, J.; Ferretti-Gallon, K. What Drives Deforestation and What Stops It? A Meta-Analysis. Rev. Environ.
Econ. Policy 2017, 11, 3–23. [CrossRef]
34. Nori, J.; Lescano, J.N.; Illoldi-Rangel, P.; Frutos, N.; Cabrera, M.R.; Leynaud, G.C. The conflict between
agricultural expansion and priority conservation areas: Making the right decisions before it is too late.
Biol. Conserv. 2013, 159, 507–513. [CrossRef]
35. Potapov, P.; Hansen, M.C.; Laestadius, L.; Turubanova, S.; Yaroshenko, A.; Thies, C.; Smith, W.; Zhuravleva, I.;
Komarova, A.; Minnemeyer, S.; et al. The last frontiers of wilderness: Tracking loss of intact forest landscapes
from 2000 to 2013. Sci. Adv. 2017, 3. [CrossRef]
36. Soares-Filho, B.; Moutinho, P.; Nepstad, D.; Anderson, A.; Rodrigues, H.; Garcia, R.; Dietzsch, L.; Merry, F.;
Bowman, M.; Hissa, L.; et al. Role of Brazilian Amazon protected areas in climate change mitigation.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 2010, 107, 10821–10826. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
37. Pfaff, A.; Robalino, J.; Herrera, D.; Sandoval, C. Protected Areas’ Impacts on Brazilian Amazon Deforestation:
Examining Conservation—Development Interactions to Inform Planning. PLoS ONE 2015, 10, e0129460.
[CrossRef]
38. Tierney, M.J.; Nielson, D.L.; Hawkins, D.G.; Roberts, J.T.; Findley, M.G.; Powers, R.M.; Parks, B.; Wilson, S.E.;
Hicks, R.L. More Dollars than Sense: Refining Our Knowledge of Development Finance Using AidData.
World Dev. 2011, 39, 1891–1906. [CrossRef]
39. Van der Eynden, M.; Fliflet, H.; Pharo, P.F.I.; Ragnhildstveit, H.; Tønset, S. Lazy thinking, lazy giving—or
lazy research? Int. Area Stud. Rev. 2017, 20, 360–363. [CrossRef]
40. U.N REDD+ Programme. Available online: https://www.unredd.net/documents/global-programme-191/
community-based-redd-2992/16012-cbr-progress-update.html (accessed on 10 February 2019).
41. Cordero Salas, P.; Roe, B.E.; Sohngen, B. Additionality When REDD Contracts Must be Self-Enforcing.
Environ. Resour. Econ. 2018, 69, 195–215. [CrossRef]
42. Chiroleu-Assouline, M.; Poudou, J.-C.; Roussel, S. Designing REDD+ contracts to resolve additionality issues.
Resour. Energy Econ. 2018, 51, 1–17. [CrossRef]
43. Dutschke, M.; Michaelowa, A. Development assistance and the CDM—how to interpret ‘financial
additionality’. Environ. Dev. Econ. 2006, 11, 235–246. [CrossRef]
44. Rajão, R.; Marcolino, C. Between Indians and “cowboys”: the role of ICT in the management of contradictory
self-images and the production of carbon credits in the Brazilian Amazon. J. Inf. Technol. 2016, 31, 347–357.
45. LTS International. Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative: Synthesizing
Report 2007–2013; Norwegian Agency For Development Cooperation: Oslo, Norway, 2014.
46. Anache, B.; Toni, F.; Maia, H.T.; Queiroz, J. Effectiveness Evaluation Report: Amazon’s Water Springs Project; GIZ
& BNDES: Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2016.
47. BNDES. Public Call for Projects. Available online: http://www.fundoamazonia.gov.br/export/sites/
default/pt/.galleries/documentos/chamada-publica/Chamada_RCV_prorrogacao-de-prazo.pdf (accessed
on 14 March 2019).
48. Azevedo, A.; Rajão, R.; Costa, M.; Stabile, M.; Alencar, A.; Moutinho, P. Cadastro Ambiental Rural e sua
influência na dinâmica do desmatamento na Amazônia Legal. In Boletim Amazônia em Pauta N. 3; IPAM:
Brasília, Brzail, 2014.
49. Hermansen, E. I will write a letter and change the world: The knowledge base kick-starting Norway’s
Rainforest Initiative. Nord. J. Sci. Technol. Stud. 2015, 3, 34–46. [CrossRef]
29
Forests 2019, 10, 272
50. Aamodt, S. The Ability to Influence: A Comparative Analysis of the Role of Advocacy Coalitions in Brazilian
Climate Politics. Rev. Policy Res. 2018, 35, 372–397. [CrossRef]
51. Sauer, S.; França, F.C.d. Código Florestal, função socioambiental da terra e soberania alimentar. Cad. Crh
2012, 25, 285–307. [CrossRef]
52. Rochedo, P.R.R.; Soares-Filho, B.; Schaeffer, R.; Viola, E.; Szklo, A.; Lucena, A.F.P.; Koberle, A.; Davis, J.L.;
Rajão, R.; Rathmann, R. The threat of political bargaining to climate mitigation in Brazil. Nat. Clim. Chang.
2018. [CrossRef]
53. Lovejoy, T.E.; Nobre, C. Amazon Tipping Point. Sci. Adv. 2018, 4. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
54. Costa, M.A.; Rajão, R.; Stabile, M.C.; Azevedo, A.A.; Correa, J.J.E.S.A. Epidemiologically inspired approaches
to land-use policy evaluation: The influence of the Rural Environmental Registry (CAR) on deforestation in
the Brazilian Amazon. Elem. Sci. Anth. 2018, 6. [CrossRef]
55. Fearnside, P.M. Brazilian politics threaten environmental policies. Science 2016, 353, 746–748. [CrossRef]
© 2019 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
30
Article
Spiders in the Web: Understanding the Evolution of
REDD+ in Southwest Ghana
Jan Willem den Besten 1,2,*, Bas Arts 1 and Jelle Behagel 1
1 Forest and Nature Conservation Policy Group, Wageningen University and Research Centre (WUR),
6708 PB Wageningen, The Netherlands; bas.arts@wur.nl (B.A.); jelle.behagel@wur.nl (J.B.)
2 International Union for Conservation of Nature National Committee of The Netherlands,
Plantage Middenlaan 2K, 1018 DD Amsterdam, The Netherlands
* Correspondence: janwillem.denbesten@iucn.nl; Tel.: +31-681498173
Received: 22 November 2018; Accepted: 17 January 2019; Published: 2 February 2019
Abstract: The implementation of the global programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation
and Forest Degradation in developing countries, and the role of Conservation, Sustainable
Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks (REDD+) is lacks a robust financial
mechanism and is widely criticized for producing too little positive impact for climate, nature,
and people. In many countries with tropical forests however, a variety of REDD+ projects continue to
develop on the ground. This paper fills in some of the gaps in our understanding of the dynamic
relation between global policymaking and implementation of REDD+ on the ground. Using the
introduction of REDD+ in Southwest Ghana as an example, we apply a practice-based approach to
analyze the different roles that local actors and global-local intermediaries played in the introduction
of REDD+. Our results show a more balanced picture than polarized debates at the global levels
suggest. The logic of practice explains how REDD+ was translated to the local situation. Global actors
took a lead but depended on local actors to make REDD+ work. Together, they integrated elements of
existing practices that helped REDD+ ‘land’ locally but also transformed REDD+ globally to resemble
such local practices. REDD+ initiatives absorbed elements from established community-based
conservation, forest restoration, and sustainable agro-forestry practices. The evolution of REDD+ in
Ghana reflects global trends to integrate REDD+ with landscape approaches.
Keywords: REDD+; practice-based approach; global-local nexus; forest and climate policy; Ghana
1. Introduction
Over the last decade, Reducing Emissions fromDeforestation and Forest Degradation in developing
countries, and the role of Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest
Carbon Stocks (REDD+) emerged as an international effort to fight tropical deforestation and to
mobilize finance for reducing CO2 emissions based on avoided deforestation and forest degradation.
It developed from a daring proposal in 2005 at the 11th Conference of Parties (COP) at the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to a key component of the 2015 Paris
Agreement. The 2013Warsaw Frameworkwas particularly important because it provided guidelines on
monitoring through remote sensing and ground-based observations. Subsequently, the Paris agreement
created the basis for REDD+ countries to attract investments from donor nations and private sector
actors through zero-deforestation policies and carbon markets linked to the national climate action
plans or Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) of REDD+ countries [1–5].
REDD+ developed because it was seen to be a legitimate climate mitigation option that involved
developing countries in climate mitigation with promises to benefit local communities and biodiversity
conservation [6]. Over time, the introduction of REDD+ has resulted in a plethora of REDD+ initiatives.
REDD+ has a strong market share in the voluntary carbon space and bilateral and multilateral
Forests 2019, 10, 117; doi:10.3390/f10020117 www.mdpi.com/journal/forests31
Forests 2019, 10, 117
programs have pledged billions of USD to REDD+ preparations including 100 million to Ghana [7].
Given this flexibility, REDD+ is considered to take place in a ‘global-local nexus’ of forest governance [8].
The global-local nexus combines the qualities of multi-level governance—that highlights how policies
are connected across global, national, and local levels—with an emphasis on how networks of actors
shape policy more horizontally as well [9,10].
The global-local nexus has not received much academic attention yet in forest policy. Selected
studies do study how global, national, and local levels together affect forest policy [9–11]. These studies
highlight the specific interactions that occur between different levels of governance. In the case of
REDD+, such studies often include calls for better inclusion of local actors and coordination across
levels [10,11], amongst others. Other studies limit themselves to the interactions between global
and domestic levels of governance more specifically [12–14], mostly focusing on the effectiveness of
international efforts—including REDD+—to influence forest policies on the ground. However, studies
that focus both explicitly on the global-local nexus and on how actors actively move from one level to
another are hard to find. The few studies that do so emphasize that interactions amongst governance
actors produce specific practices that are highly sensitive to social-ecological context [15–17].
Critics REDD+ argue that projects fail to be sensitive to both global aspirations and local needs.
First, the demand for REDD+ projects that produce emission reductions is relatively small. Reasons
include the slump in global carbon prices due to the post-2008 economic slowdown and the failure
of the Parties to the UNFCCC to agree on a financial architecture for REDD+. Second, REDD+
is viewed by some as a false solution that deflects attention from the need for companies and
governments in the industrial world to take a lead in decarbonizing the economy and places too
much responsibility on local communities. Third, the inclusiveness and effectiveness of REDD+ on
the ground is challenged by critics that fear for the exploitation and further marginalization of local
communities in light of inadequate legal frameworks and a lack of transparency and rule of law [18–23].
Finally, Fletcher et al. [24] argue that conservation markets cannot compete with extractive markets
and will always need additional support in terms of subsidies and regulation.
Responding to critiques of REDD+, Angelsen et al. and others [18,25] argue that REDD+
serves as a discursive resource that is constantly reproduced—and altered—in practice. Indeed,
Turnhout et al. [26] highlight that REDD+ over time has moved from being a carbon-centered,
market-based instrument, to include broader climate mitigation and nature conservation strategies
that focus on co-benefits and landscape approaches. Den Besten et al. [27] illustrated that this
‘evolution’ of REDD+ takes place in the global-local nexus where actors and ideas travel across
levels: the capacity building and learning activities of local REDD+ piloting and testing informed
REDD+ policy development at the global level. This contributed to the prioritization of inclusive and
extensive REDD+ preparations and governance development, ahead of possible future carbon finance
mechanisms [6,28].
Ghana is a prominent REDD+ country that has witnessed one of the highest deforestation rates in
the world [29]. In 2010, 21.7% of land or 4,940,000 hectares was covered by forest [29]. Deforestation is
a critical environmental and economic issue and Ghana. Since 1990, the country has lost more than
33.7% of its forests [29], costing the forest sector an estimated USD $500 million [30]. Subsequently,
Ghana received a lot of attention from REDD+ donors and programs. At the same time, it is a country
where challenges regarding land rights and inclusive governance by some were seen to complicate the
implementation of REDD+ [31]. Despite pledges and commitments from REDD+ donors, relatively
little of these funds are shown to reach actors at the lower levels of governance [7]. Early REDD+
actions in Ghana have nevertheless contributed to a strong REDD+ commitment as part of the country’s
INDC in the context of the Paris agreement [32].
In this article, we show that both global-local intermediaries and local actors have played a key
role in the evolving meaning and practice of REDD+ in Ghana, often with limited funding on the
ground and in areas where the challenges in terms of land and tenure rights were great. To better
understand how the global idea of REDD+ was increasingly shaped by local REDD+ initiatives and
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practices, this article focuses on the process of REDD+ introduction in Southwest (SW) Ghana between
2007 and 2017. We apply a practice-based approach [15,33] to analyze how actors across governance
scales shape the meaning of REDD+ and how key elements of REDD+ were introduced in practice.
2. Materials and Methods
When analyzing global forest policy, many studies have generated useful insights into the roles
that global actors—including governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), development
agencies, and companies—play on higher levels of governance [6,33–36]. These studies discuss
how actors may form new and sometimes unexpected alliances in diplomatic processes [37] and
subsequently form coalitions that support new forest discourses, including REDD+. At the same
time, these studies often fail to explain how local community members exactly respond to new ideas,
policies, and programs in their daily activities and how they relate to the actors designing these policies
and programs and how individual actors can operate at multiple governance levels.
To flesh out how local levels of forest governance contribute to global policy development, we
need to better understand how the agency of actors is shaped in these contexts [15]. Practice-based
approaches explore how actors shape their ideas, identities and behaviors in the context of social
practices. In particular, they emphasize that reality—and thus also change—emerges from our practical
engagement with it [15]. Practices can be broadly defined as routinized behaviors where meaning and
action are entwined [33,38]. Actors are situated in these practices. Their ideas, identities, and behavior
are shaped as they reproduce the practice of which they are part [39,40]. Practices are therefore not
only just ‘entities’ but also ‘performances’ [15,33] of which actors are an active part: as they perform
practices, they simultaneously change practices over time.
Practices are not restricted to a single place. They emerge in one place and can travel over time and
space, including across a global-local nexus. To understand this mobility of practice, Shove et al. [33]
identify three key elements that make up a practice: meaning, competences, and materiality. Meaning
includes images and ideas that form the emotional, motivational and normative components of
practice. Competences include technical knowledge, know-how and skills that people have or need
to perform the practice. Materiality includes physical and technological attributes that are part of
society, such as machines, cooking stoves, utensils [33]. These elements are thought to give unity to
a practice: when their links are strengthened, the practice persists and when their links are broken the
practice dies out. Change can mean that the link between two elements (e.g., meaning and competence)
persists while the link with a third element (e.g., materiality) is broken. For our analysis, we use the
operationalization of the conceptual framework of Shove et al. [33] by Arts et al. [41]. They interpret
meaning as ideas and discourses; competences as standards and procedures; and materiality as
technologies and resources.
When practices arrive in a certain place, people unpack them and have the agency to fit them to
the local situation [33]. When actors do so, they can change elements and combine them in new ways
with the elements of other practices. This ability of actors to change practices within specific situations
is called ‘situated agency’ [40]. It means that actors have the freedom to change practices, not so much
because they are autonomous agents, but more so because they are part of the practices that they find
themselves in [40]. Accordingly, they have a certain freedom and agency to improvise on existing
practices. This improvisation is often done by recombining existing elements of practice, also known as
institutional ‘bricolage’: “a process through which people, consciously and un-consciously, assemble
or reshape institutional arrangements, drawing on whatever materials and resources are available,
regardless of their original purpose” ([42], p4).
We apply the practice-based approach [33,40] and the idea of ‘bricolage’ [42] to the case of the
introduction of REDD+ in SW Ghana. Doing so, we explore how REDD+ ‘traveled’ to this area as a set
of elements of practice. The practice-based approach makes it possible to analyze how actors received,
interpreted, and adjusted REDD+ in SW Ghana to their local practice. By dissecting REDD+ into
the materiality, competencies and meaning as elements, it was possible to assess how these elements
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combined with elements of other, existing practices as part of the local uptake of REDD+. The actors
reconfigured elements via their situated agency in existing practices in the unpacking, influencing,
and re-aligning of the elements of REDD+. We focused in particular on how groups of actors sought
to introduce new elements of practice in existing routines and practices of forest management and
community-based conservation.
We collected data on the introduction of REDD+ in the cocoa growing landscape in the High
Forest Zone in SW Ghana from 2009 to 2016. (see Figure 1). Ghana has both seen high rates of
deforestation [29] and the development of a variety of REDD+ initiatives. Between 2009 and 2016,
the first author helped organize several dialogues, multi-stakeholder consultations and knowledge
sharing initiatives while working for the International Union for Conservation of Nature National
(IUCN) and the IUCN National Committee in the Netherlands (IUCN-NL). This provided context and
contacts with various actors with different views and interests in the introduction of REDD+ in Ghana.
It also enabled us to observe interactions of actors with different roles, expertise and expectations with
regard to the effectiveness and fairness REDD+. The ‘web of actors’ are described below following
the observations of the first author as one of these actors (representing IUCN). A non-authoritative
graphic representation is given in Figure 2.
Figure 1. Map with main research area in SW Ghana highlighted.
34
Forests 2019, 10, 117
 
Figure 2. Graphic representation of the relations between various actors of the web of actors of
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in developing countries, and the
role of Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks’
(REDD+) implementation of SW Ghana as observed by the first author. Actors are color-coded as
follows: Red = spiders in the web; Yellow = REDD+ implementation working groups; Blue = global
actor; Orange =-national actor; Green = local actor.
To understand the role of global-local intermediaries in Ghana, it was important for the authors
to interact with actors working on REDD+ implementation at the national level. In Ghana, the Forestry
Commission (FC) of the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources (MLNR) functions as the focal
point for REDD+. The Climate Change Unit functions as the secretariat of the multi-stakeholder
REDD + Technical Working Group (NRTWG) that coordinates Ghana’s overall REDD+ development
process. Government, private sector, civil society and other organizations are represented in this
group. The NRTWG gives advice and guidance on all REDD+ processes (FCPF, 2012). Parts of
REDD+ are driven by the Natural Resources Advisory Council (ENRAC), the Natural Resources and
Environmental Governance Technical Coordination Committee (NREG TCC) that is responsible for
the Forest Investment Program and the coordination of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF).
Actors in Ghana working with these institutions at the national level, as well as inter-governmental
development organizations, conservation and more critical NGOs were interviewed as part of this
research. These actors were directly involved in both the international REDD+ engagements and
discussions, and the translation of these concepts to the local situation in Ghana. These actors were
operating at the global-local nexus, but not in isolation. They worked directly or indirectly with actors
at the local levels. Men and women were for example involved in the translation, interpretation and
implementation of REDD+ at the local level in the Wassa-Amenfi-West District (WAW). As a case study,
we interviewed such actors in WAW and asked them how they viewed, interacted and worked with
national and international actors. Locally, members of local settler communities, the District Assembly,
traditional authorities, the Forestry Services Division of the Forestry Commission, members of the
Community Resource Management Areas (CREMA), companies, local entrepreneurs, representatives
of youth and women groups and members of the local multi-stakeholder REDD+ working group
were interviewed.
Data collection consisted of three stages. A total of 35 Interviews took place. First, 20 interviews
were conducted with local residents of three villages in the WAW where stakeholder consultations on
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REDD+ had taken place. These interviews included several group interviews with local smallholder
farmers with informal land tenure arrangements. Most of them had been exposed to REDD+
information and awareness raising activities. A few interviewees were local chiefs and two farmers
owned larger plots of land. In addition to group and individual interviews in the villages, group
interviews were also conducted with one of the CREMAs in WAW and the REDD+ multi-stakeholder
platform in the District. The District head and a professional working for the District Assembly
were also interviewed. The villages had in the past been involved with various community-based
conservation initiatives, such as when Globally Significant Biodiversity Areas were identified. In these
initiatives, as well as during the introduction of REDD+, the Forest Services Department of the Forestry
Commission of the Government of Ghana played an important liaising role between global NGOs,
local communities, and the District Assembly. Second, 15 interviews and various additional informal
conversations took place with NGOs, government agencies, and companies that were involved in the
introduction or awareness raising REDD+ in SW Ghana. Third, various REDD+ preparatory meetings,
dialogues and discussions were observed, and meeting reports studied.
Transcripts of interviews and collected documents and field notes were first coded for categories
such as prevailing ideas about forest dependency; indications of actors that presented information and
concerns of local actors at the national and global levels; indications of practices and activities that
helped local actors in socio-economic development and indications of uptake or change of elements
of REDD+ introduced. In a second round of coding, data was analyzed for the three elements of
practice, i.e., meaning, competences, and materiality. These initial rounds were then followed by
several iterations to structure the results as they are presented below.
3. Results
3.1. The Introduction of REDD+ Practice in SW Ghana
3.1.1. Meaning: Ideas and Discourse
The global meaning of REDD+ is underpinned by the idea that deforestation is a major contributor
to climate change because of the CO2 emissions it causes. Governments, NGOs, Inter-Governmental
Organizations (IGOs), companies, and research organizations that helped develop REDD+ at the global
level believed that that it was imperative that tropical forests should be protected for climate but also
for the biodiversity they harbored and for the local livelihoods they supported [4,5,27]. These ideas are
supported by global discourses that assume that addressing deforestation will be an effective, fast,
and financially efficient way to help global CO2 emissions to peak and subsequently fall [43,44].
In Ghana, organizations that were involved in early REDD+ introductory activities included
the Nature Conservation Research Center (NCRC), Forest Trends, Rainforest Alliance, Katoomba
Group, Conservation Alliance, SNV, Tropenbos Ghana, University of Ghana, World Bank Ghana, Price
Waterhouse Coopers (PWC), Permean Global, the Rockefeller Foundation, and Form International.
Government agencies such as the Ghana Forestry Commission (FC) that hosted the National REDD+
Secretariat and led the development of Ghana’s National REDD+ Strategy played an important
role [38,45]. These actors had in common that they worked across the local and global levels of REDD+
development. In particular the non-governmental actors were active in introducing the idea of REDD+
in SW Ghana. Where introductions took place, these organizations generally focused on people and
organizations in locations where they were already involved in community-based conservation and
sustainable agro-forestry practices.
3.1.2. Materiality: Technology and Resources
Globally, the introduction of REDD+ was closely connected to the emergence and development
of remote sensing equipment to monitor forest cover change in ever-greater detail, and information
technology (IT) to quantify these changes in terms of loss of carbon to the atmosphere. The emergence
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of carbon markets after the Kyoto Protocol that went into effect in 2005 made it possible to credit
reduced deforestation and sell the emission reduction permits. Advances in development of use
of increasingly complex computer programs also made the presentation of data in maps possible.
These made up the materiality of REDD+. The maps of forest cover change and fluxes in carbon stocks
became powerful tools to promote the idea and meaning behind REDD+. The combining of these
elements clearly strengthened the unity of REDD+ as a practice.
In Ghana, like in many countries, access to forest resources has been unequally distributed.
This instilled widespread concern about the access to REDD+ benefits for different groups. REDD+
benefit sharing therefore became a key topic of debate when local actors were engaged in REDD+
preparations. In Ghana, it was mostly official institutions and prominent NGOs that used and
adapted remote sensing technology for local biomass monitoring, Carbon stock mapping and the
development of national and sub-national MRV systems [46]. Additionally, the economic aspect of
REDD+ materiality did not materialize quickly at the local levels. Challenges around land and resource
ownership rights and unequal access of communities to forest benefits meant that the translation
of Carbon finance into concrete REDD+ projects with benefit sharing was slow. In the meantime,
most public REDD+ funds flowed to large, government-led initiatives that deployed relatively few
resources piloting and testing [7].
3.1.3. Competences: Standards and Procedures
Global policy development of REDD+ introduced standards and procedures for establishing
deforestation rates and baselines for measuring and accounting carbon. New systems for the monitoring,
verification, and reporting (MRV) of reduced CO2 emissions through reduced deforestation,
degradation and through forest restoration, made it possible to translate these data into carbon credits.
In SW Ghana, competencies to use Geographic Information Systems (GIS), remote sensing, carbon and
biomass mapping were mostly introduced and applied by global-local intermediaries such as IUCN,
Forest Trends, Katoomba Group and Nature Conservation Research Centre (NCRC) [47]. They worked
with the GFC and the Centre for Remote Sensing and Geographic Information Services of the University
of Ghana. Local actors were only in some cases involved for on-the-ground verification and to achieve
greater accuracy and inclusion [48]. Maps showing trends of deforestation and established baselines
were important to prioritize REDD+ action, and to have a reference against which it could be established
that REDD+ action would be additional [49]. The mastering of these skills and the resulting calculations
and mappings helped organizations in Ghana to promote the argumentation behind REDD+ (meaning)
but also made it possible to attract REDD+ finance from international donors. It illustrates that the
possibilities for the elements of ideas, materiality, and competences to be linked, contributed to the
creation of unity of REDD+ practice.
3.1.4. The Role of Global-Local Intermediary Organziations
The introduction of REDD+ was dominated by organizations that served as intermediary
between global and local levels of forest governance. These intermediaries were often NGOs that
prioritized the introduction of REDD+ information and ideas to local actors. Technologies, resources,
standards, and procedures were however more likely to be overlooked at lower levels of governance.
An additional challenge for REDD+ was that REDD+ intermediaries initially did not connect to actors
and spaces that represented the larger industrial complex behind deforestation. The dominating idea
was that local communities had to be in charge of, and benefit from, REDD+, even when REDD+
introductions were not considered to be truly bottom-up. REDD+ intermediaries had an advantage
over local actors because they had access to global ideas and knowledge about REDD+, they took
a lead in the disbursement of information, and they dominated the recruitment of participants
locally. The following sections will detail how these discrepancies were (partially) addressed while
REDD+ evolved.
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3.2. The Unpacking and Evolution of REDD+ in Southwest Ghana
In this section, we assess how the ‘global-local intermediaries’ introduced REDD+ and how
REDD+ evolved by integrating elements of existing local practices. The results show how different
practices link to and follow up on each other, as well as the role that various actors play in this ongoing
process of change. We identified several practices that were empirically linked to REDD+ and to
REDD+ working groups by the actors in the field. The most important types of practices thus found
were (1) community-based conservation; (2) tree planting; (3) agroforestry and sustainable agriculture;
and (4) integrated landscape approaches. Each type of practice is analyzed below.
3.2.1. REDD+ and Community-Based Conservation
Meaning
The ideas behind REDD+ resonated well with local meanings in SW Ghana. A total of 18 out of
20 women and men that we interviewed in WAW confirmed that forests and trees were important
for their socio-economic development. Many also believed that forests helped buffer against heat,
droughts, floods, and disturbed seasons. The idea that protecting forests contributed to a healthy
environmental change resonated well with prevailing, local, holistic views of forests as their social,
cultural, spiritual, and physical domain [50]. Most respondents related their personal experiences with
climate variability to climate change and believed that they contributed to extreme weather events
through their own involvement in tree-cutting. This belief and understanding was probably partly
a result of the awareness raising and information activities organized as part of REDD+ preparations
and earlier conservation practices but some respondents also referred to information about climate
change that they received through the media. Local people seemed perceptive even if they were not in
a position to fully assess how their contributions stood in comparison to other global forces driving
climate change. A local farmer in WAW for example said:
“In the dry season the trees preserve water. They give us strength because the trees give
us clean air . . . they prevent high temperatures and heavy rains, we need to protect them
so we can develop the area well. Streams will (then) never dry up. . . . If we cut the forest,
rainfall will reduce so in order to get rainfall and promote agriculture, we need to keep
forests intact.”
The global meaning of REDD+ was somewhat less compatible with prevailing assumptions
among local actors about the role that forests played in their socio-economic development. One of
the underpinning ideas of REDD+ social and environmental safeguards is that local communities
will prioritize protecting natural forests because they rely on these forests for food, medicinal plants,
proteins, medicinal herbs, water, and fuel. Our analysis of local responses to REDD+ however suggests
that there is a mismatch between the assumptions behind REDD+ and those of local communities.
As we will see in the following sections, they are often inclined to give priority to development
opportunities “outside” the forest.
Materiality
REDD+ initiatives in the study period saw little trickling down of forest and carbon monitoring
technologies to the lower levels. Additionally, the introduction of REDD+ carbon payments hardly
materialized locally while carbon finance from donors and multilateral initiatives mostly flowed
to national programs and agencies. Yet, the prospect of possible economic benefits from REDD+
projects created opportunities for people to think about the role that the marked could have in the
management of their forest landscapes. It put the spotlight on prevailing local issues of inequality and
the experience of people that they had mostly been barred from protected forests. Local interviewees
therefore, when asked about opportunities for economic development from forests, often mentioned
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options “outside” the forest, such as agriculture, agro-forestry development, and tree-planting. In the
words of a professional working for a local conservation NGO:
“People might rather not have forests because they are disillusioned with the way in which
things used to be managed.”
The Secretary of a Community Resource Management Area in WAW summed up that REDD+
sounded great but would not be able to materialize for some time due to persisting tenure insecurity
and inadequate benefit sharing arrangements:
“Because of REDD+ we know what we can achieve one day.”
The introduction of REDD+ forced actors engaged in community-based conservation to consider
the challenges that local communities faced in receiving formal recognition of informal land tenure and
ownership arrangements. Statutory and traditional land tenure arrangements in Ghana overlapped
and often conflicted. They were virtually nowhere gazetted, and informal tenure arrangements of
settler farmers in SW Ghana did not have any formal legal protection at all [13,31]. Even though the
introduction of REDD+ benefits did not materialize, the introduction of REDD+ ideas and discourses
helped create renewed urgency for the issues of tenure and rights.
Competences
REDD+ introduced competencies to use forest and carbon monitoring technology as well as
standards and procedures for establishing deforestation rates and baselines, and for the measuring
and accounting of forest carbon. As these technologies were mostly used by national-level agencies,
these competencies did not play a direct role in the reconfiguration of REDD+ at the local levels.
The focus on equity and the social and legal dynamics of REDD+ however did trigger a demand for
an altogether different set of competencies. Standards and procedures had to be developed to ensure
social fairness and avoid further exclusion and marginalization of local communities. Here, something
interesting happened. The formulation, adoption and prioritization of environmental and social
safeguards as part of international REDD+ program and policy development was a direct response
to concerns voiced by local actors and their global-local intermediaries [27]. Support for a social and
environmental focus was particularly urgent in SW Ghana where formal and traditional legal systems
contradicted and where local tenure was considered insufficiently protected by law [13]. The very
early REDD+ piloting that global REDD+ had made possible, helped change global REDD+ in such
a way, that it created a demand for standards and procedures for the strengthening and safeguarding
of social and environmental benefits [27]. In many cases, local actors were already acquainted with
these kinds of standards, because they had been developed as part of earlier conservation practices.
The introduction of REDD+ created fresh “demand” for competencies and procedures to ensure
social and environmental safeguards, and the deployment of these local competencies contributed to
the development of REDD+ in new directions. In SW Ghana for example, existing community-based
conservation practices put a lot of emphasis on the importance that forests played in the social,
economic, and cultural lives of local people. Participatory research in WAW showed how cash and
non-cash use of forest products helped forest-dependent communities to move out of poverty in the
long term [51]. REDD+ consultations and interviews with local men and women in the same areas
however suggested that socio-economic development could not come from protecting forests alone.
Many respondents believed that the future lay in raising standards of agriculture and tree-planting as
well as income generation activities “outside” the forest such as tourism and jobs in the city. In the
words of local women living near the Globally Significant Biodiversity Area (GSBA) in WAW:
“We need knowledge for planting crops, for agricultural improvement, production and
output of agriculture of our livelihoods for example not to burn our fields, we need the
technological know how to improve that.”
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“I will tell that before we benefited from the forests and now we don’t get benefits. So maybe
we can get additional support from the government. It is best is for someone to come and
teach us techniques to multiply agriculture production.”
In short, the outcomes of REDD+ stakeholder consultations in areas where global-local
intermediaries had worked on community-based conservation generally pointed at a local need
for standards and procedures to redress unequal forest and land access rights, and for competencies to
create economic value from the forest areas. The following sections will show how different practices
of REDD+ integrated responses to these local demands for particular competencies by building on
established practices such as tree planting and sustainable agro-forestry.
3.2.2. REDD+ and Tree Planting Practices
Meaning
Local meanings behind tree planting resonated well with REDD+ meaning. People felt that
bringing back trees on deforested and degraded lands were good for themselves and for nature. It also
helped them buffer against the impacts of extreme weather. For local people, it was easier to see
that they could reap benefits from planting trees than from not cutting naturally growing trees that
someone else might cut anyway. In areas where deforestation took place and where individual land
rights were not well-defined, it would be difficult to attribute reduced deforestation to individual
action and individual people in order to distribute benefits as a reward [52]. The perception was also
different because local people could claim rights over planted trees but not over naturally growing trees.
Cutting trees was a way for farmers to affirm their right over land tenure and cocoa farmers were afraid
to let trees mature in their cocoa farms because licensed loggers were allowed to harvest naturally
growing trees, causing damage to crops in the process [28,31]. Reserves or forests nominally owned
by traditional authorities were generally treated as common pool resources, resulting in widespread
illegal deforestation and forest degradation [31].
Materiality
In Ghana, tree planting could more easily be translated into material gains, because each person
that planted and took care of a certain number of trees, would be able to receive incentives or
compensation, and could also use other products of the tree. As local farmers said:
“Local people don’t want to invest in not using forest for 20 years. If they plant trees such as
rubber, they will at least receive income at some point.”
A local timber company explained:
“For example, in this REDD+ area, we can give them (local smallholders) incentives to
plant trees and then maybe go further, to help them establish small scale saw mills where
they process the wood for charcoal, preserve the wood for their daily lives, timber for their
domestic use, and then to sell to the local market.”
As REDD+ was negotiated at the global levels, many campaign NGOs had criticized this
component of the scope of REDD+ out of concern that large scale plantation companies could access
REDD+ finance [27]. The above quotes of local actors illustrate that the options for “forest restoration”
could indeed be used by plantation companies, but that it also created opportunities to address
the needs of local actors. This potential for tree planting and plantation management was strongly
represented in early REDD+ proposals and plans in Ghana. The planting of community woodlots
for charcoal and fuelwood production, for example, was a main focus area for the REDD+ Readiness
Preparation Proposal of the Government of Ghana. The World Bank Forest Investment Program
(FIP) and the Government of Ghana also looked into possibilities to support forest restoration and
plantation management under REDD+ in Ghana [53]. The FIP was set up to bridge early phases of
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REDD+ readiness preparations with future private sector investments [27]. In Ghana, it financed
a timber plantation initiative by the Dutch company Form International, a company that had already
independently produced Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS)-certified REDD+ Carbon Credits in their
inclusive and sustainable plantation program in Ghana.
Competences
Tree planting practices in Ghana also included important competencies for the clarification of
rights that combined well with REDD+. The rights that local people held over planted trees were
laid down in the constitution of Ghana [54,55]. In many areas in SW Ghana, local farmers did not
know how to assert this right or were not even aware of it, but global-local intermediaries introduced
standards and procedures to create awareness and recognition of these rights. Already before REDD+
introductions started earnestly, global-local intermediaries such as IUCN had worked with local actors
on the clarification and formalization of this right. They had raised awareness among local bureaucrats
and smallholders about existing regulations on the ownership of planted trees, and had developed
tree registration procedures with local authorities [56]. The certainty over rights, the prospect of
future returns in timber, and possible carbon payments triggered small NGOs and land owners to
start small plantations, even though national and local REDD+ monitoring systems were not yet in
place. One local farmer in WAW for example was not part of a formal REDD+ project and would alone
never be able to produce verified carbon credits. The costs of most certification were so high that it
was generally accepted that hundreds of smallholders would have to be aggregated to have the scale
needed to carry such investments and generate enough carbon credits to be able to recover upfront
investments. He had set up his own mini plantation anyway:
“I heard a lot on the radio about the money that we could receive for trees. When I decided
to have my own little tree plantation early on, many people in my village thought I was
crazy, but now that the trees are maturing, they see that I am already reaping benefits, for the
community and for my family, regardless of any payments I might receive from carbon
or not.”
Additionally, larger-scale plantation initiatives and policies included provisions to protect the
rights of local people and make the sharing of benefits possible. One such provision was the Modified
Taungya System (MTS), a forestry system that involved inter-planting trees with agricultural crops.
Respondents regularly suggested that the competences developed under MTS served as an example
how benefit sharing could be possible under REDD+.
3.2.3. REDD+, Agro-Forestry, and Sustainable Agriculture Practices
Meaning
As the development of REDD+ progressed in Ghana, its focus gradually shifted to sustainable
agroforestry systems and tree planting. Smallholder agro-forestry cocoa production had been a main
contributor to the gradual degradation and destruction of biodiversity-rich and high-carbon rainforest
in SW Ghana [57]. With a main focus on carbon and avoiding deforestation, the global meaning of
REDD+ nevertheless converged well with the meaning of sustainable agro-forestry practices. REDD+
proponents developed programs that focused on increasing per-hectare cocoa yields, improving
input management and certified crops. These approaches shared ideas with REDD+ on reducing
deforestation, reducing CO2 emissions, and creating outcomes for local communities.
Materiality
Creating economic return from sustainable agro-forestry presented REDD+ with an alternative
for carbon finance. The one-million USD ‘Climate Cocoa Partnership for REDD+ Preparation’ of
Rainforest Alliance International and trading company Olam International in the Juabeso-Bia District
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in SW Ghana for example made that shift. The project focused on generating increased income from
sustainable cocoa production and biodiversity protection through bringing back shade trees and forest
protection. A Landscape Management Board consisting of community representatives was set up.
The project achieved positive outcomes for communities and biodiversity, but it did not produce
verified CO2 emissions. In the end, the project was not a success because it cost more than the premium
sale of sustainable cocoa could deliver. There was also some misunderstanding between the different
parties whether REDD+ credits would be generated. The project however showed that the materiality
of reducing Carbon emissions and deforestation in (agro-) forestry practices combined well with the
idea of REDD+ to address social, environmental and climate objectives simultaneously. This new
combination of elements developed also internationally under the term Climate Smart Agriculture
(CSA). FAO [58] defines CSA as “an agriculture that sustainably increases productivity, resilience
(adaptation), reduces/removes greenhouse gases (mitigation) while enhancing the achievement”.
Competences
Sustainable agriculture and agro-forestry practices presented REDD+ with standards and
procedures that helped farmers create more return from their fields and competencies to improve their
rights. In established sustainable agro-forestry practices, smallholder cocoa farmers were trained in
competencies to apply fertilizers and other farm inputs. These meant that these famers could increase
their income and have more stable harvests. The planting of trees for shade was also encouraged,
and this contributed to the halting of deforestation and the protection of biodiversity. Additionally,
it could, if needed, be translated in reduced CO2 emissions and increased carbon sequestration.
Sustainable cocoa agro-forestry presented REDD+ with standards and procedures to achieve social
and environmental REDD+ objectives such as increased income, gender inclusiveness, improved input
management and soil treatment. It fitted the need for REDD+ to diversify income streams.
3.2.4. Integrated Landscape Approaches to REDD+ in SW Ghana
Meaning
After 2010 and 2013, global-local REDD+ intermediaries in Ghana collaborated to develop
landscape approaches to REDD+. These approaches integrated ideas about conservation, inclusive
governance, soil and water conservation, sustainable agricultural intensification and the re-planting
of shade trees as a means to reduce CO2 emissions from the landscape and achieve additional social
and environmental benefits. In Ghana, a civil society initiative of NGOs, traditional leaders, cocoa
trading companies, farmer cooperatives, insurance companies, consultancy firms, certifying agencies
and scientists worked with the country’s REDD+ Secretariat and Cocoa Board to develop Ghana’s
‘Emission Reductions Program for the Cocoa Forest Mosaic Landscape’ [59,60]. Leading actors in this
movement were also actively involved in global trends to integrate elements of REDD+, sustainable
agro-forestry, and Climate Smart Agriculture in landscape and jurisdictional approaches [61]. During
that time, the landscape approach became a dominant REDD+ discourse globally. It added the idea
of territoriality, which according to some actors is problematic because landscape boundaries do not
correlate to administrative-political boundaries [12]. The landscape approach nevertheless provided
a useful concept that helped in the linking of the elements of materiality and competencies and thus in
reproducing REDD+ towards new directions.
Materiality
With the broadening of the scope of REDD+ landscape approaches, the element of carbon
monitoring and accounting found new connection with other elements of REDD+ practice. Whereas
project-based REDD+ did not “land” due to faltering carbon markets, the scale of large multilateral
and donor REDD+ finance arrangements fitted well with landscape and jurisdictional approaches
to REDD+. In Ghana, the Cocoa Forest Landscape Mosaic program successfully applied for funding
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from the World Bank Carbon Fund. On-the-ground preparations for REDD+ in the cocoa sector were
a continuous process where focus gradually shifted from individual projects and carbon finance to
creating economic value from climate smart agriculture in a landscape approach. In the words of
a professional working on the program:
“Finally (after years of REDD+ preparations) we sat down with the community and looked
at the landscape. And we decided there was no play for REDD+ because carbon finance
could not come from reduced deforestation alone. We therefore decided to go for Climate
Smart Cocoa.”
In 2014, this cocoa landscape program managed to secure the commitment of at least 40 million
USD in funding from the World Bank’s Carbon Fund to demonstrate REDD+ on a landscape scale [62].
In the next section, we further explain the success of this particular program and the finance it was
able to attract.
Competences
The Cocoa Forest Landscape Mosaic program in Ghana was built on a thorough analysis of
climate vulnerability in the cocoa sector and the suitability of soils for cocoa production across the
landscape. The introduction of procedures for better cocoa planting techniques, farm input use and the
planting of shade trees would be crucial to maintain soil productivity and lift farmers out of poverty.
Where soils were sub-optimal and climate models were unfavorable, cocoa would have to be taken
out of production altogether. However, another set of procedures focused on social inclusion and the
clarification of rights: the procedures around the rollout of the Community Resource Management Area
(CREMA) model. The CREMA standards and procedures proved a good match with the materiality
and meaning of REDD+ landscape approaches.
CREMA became a central component of the development of the Government of Ghana’s REDD+
policies and they contributed to the enthusiasm of international donors in the Cocoa Forest Landscape
Mosaic program [45,46]. CREMA represented a set of standards and procedures for the devolution
of forest resource rights to local communities that had legal backing in Ghana’s National Forest
and Wildlife Policy [63,64]. NGOs, community groups, and government organizations had years of
experience with CREMA as part of community-based conservation and wildlife management [28,65].
In the early 2010s, it became a central element of many REDD+ pilots. In some cases, such as in
the Juabeso-Bia project, similar governance structures were designed, modelled on CREMA [66].
For the Cocoa Forest Landscape Mosaic program, CREMA could function as a mini landscape within
which the merits of a landscape approach could be combined with the rigor of REDD+ monitoring
and verification of reduced deforestation. The interventions and monitoring could subsequently be
replicated in new CREMAs and eventually cover the larger landscape. In this way, CREMA was
made instrumental in the development of standards and procedures needed to implement REDD+ in
a landscape approach.
4. Discussion
The introduction of REDD+ in SW Ghana was not a clear-cut, linear process in which local
actors simply implemented global ideas and aspirations. REDD+ was initiated by public, private
and non-profit actors that worked across global and local governance scales. They chose sites and
got involved in the introduction of REDD+ with local actors with whom they were already involved
with in established community-conservation practices. Our practice-based analysis shows how these
local actors and global-local intermediaries renegotiated REDD+ and helped shape the evolution
of REDD+ at the local, and in return, at the global level. The CREMA model for example, with its
procedures for multi-stakeholder collaboration, community consensus building, decision-making,
and the formalization of rights, was integrated in various REDD+ initiatives and served to illustrate to
international audiences how REDD+ could work at the implementation level [60,63,67].
43
Forests 2019, 10, 117
Applying and refining the framework for studying practices of Shove et al. [33] helped us
understand how actors involved in the local introduction of REDD+ combined REDD+ meaning,
materiality, and competences with elements of local practices. First, REDD+ ideas about the importance
to protect forests resonated well with local ideas and beliefs about the important role that forests played
in livelihoods and cultural development of local actors. These ideas prevailed in established practices
and, as a result, these practices provided entry points for the introduction of REDD+. Prevailing ideas
about the importance of ecologically healthy forests for example helped people realize the assertion of
REDD+ that forests also play important roles in reducing the impacts of extreme weather events and
climate change. The introduction of REDD+ in Ghana however also exposed divergence between global
and local understanding of the role that forests can play in the development of community benefits.
Specifically, global ideas on REDD+ underplayed the trade-offs between social and environmental
interests in local practice.
The introduction of REDD+ and concerns over social issues created a demand for competences
for the organizing of multi-stakeholder engagement, participatory decision-making making, the
formalization of rights, and the development of benefit distribution mechanisms. Global negotiations
over REDD+ policies and programs started to prioritize social, environmental and governance issues
over technical issues of monitoring and this led to the adoption of social and environmental safeguards
at COP15 [27]. This shift in thinking at the global level was at least partly a result of early REDD+
introductions and testing at the local levels, such as in SW Ghana [27]. The reshaping of REDD+ on
the ground happened in interaction with developments at the global levels, and it was the result of
an enactment of REDD+ in the context of established practices in which global-local and local actors
were jointly involved. Therefore, as carbon finance moved to the background, established practices
such as the creation of economic value tree planting, sustainable agro-forestry, and CSA complemented
or replaced this material element of REDD+ practice.
Third, when looking at the material element of REDD+ it transpired that local people welcomed
the introduction of carbon finance or other forms of economic value for forests and that monitoring
was less relevant in the absence of well-functioning global carbon markets. However, they expressed
serious doubts that REDD+ benefits would be effectively and fairly shared among local communities.
Their concern was based on past experiences of being denied their rights over natural resources.
Neither local nor global-local intermediary actors that were involved in the introduction of REDD+ in
SW Ghana considered this the end of REDD+. Instead, at REDD+ introductory and preparatory
meetings, people that were involved in the introduction of REDD+ often stressed that REDD+
created opportunities to put concerns over rights and inclusive governance on national and local
political agendas.
Our case of in SW Ghana illustrates that global-local intermediaries played an important role in
the development of REDD+ pilots. Local community members, local government agencies, and local
private sector actors depend on these global-local intermediary actors to provide ideas and information
about new technologies, instructions, and skills. Many authors confirm that global policy processes are
a source for ideas and discourses [11,12]. What our research shows is that these global processes equally
depend on the materiality and competences that form the elements of local practice. The global-local
intermediaries that led introductions of REDD+ at the local levels did not only shape the introduction
of REDD+ locally, but also influenced the development of REDD+ at the global levels, together with
actors involved in the introduction of REDD+ in other countries [27]. As early as 2008, and through
2012, lessons from REDD+ introductions, pilots, and dialogues in SW Ghana reached global REDD+
debates [28,31,68–71]. The mobility of REDD+ to move from the local to the international levels
continues to be relevant today, as global negotiations over REDD+ policies and programs are ongoing
along with critical debate about the effectiveness and inclusiveness of REDD+ [24,25].
This channeling of ideas, experiences, competences, information and alternatives up and down
the global-local nexus make the global-local intermediaries look like “spiders” in a web. They take the
lead in initiating REDD+ locally; in choosing sites for REDD+ introduction, and in the recruitment of
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local actors. The spiders dominate the process, manage to maintain their place in the web of networks
and relations along which elements of REDD+ practices travel from the global to new places such as in
SW Ghana. These actors enjoy a position of comparative advantage, having “access” both to local and
global ideas, competencies and materialities. Local actors depended on the decisions and resources of
these global-local intermediaries, who had comparative advantage over them. Global-local actors in
turn also depend on local actors. It was in the joint enactment of established practices with local actors
that they could renegotiate and reshape REDD+. By refining the meaning of REDD+ and by absorbing
and combining materiality and competences from established practices, global-local actors showed
international REDD+ policymakers how REDD+ could work on the ground.
5. Conclusions
Global-local and local actors in SW Ghana continue to develop local interpretations of REDD+
and attract international resources for their initiatives, even while REDD+ is declared “dead” by
some [24]. This shows the importance of understanding of REDD+ as part of the global-local nexus
of governance [7] By considering the connections between forest governance levels and the key role
that both local and local-global actors played, REDD+ is shown to evolve in response to local needs,
rather than simply failing to live up to the first ideas that were articulated at the global policy level.
While none of the resulting REDD+ initiatives in SW Ghana are ‘schoolbook’ examples of reducing
deforestation and forest degradation through carbon finance based on verified emissions reductions,
they are actively changing local practice of tropical forest conservation. Moreover, even when it is too
early to tell if those REDD+ projects or programs managed to create a breakthrough in entrenched
issues of poverty, social exclusion and a lack of rights, we do see increased attention for these issues,
also on a global level.
Ambiguous results do not mean that REDD+ merely reinforced a status quo or contributed to
“business as usual”. Confronted with REDD+, local actors used their situated agency to integrate
the meaning, competences, and materiality of global REDD+ in locally established practices of
conservation, tree planting, agro-forestry, and integrated landscape management. This enabled them to
absorb elements of these practices in REDD+, as they re-negotiated and shaped REDD+ in SW Ghana.
In turn, the intermediary global-local actors that initiated and led these REDD+ introductions acted
like “spiders” in the web between the global and local levels. They channeled ideas, information and
resources from the global to the local levels, chose sites for introduction of REDD+ and recruited local
actors for implementation.
The case illustrates how global policy on REDD+ can reach local levels of governance but also
what the challenges are. Global-local actors worked from an advantageous situation because they had
access to REDD+ ideas and information, techniques and technologies and the necessary competencies
to translate it to the local situation. They did, however, depend on the extent to which local actors could
make REDD+ work on the ground. Local people had agency that was situated in practices that they
are already involved in, and they were the ones to draw on elements which did or did not combine
well with elements of REDD+ practice. One of the most important lessons from the example in SW
Ghana is that global REDD+ design has underestimated the trade-offs between REDD+ effectiveness
to mitigate climate change, to be fair and inclusive, and to halt deforestation and biodiversity loss.
When REDD+ was enacted on the ground, this often translated to interesting initiatives with local
communities that could combine goals of social development, conservation, and climate mitigation.
Whether these local initiatives can in turn provide the basis for a more global answer to political and
economic drivers of deforestation is still an open question.
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Abstract: The need to tackle international drivers of deforestation has long been acknowledged;
but remains little addressed via policy measures. In the European Union (EU), a new policy debate is
emerging around the concept of “embodied deforestation”, which targets EU agricultural commodity
imports as drivers of deforestation. The notion views deforestation as an externality generated
by EU imports associated with tropical deforestation. Our article examines whether this concept
represents a shift in tackling international-level drivers of tropical deforestation within EU policy.
We also examine, from a networked governance perspective, whether this new debate fuels further
fragmentation or rather a move towards a more integrated approach to combating tropical forest loss
within EU policy, and what the implications are for other initiatives, such as the climate change related
“reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation” (REDD+). Our analysis draws on
an extensive analysis of EU policy documents and semi-structured interviews with stakeholders
and EU decision-makers. We find that, despite growing debate around the concept of embodied
deforestation, policy measures necessary to reduce the impact of EU consumption of agricultural
commodities associated with tropical deforestation have not yet been developed. We conclude that
“embodied deforestation” remains more an idea than reality within EU policy to date, with the
burden of responsibility for addressing international deforestation drivers still largely remaining on
developing countries. There is still potential, however, for this debate to lead to a more integrated
approach to tackling tropical deforestation within EU policy, if it comes to be seen, together with
REDD+, as one of a number of linked approaches to EU efforts to combat deforestation.
Keywords: REDD+; European Union; forest policy; deforestation drivers; tropical forests
1. Introduction
The need to tackle drivers of deforestation and forest degradation operating at the international
level has long been recognized [1], but has thus far largely been overlooked by national environmental
policy-makers [2]. However, the issue is now beginning to be actively taken up in policy debates,
including within the European Union (EU), as global trade in agricultural products becomes a more
prominent driver of deforestation [3]. More than half of all deforestation and forest degradation
worldwide is now estimated to be due to the conversion of forestland for commercial agriculture to
meet global demand for food, fuel, and fibre [4]. Global demand for commodities is a major driver
of deforestation in Latin America and Asia in particular, and a significant component of this global
demand originates from within the EU [5]. How developed countries contribute to deforestation
in tropical countries, particularly through importing agricultural commodities, is thus garnering
increased attention, including within the EU.
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A study produced for the European Commission in 2013 [6] (p.iv) estimated, for example, that the
EU is responsible for 10% of global “embodied deforestation”, i.e., deforestation as an externality
in the production, trade or consumption of a good, commodity, or service. Recent declarations at
the international level to reduce or end deforestation, such as the 2014 United Nations (UN) New
York Declaration on Forests, and the Amsterdam Declaration by a number of European governments,
as well as commitments by multinational companies to promote deforestation-free supply chains
and certification schemes, such as the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), are giving further
impetus to policymakers seeking to tackle international consumption patterns that fuel tropical
deforestation. Arguably, one of the first attempts by the EU to decrease the negative impacts of its
consumption on tropical forests was through its 2009 Renewable Energy Directive, which required
the introduction of sustainability criteria [7] to ensure biofuel production did not impact biodiverse
primary forests [8]. The development of EU sustainability criteria was influenced by voluntary
certification schemes, such as the RSPO [9], but both have been criticised for their limited ability to
achieve sustainability in practice [10,11]. These efforts are now increasing, most recently, with adoption
of a European Parliament resolution in 2017, which advocated restrictions on palm oil imports because
of their negative environmental impacts, including adverse impacts on forests [12].
While the sustainability of commodity supply chains is increasingly the focus of both academic
and policy scrutiny, our article analyses how these issues land within an increasingly fragmented global
and EU-level forest governance architecture, with a wide array of initiatives spearheaded by both state
and non-state actors to address tropical deforestation. Another highly visible such initiative is REDD+
(REDD+ stands for: Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing
countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest
carbon stocks in developing countries) under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), which financially compensates developing countries for reducing greenhouse
gas emissions associated with deforestation and forest degradation [13]. REDD+ has been understood
and implemented in a variety of ways by a range of state and non-state actors [14,15]. These include
project-level initiatives, aiming to deliver co-benefits for biodiversity and communities in specific local
contexts [16]; performance-based carbon payments [17,18]; and, more recently, sustainable landscape
approaches that often involve the private sector [19,20].
REDD+ projects and sub-national initiatives have been shown to be responsive to some drivers
operating at local and national levels, but are largely unable to tackle drivers of tropical forest loss
operating at the international level [21,22], particularly those linked to agricultural production [23].
In addition to its focus on local as opposed to national or international drivers, REDD+ has also been
criticised because of negative socio-economic impacts, such as fuelling inequality through restrictions
on access to forests and the commodification of carbon [24,25]. In general, commentators see REDD+
as having failed to live up to the initial high expectations following its introduction in international
climate change policy discussions in 2005, especially in terms of finance flowing to developing countries
to combat tropical deforestation [15]. Notwithstanding such criticisms, recent research points to
a reconceptualization of REDD+ in which it is viewed as a conservation and development measure,
with more realistic expectations with regard to its performance, rather than being seen as “the” answer
to tropical deforestation [26–28]. Furthermore, there is also expectation in both policy circles and
academic literature that newer REDD+ landscape approaches, particularly those that involve the
agri-business sector, will be better able to tackle drivers of deforestation linked to the expansion of
large-scale agricultural commodities for export [29], even if their impact on drivers operating at the
global level is limited [30]. The new interest in tackling international drivers linked to consumption
in developed countries (i.e., the concept of embodied deforestation), combined with newly emerging
REDD+ initiatives involving the private sector, may thus signal a new and more integrated approach
to combating tropical forest loss, one that prioritizes tackling drivers of deforestation and forest
degradation operating at the international level.
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Yet whether this potential is being realized remains little analysed. The concept of embodied
deforestation has not yet been discussed in the scholarly literature, given its very recent emergence
within the EU policy arena. How the concept is understood, and the extent to which it is gaining traction
from policy-makers, requires further examination. It is also unclear what role, if any, is foreseen for
REDD+ by those engaged in this new discussion. Will a focus on embodied deforestation marginalise
REDD+ or give it fresh relevance? How is REDD+ performance, particularly in relation to tackling
international drivers, related to this new approach, if at all? And, finally, will tackling embodied
deforestation become one of many initiatives aiming to address tropical deforestation within the EU,
contributing to further fragmentation, or will it facilitate a more integrated approach?
This article analyses these timely questions. We proceed as follows: Section 2 reviews the concepts
of fragmented and networked forest governance architectures, as the conceptual lens through which
we analyse the nature and implications of the new notion of embodied deforestation. Section 3 outlines
our methodology and methods of data generation and analysis. Section 4 maps the existing fragmented
approach to forest policy-making in the EU, and how the embodied deforestation debate is emerging
within this policy context. Section 5 presents our analysis of whether and how this new notion is being
translated into EU policy. We conclude with considering whether it represents a move towards a more
fragmented or integrated forest policy, and with what implications for REDD+.
2. From Fragmented to Networked Forest Governance: A Conceptual Shift
Forest governance arrangements, both globally and within the EU, have long been considered
fragmented, insofar as multiple sites of governance authority co-exist. In recent years, there has been
a shift from analysing causes and consequences of fragmentation to analysing the networked nature of
forest governance [13,31]. Networked forest governance involves bringing together a wide range of
actors representing different interests from the private and public spheres [32], with coordination and
negotiation between independent stakeholders interacting horizontally (rather than vertically) [33].
In this context, forest governance by formal political administrative structures is replaced by diffuse
and complex networks that involve a wide range of actors, [34], including from the private sector [35].
Although networked forest governance scenarios often describe a retreating of the state to make way
for other actors, recent studies highlight that the state still imposes limits on the involvement of other
actors [33] and often continues to exert considerable influence over the policy process [36].
As production and consumption of forest and agricultural products becomes increasingly
globalised, with complex supply chains, it becomes increasingly difficult for states to regulate and
govern the sustainability of production, leading to an emergence of hybrid forms of state and private
governance [37]. Within globalised commodity chains, highly complex horizontal and vertical chains
and networks emerge, with interactions between actors at different points of transactions. As such,
networked governance can be “ . . . conceived as a mosaic of both formal and informal networks,
interconnecting production practices in the space of place to the space of flows of global trade” [38].
In terms of action to tackle deforestation drivers linked to global commodity chains, the intervention
points in such networked contexts are thus often located in developed countries (such as the EU),
and therefore are outside the sphere of policy action that can be taken by governments in developing
countries. The globalisation of commodity chains is increasingly impacting the effectiveness of
REDD+ implementation, which is being adopted in a fragmented manner at sub-national or national
levels [39]. This has meant, in some cases, a displacement of deforestation from early to late adopters
of REDD+ [40].
It has been observed, however, that governance of some global value chains is also becoming
more coordinated between concerned public and private actors at different scales [41]. Few studies,
however, have analysed diverse EU forest policies from a networked forest governance perspective,
with little analysis of the implications of emerging and new policy discourses for future EU action on,
inter alia, REDD+. Some forest governance studies have been conducted in relation to the EU Forest
Law Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT) [42], but these have tended to focus on its impacts in
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partner (i.e., developing) countries (for example, [43,44]). Studies have also been undertaken with regard
to regional European forest policy, which indicate a long-recognised lack of policy integration within
the EU itself [45], and an increasing trend of influence by economic state interests over environmental
interests [46]. It is therefore timely to analyse whether the emerging EU “embodied deforestation” debate
represents an actual shift in responsibility to address deforestation drivers from developing countries
(via supply-side measures) to developed countries (via demand-side measures), whether it signals a shift
from a fragmented to a more integrated approach, and what the implications for REDD+ are.
3. Methodology and Methods of Analysis
This analysis relies on qualitative methodologies of document analysis and interviews. Given that
there is little published secondary literature on the concept of embodied deforestation, our sources
of data have been almost exclusively primary documents, as well as semi-structured interviews with
those involved in this very new, emerging debate. Our analysis is thus based on detailed primary
document analysis of 55 recent policy documents (generated during the period of January 2014
to December 2017) developed by or for the EU, which we identified as being of relevance to EU
tropical forest policy (for a complete list of analysed documents, see Appendix A). We selected these
according to the following procedure: With regard to European Parliament documents, a search
was conducted on the Parliament website for documents containing a reference to the word “forest”.
Any documents found were then included in the analysis, if they concerned global or tropical forests
(as opposed to only being concernedwith European forests). No equivalent search function exists on the
European Commission website, so documents were instead searched for on the webpages of relevant
Directorate-Generals covering policy areas considered to be relevant to the issue of international
tropical forest policy, namely: climate change, energy, trade, sustainable development, agriculture,
foreign policy, environment, development, and the general future direction of EU strategy and budget.
Again, documents were only included in the analysis if they referred to forests globally or outside of
the EU (with the exception being a few overarching documents that set out the general direction of
future EU policies, which were included for their relevance to all EU policy areas).
Once the documents had been selected, the document analysis consisted of mining these
documents to distil answers to a number of questions, through close reading of each. The questions
related to, inter alia, what new policy measures were being proposed/advocated; what drivers of
deforestation or forest degradation were sought to be addressed, if any; whether the emphasis was on
tackling consumption in the EU, or on support for measures in developing countries; whether REDD+
was mentioned and if so, how; and whether new policies or funding for REDD+ implementation were
being proposed, also in conjunction with efforts to tackle international drivers.
In addition to the document analysis, 15 semi-structured interviews were conducted with
stakeholders and policy-makers involved in discussions on embodied deforestation in the EU, during
the period of February–August 2018. These were intended to verify the findings of the document
analysis. Stakeholders were mainly selected based on their participation in two conferences organised
by the European Commission on tropical deforestation in 2014 and 2017 [47] and because they were
known to be actively involved in EU tropical forest policy debates. A stakeholder mapping was
undertaken to select a range of participants working in different organisations. There was, however,
a lower response rate from those working in EU institutions and national governments than from
those working for NGOs and research institutes. A list of interviewees is provided in Appendix B,
and includes five policy-makers from EU institutions and national governments, five representatives
of environmental NGOs, four independent experts and researchers, and one staff member from a UN
agency. The questions posed included: Whether stakeholders saw the embodied deforestation concept
as useful and why; whether they saw a change in the balance between EU support for demand-side
measures (to be implemented by the EU) versus supply-side measures (to be undertaken by developing
countries) to tackle tropical deforestation; what outcomes they hoped for; and what role they envisaged
for REDD+ in evolving EU policies targeting deforestation.
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4. Mapping the Fragmented Evolution of EU Tropical Forest Policy
Since there is no single international treaty dealing with tropical deforestation, the issue has
been dealt with globally in a fragmented manner, through a range of diverse policy instruments
and agreements on related topics, such as biodiversity or climate change [48]. EU policy instruments
dealing with tropical forests have generally developed in response to participation in such international
United Nations (UN) conventions and agreements. Thus, tropical forests have been dealt with across
a range of EU policy instruments, mirroring the situation at the global-level where forests are addressed
within international agreements on biodiversity, trade in endangered species, climate change, etc.
EU forest policy is thus spread across various EU-level institutions, such as Directorates-General for
climate change, development cooperation, environment, and trade. Each of these have their own
perspectives on forest issues, with a similar situation prevailing at the level of individual EU Member
States as well, where different dimensions of forest policy, whether climate, trade or biodiversity
related, are usually addressed by different national-level ministries [49].
External EU policy-making on forests has been largely aligned with the goals of specific, existing
UN Conventions and international agreements. Thus, policies on biodiversity have sought to find
a balance between biodiversity conservation and its sustainable economic use [50], with a stated aim
of achieving and supporting sustainable forest management in this context [49]. The EU Biodiversity
Strategy [51] sets out actions to implement the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and
promote the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, including forests. Similarly, EU wildlife
trade legislation [52] was adopted to implement rules under the Convention on the International Trade
in Endangered Species (CITES) in order to protect species (including timber species) threatened by
international trade. The EU also participates in the UN International Tropical Timber Organisation
(ITTO), which was established from a commercial viewpoint to reconcile sustainable forest management
with expansion of the tropical timber trade [53], and the UN Forum on Forests (UNFF), which
emphasises the need to combat deforestation through expansion of sustainable forest management
(SFM) [5]. Arguably, the EU policy instrument that has gained the most traction, political attention,
and funding in relation to tropical forests is its Forest Law, Enforcement, Governance, and Trade
(FLEGT) initiative developed in the context of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development [54].
FLEGT aims to reduce imports of illegally logged timber into the EU, including by supporting action in
developing countries to strengthen sustainable forest management and improve governance [55].
The EU and its Member States are also parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) and have together contributed about 30% of global finance for REDD+. A large
proportion of this has, however, been in the form of bilateral aid from Germany and the UK [56].
The EU established its REDD facility in 2010, but has also donated to existing multilateral initiatives,
such as the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and UN-REDD programme [57],
rather than choosing to become a major player in its own right within global REDD+ discussions.
The introduction of REDD+ in the UNFCCC discussions in 2005 represented a significant shift in the
objectives of international forest policies, including at the EU level [58], with the focus on reducing
carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation [59]. This new focus on carbon as the main
service provided by forests contrasted to previous approaches [60] that aimed to find a balance between
biodiversity conservation and logging for timber. The development of REDD+ was highly influenced
by a growing narrative on “payments for ecosystem services” (PES) [61], which explored new funding
sources for the conservation of ecosystems based on their utilitarian socio-economic values [62,63].
The PES approach was also promoted by EU policy-makers who, for example, funded ecosystem
valuation studies such as the 2009 “The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity” report [64].
Although widely endorsed within policy, the PES approach has also drawn criticism from those who
highlighted concerns about the commodification of forests for their carbon values, and the potentially
negative ecological [65,66] and social [67,68] impacts of this shift in focus.
Concerns have also been expressed that REDD+ unfairly burdens developing countries, with some
suggesting it has been used as a distraction to cover up the lack of action by developed countries to
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tackle their own greenhouse gas emissions [69]. In terms of external forest policy, EU policy processes
have, like other international policymaking fora, historically focused more on supply-side rather than
demand-side measures. They have done so by supporting actions taking place in partner (developing)
countries, including through REDD+. The evolution of FLEGT, however, did signal a recognition that
the EU needed both supply and demand-side measures to tackle illegal timber imports. Thus, the EU
has been working to reduce the negative impacts of its tropical timber imports through engagement in
the ITTO and CITES, and the adoption of its FLEGT Action Plan on combating illegal logging. It is
now also beginning to develop policies to decrease the wider environmental impacts of consumption
patterns, and its greenhouse gas emissions, and has adopted a Circular Economy Action Plan in 2015
to help transition to a sustainable, low carbon, resource efficient, and competitive economy [70].
Similarly, there has been an apparent shift in the implementation of development aid policies
and programmes, with developed countries moving away from simply acting as donors to also
committing to change their own policies. The adoption of the UN Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) in 2015, for example, represented a significant change in focus from their predecessor,
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), due to their universal applicability, with goals applying
to both developed and developing countries. The European Commission is also considering whether
to propose an EU Action Plan to Combat Tropical Deforestation, and in 2018, published a study [71]
outlining the feasibility of policy options to tackle the drivers of tropical deforestation linked to EU
imports of so-called “forest-risk” commodities, a new term gaining traction within this policy debate,
which appears to refer to globally traded agricultural commodities that are associated with significant
tropical deforestation. However, the European Commission has not yet decided which, if any, option
to pursue. We turn next to whether this emerging discussion represents a real shift in EU policies
dealing with tropical forests, by presenting the findings from our document analysis and interviews.
5. Tackling EU Embodied Deforestation: A New Approach to Addressing Drivers?
This section addresses whether and how the new debate on embodied deforestation is poised to
address demand-side, international deforestation drivers, through specific adjustments to EU forest
policy. It does so by analysing three aspects of this broad question: First, how the notion of embodied
deforestation is conceptualized, and what new policy measures, if any, are advocated by policy-makers
and stakeholders to tackle it; second, whether these debates and developments signal a real shift
towards tackling deforestation drivers linked to EU consumption (i.e., demand side drivers); and third,
whether these new debates and developments signal a move towards a less fragmented and more
integrated approach to EU forest policy, and what role remains for REDD+ herein.
5.1. Conceptualising Embodied Deforestation: Emerging Policy Narratives
Our study of EU policy documents reveals a high level of EU support for implementing the SDGs
(a central focus of 20 of the policy documents we analysed) and, to a lesser extent, climate action
(a central focus of 10 documents), as illustrated in Table 1. EU policies across a range of subject areas
are being shaped to reflect the aims of the SDGs. Those relating to climate, energy, and environment are
all being tailored to tackle climate change, relating both to the EU’s own emissions and to supporting
actions in developing countries. In accordance with a realignment of its development policies to
reflect the SDGs, the EU increasingly views its role less as a donor and more as a partner with
developing countries. For example, the European Consensus document sets out the EU’s development
aid priorities, but also includes action on EU consumption patterns. The EU is also now encouraging
other countries to address their own consumption patterns to become more sustainable, for example,
through the EU-funded Switch Asia programme (Switch Asia is an EU funding programme to support
sustainable production and consumption in Asia, http://www.switch-asia.eu/).
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Somewhat surprisingly, however, tackling global deforestation and REDD+ are low priorities
within wider policy discussions on climate and the SDGs, and the relevance of forests and land use,
in particular, to the climate debate is largely missed. Instead, EU climate action appears to focus more
on tackling EU greenhouse gas emissions and how this can lead to innovation and new jobs within the
EU, rather than on reducing negative environmental impacts elsewhere, caused by EU consumption.
The Eurostat report on monitoring EU action to achieving the SDGs demonstrates the strong shift
towards supporting action within the EU rather than in developing countries. Although the need to
halt global deforestation is mentioned [72] (p. 299), the proposed indicators to monitor progress only
cover forests in the EU. A key finding of our analysis is that REDD+, in particular, has a very low
profile within analysed policy documents. It is the dominant theme of only two EU policy documents,
both of which are reports on EU activities undertaken in the past. Of the 55 policy documents we
analysed, only 16 mention REDD+ in passing. Even reports and documents that are very supportive
of policy measures to conserve tropical forests, such as the European Parliament report calling for EU
action for sustainability (which highlights the need to address deforestation drivers and expresses
support for afforestation for mitigation), do not mention REDD+ specifically.
Whilst some support was expressed for “embodied deforestation” as a conceptual approach
in our stakeholder interviews, it is unclear whether sufficient momentum is behind it to signal
a change of approach in external EU forest policy. Around half of those interviewed consider
the “embodied deforestation” concept to signal a useful approach, whilst identifying a number
of limitations (Interviews with: EU policy-maker in Brussels, 1 February 2018; NGO representative
by skype, 16 March 2018; EU agency representative by skype, 12 April 2018; independent expert by
skype, 18 April 2018; researcher in Brussels, 26 April 2018; NGO representative by skype, 18 May 2018;
EU policy-maker in Brussels, 24 May 2018; independent expert by skype, 17 August 2018). Interviewees
noted, for example, that various terms are being used to express similar concepts, which is confusing.
For example, the French government refers to “imported deforestation” [73], Sweden refers to reducing
its ecological footprint (Interview with UN agency staff member by skype, 2 February 2018), and the
recent European Commission feasibility study refers to “embedded deforestation” [71] (p. 31). Second,
it was observed that the term has to be explained each time it is used, which limits its usage to
policy-makers rather than being broadly understandable to a wider public. Others noted that all
imports of a particular commodity are treated, within this simplified concept, as having the same
deforestation impacts, which limits its accuracy. One interviewee commented that alternative concepts,
such as “sustainable supply chains”, are more likely to be understood and supported by a wider
audience (Interview with EU policy-maker in Brussels, 1 February 2018). Despite the limitations of
the approach, we next turn to considering whether the EU is moving towards a greater emphasis
on demand-side measures to be adopted by developed countries, thereby sharing responsibility for
tackling deforestation drivers more evenly than previous initiatives focusing on supply-side actions by
developing countries.
5.2. Shifting Responsibility from South to North: Targeting Demand?
In terms of whether there has been a shift in the balance of responsibility for tackling deforestation
drivers from developing to developing countries, with a corresponding shift in the balance between
demand and supply-side measures in EU external forest policy, there appears to be a shift in rhetoric,
at least. This is demonstrated, for example, by the European Parliament report on palm oil [12],
which advocates restricting imports of palm oil to the EU to prevent deforestation. It should be noted,
however, that this is just a policy recommendation by the European Parliament, with no proposals from
the Commission to implement it, partly because this report was met with strong political opposition
from Indonesia and Malaysia, who want to protect their export markets, as widely reported in the
media, for example, [74] More generally, in our analysis of policy documents, we identified various
supply-side and demand-side measures being advocated within EU policies relevant to forests (see
Table 2 for the list of suggested new policy measures), with a higher number of actions relating to the
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demand-side. As in the case of palm oil, however, very few of the suggested demand-side measures are
mentioned in official policy documents. Instead, they are mainly mentioned in the draft of a feasibility
study undertaken by consultants for the European Commission. If enacted, however, these suggested
new policy measures would help to address a number of international drivers of deforestation and
forest degradation. These include illegal logging and the international trade in timber (building on
existing EU efforts under FLEGT and the EUTR), agricultural conversion linked to the global export of
commodities and imports, as well as international financial transfers associated with deforestation.
Interviewees expressed strong support, for example, for the EU Timber Regulation (EUTR) as
a model for tackling demand, despite well documented implementation challenges [49,75]. At least
six interviewees noted that the EU needs to take a regulatory approach to tackling deforestation,
along the lines of an EUTR for agricultural commodities (Interviews with: EU policy-maker in
Brussels, 1 February 2018; NGO representative by skype, 23 February 2018; and NGO representative
by skype, 16 March 2018; an EU agency member by skype, 12 April 2018; independent expert by skype
15 April 2018; independent expert by skype, 17 August 2018). Two of the interviewees also stated
that the EU should develop a policy instrument that provides transparency in financial reporting
by companies on deforestation risks (Interviews with an EU policy-maker in Brussels, 1 February
2018; an NGO representative by skype 12 April 2018). The only recent EU legislative proposal to
actually tackle a driver of tropical deforestation or forest degradation is a proposal from the European
Commission to decrease competition for land between biofuels, agriculture, and forests through
changes to the Renewable Energy Directive. This was developed in response to considerable criticism
of the EU’s biofuels policy, see, for example [76]. As revealed in one of our interviews, however,
the proposal was watered down considerably in early 2018 before being adopted (Interview with EU
policy advisor in Brussels, 28 June 2018). Therefore, despite the rhetoric and the growing number of
new suggested policy measures to tackle embodied deforestation, there is very little in the way of
actual new legal or policy proposals to address EU consumption impacts. As summed up by one of
our interviewees, in general, the European Commission is mostly interested in developing voluntary
rather than regulatory measures to tackle demand and “expects more from partner countries than they
are willing to do themselves” (Interview with an NGO representative by skype, 23 February 2018).
Our interviews with stakeholders involved in the EU policy debate also reveal differing views as
to whether the EU should go beyond achieving legality to also mandating sustainability standards that
imports should meet or aim for “zero deforestation” targets for commodity imports. This emerging
discussion is building on experiences in relation to FLEGT, which currently only covers legality but
could, in theory, be expanded to include sustainability criteria [42,44]. Four of the interviewees
(Interviews with an EU policy-maker in Brussels, 1 February 2018; an NGO representative by
skype, 16 March 2018; an NGO representative by skype, 12 April 2018; independent expert by skype,
17 August 2018) consider that a new policy tool to deal with deforestation should be based on
sustainability rather than legality standards, although they recognised the challenges this posed in
terms of gaining acceptance from partner developing countries. They also expressed concern that
the EU would be imposing its sustainability standards and governing beyond its borders, although it
should be noted that none of our interviewees recognised that in some cases, partner countries may
have higher standards in place than the EU would like to impose for example [7]. Differing views were
also expressed as to whether partner countries have adequate legal frameworks in place through which
to implement a sustainability approach, or whether these would need to be updated or developed first.
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5.3. From Fragmentation to Integration in Networked EU Forest Governance: What Role for REDD+?
Currently, EU external forest policy-making is highly fragmented, inconsistently applied,
and contains gaps, or as one interviewee put it “efforts are all over the place so an overarching approach
is needed” (Interview with EU policy-maker in Brussels, 1 February 2018). Another interviewee
outlined the challenges as including contradictory policies proposed by different Commission
Directorate-Generals; a lack of coherent planning as to how the EU will achieve its international forest
policy commitments; and no standardised EU definition or understanding of key concepts, such as
Sustainable Forest Management (SFM), REDD+, or even forests (Interview with NGO representative
by skype, 18 May 2018). As pointed out by one interviewee, “the EU needs a deforestation policy and
a REDD+ policy as it’s not clear what it’s trying to achieve in either sphere” and “the Member States all
have divergent views” (Interview with an EU agency staff member by skype, 12 April 2018), thereby
demonstrating a challenge of multilevel governance.
These views are reflected in a report from the EU REDD+ facility that outlines the REDD+
activities the EU is now supporting to address tropical deforestation, which includes several initiatives
that are not generally thought of as being “REDD+”, such as, for example, demand-side measures.
This could either be interpreted as REDD+ evolving into a new conceptual approach or becoming
increasingly irrelevant or side-lined in funding priorities. Those we interviewed gave differing views
regarding the potential of REDD+ and its performance, also in terms of addressing deforestation
drivers. One interviewee noted that “REDD+ has got so complex it’s stuck and should go back to being
an offsetting mechanism” (Interview with NGO representative by skype, 15 February 2018), whereas
another was of the opposite view that “REDD+ is an umbrella which also encompasses sustainable
supply chain approaches” (Interview with EU agency staff member by skype, 12 April 2018).
Looking ahead, as shown in Table 2, very little is actually suggested within documents published
by or for EU policy-makers in relation to new REDD+ policies or funding. Divergent views were
expressed in our interviews regarding the continuing role of the EU as a donor to REDD+. In theory,
the EU target of 20% of budgetary spending for climate objectives (with a proposed increase to 25%
in the European Commission’s proposal for the new EU budget post-2020) [77] should make way
for significant funding to be made available for REDD+. Large-scale European Commission funding
has not been forthcoming in practice, however, although some individual EU countries, such as
Germany and the UK, have provided substantial bilateral support for REDD+ [57]. Three interviewees
(Interview with UN agency staff member by skype, 2 February 2018; NGO representative by skype,
15 February 2018; EU agency staff member by skype, 12 April 2018) were of the view that REDD+
finance from donors, such as the EU, has been helpful in creating enabling conditions to combat
deforestation, even as the readiness process has created expectations within partner (developing)
countries of continued finance (as also mentioned by Hein et al [78]). This would need to be followed
through, for example, by funding REDD+ landscape/jurisdictional approaches, yet our analysis
suggests that such increasing funding is not necessarily envisioned.
Skepticism was also expressed regarding the proper establishment of a functioning carbon
market and the lack of interest in this by the private sector, who seem to be more attracted to the
idea of sustainable supply chains (Interviews with UN staff member by skype, 2 February 2018;
NGO representative by skype, 15 February 2018; NGO representative by skype, on 16 March 2018;
and EU agency staff member by skype, 12 April 2018), although it was also noted that international
aviation carbon offsets schemes could provide a new way forward, as also commented by Golub [79].
A Commission-funded study published in March 2018 outlines potential EU policy options for
tackling tropical deforestation and includes a recommendation for the EU to support “jurisdictional
REDD+ projects to promote sustainable and deforestation-free agriculture production” [80] (p. 75),
which, if implemented, could provide a new way forward for EU support for REDD+ initiatives that
combines jurisdictional REDD+ with supply chain approaches. Furthermore, EU development aid
policies are increasingly looking to partner with the private sector to deliver policy goals through
public-private-partnerships (PPPs), which may open new opportunities and lead to novel networked
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forest governance arrangements in partner developing countries [81], but also risks watering down
forest conservation objectives.
Several interviewees mentioned the need for the EU to contribute to global dialogues on REDD+
or other multilateral processes that can link demand and supply-side measures, and suggested that
the SDGs could provide a helpful framework for this process (potential synergies between REDD+
and the SDGs have also been noted by others, such as [82]). However, it was noted that there is no
obvious existing UN fora where such a dialogue could take place, with little confidence expressed
in the UNFF (in line with previous criticism, for example, [83]). It was therefore suggested that in
practice it may be more workable for the EU to encourage further dialogue on this issue (Interviews
with UN staff member by skype, 2 February 2018, NGO representative by skype, 15 February 2018,
NGO representative by skype, 23 February 2018 and EU agency staff member by skype, 12 April 2018).
One interviewee noted that the UNFCCC is now turning its attention to decreasing greenhouse gas
emissions linked to agriculture. This could be an area in which the EU could envisage playing a leading
role, both by tackling emissions linked to its own domestic agriculture as well as through promoting
sustainable supply chains and responsible consumption, partially through existing REDD+ approaches.
Others note, however, that there is limited potential to build synergies between LULUCF accounting
and REDD+ (see, for example, [84]) and from the perspective of one interviewee, the EU’s own rules
on LULUCF accounting lack credibility and environmental integrity (Interview with an EU agency
staff member by skype, 12 April 2018).
Our analysis reveals, furthermore, several calls from different stakeholders for an EU Action Plan
to Combat Tropical Deforestation (mentioned in five documents from the European Parliament and
one from a research agency), and in two interviews (Interview with NGO representative by skype,
16 March 2018 and independent expert by skype, 18 April 2018). An Action Plan could provide a new
comprehensive approach to external EU forest policy, with an overarching policy framework that
includes both demand-side and supply-side measures. It could also place current support for REDD+
within a more integrated approach, as one of a number of measures to tackle deforestation rather
than as the sole solution to tackling tropical deforestation. EU action plans can be effective tools for
increasing political and financial support to tackle an issue. The publication of the EU FLEGT Action
Plan in 2003, for example, garnered significant support for preventing the imports of illegal logged
timber into the EU [85], thereby tackling one important driver of forest degradation. The publication
of an EU Action Plan against Wildlife Trafficking in 2016 similarly gave considerable impetus to
addressing wildlife trafficking. Action plans can, however, also remain weak, non-binding documents
if they do not include legislative proposals. Thus, they may fail to achieve inter-sectoral integration,
as was reportedly the case for the EU’s domestic forest strategy and associated action plan [45,86].
So far, the European Commission is yet to come forward with a proposal for an action plan in relation
to tropical deforestation.
6. Conclusions
Our analysis has shown that there is growing momentum within the EU to implement the
SDGs and act on climate change, but tackling tropical deforestation or supporting REDD+ remain
relatively low priorities for policy-makers within these wider debates. There has been a genuine shift
in emphasis within policy debates towards addressing greenhouse gas emissions and negative impacts
of consumption at the EU level. However, a gap remains between such rhetoric and specific policy
measures being proposed to tackle EU consumption in relation to tropical deforestation. Despite
several calls for an EU Action Plan against Tropical Deforestation that contains regulatory measures
on EU imports of forest-risk commodities, and suggested new policy measures included in several
documents, the European Commission has not yet acted. This may be because economic interests are
now dominating strongly over environmental ones, as has happened in the case of domestic EU forest
policies [87], although there are indications that some private companies are actually supportive of
greater EU action on tropical forests [71].
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With regard to REDD+, very little is being proposed in terms of new policies or funding. This could
be because of the perception that the private sector is more interested in “sustainable supply chain”
approaches, despite limited evidence that they can deliver on social sustainability objectives and
reduce deforestation [78,88]. It is currently unclear whether supply-chain approaches will give further
impetus to jurisdictional REDD+, whether they will replace or be a substitute for REDD+ initiatives,
or whether new networked governance arrangements will emerge with partner (developing) countries.
If the European Commission does decide to develop an overarching action plan that includes both
demand- and supply-side measures, this could indeed signal a new integrated EU approach to tackling
deforestation, which replaces the current range of fragmented approaches. Under this scenario,
REDD+ could become one of a number of linked policy approaches, rather than being burdened
with the expectation that it can solve tropical deforestation (and all associated issues) on its own.
This would also spread the burden of responsibility more evenly between developed and developing
countries. Embedding REDD+ within the framework of an initiative, such as an EU Action Plan,
could also contribute to overcoming two major challenges, namely the lack of REDD+ finance and the
need to address international drivers of deforestation and forest degradation [89]. However, in the
absence of actual EU legislative proposals to tackle drivers linked to global consumption and new
commitments to REDD+ finance, the interest in tackling embodied deforestation is unlikely to signify
major policy change, with the burden of responsibility to combat deforestation continuing to fall on
developing countries.
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Abstract: Command-and-control policies are often criticized as insufficient to tackle tropical
deforestation. Over the past two decades, both academics and policy-makers have promoted
incentive-based policies, notably REDD+ (Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest
Degradation), as attractive alternatives to curb forest loss, while also potentially contributing to the
poverty reduction of forest-dwelling populations. Governments have been the driving force behind
the largest incentive-based forest conservation programs in Latin America. Many science-based
recommendations on how to design effective incentive-based policies have, however, not found
much resonance within policy circles. To understand the gap between recommendations and practice,
it is important to analyze how these schemes are designed towards achieving environmental and
non-environmental outcomes. To this end, we analyzed the comprehensive history of governance
dynamics behind two government-led incentive schemes in Ecuador and Peru. We found that
electoral interests and bureaucratic politics exerted pressure on policy design teams, which eventually
traded off long-term societal efficiency concerns against short-term administrative goals. Priority was
often given to non-environmental concerns, due to perceptions of political feasibility, the influence
of non-environmental government agencies, and beliefs in particular government roles or public
response. These findings are especially relevant for scholars studying the design, implementation
and impacts of incentive-based conservation policies, and for practitioners aiming to enhance
policy efficiency.
Keywords: environmental governance; forest conservation; climate change mitigation; public
policies; Amazon
1. Introduction
Despite the sluggish progress in international climate policy, Reduced Emissions from
Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) has become an important international source
of funding for forest conservation since the mid-2000s. REDD+ was conceived as a means to
harness the allegedly high potential for cost-effective emissions reductions in the forestry sector [1].
As international negotiations went on, countries with forest reserves prepared to receive international
transfers for REDD+ implementation.
Incentive-based policies, such as Payments for Environmental Services (PES), were frequently
proposed mechanisms to implement REDD+ on the ground [1]. Many PES initiatives were born
over the last couple of decades, often preceding official decisions at the United Nations Framework
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Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) on REDD+. Existing PES schemes can thus provide lessons
to inform the implementation of REDD+ on the ground [2,3].
Governments were often the driving force behind large REDD+ and PES programs [4]. Arguably,
due to economies of scale and the possibilities for integration with other sectoral policies, governments
are bound to be at the forefront of adopting PES as a large-scale forest conservation tool. Early PES
research, however, suggested that government-led PES schemes tend to be less cost-effective than
private PES initiatives [5]. Emerging impact evaluation studies confirmed this conjecture, showing
that the effectiveness of selected schemes in reducing deforestation has been low [6].
One of the reasons singled out for the low effectiveness of government-led PES is the
existence of “major political-economy obstacles” [7] (p. 11) and a “need to accommodate political
pressures” [8] (p. 260). Early PES research mostly focused on the technical aspects of designing
payments to provide additional environmental services cost-effectively. In recent years, however,
a growing body of literature has investigated the complexities of REDD+ and PES policy-making
processes, beyond technical aspects. This research focused on the political contexts and discourses
related to REDD+ in several countries [9–16], multi-level and polycentric governance issues in
REDD+ [17–20], the institutionalization processes of REDD+’s technical aspects such as monitoring
and benefit-sharing [21,22], and national case studies on the governance of REDD+ and PES design
and implementation [23–28]. This paper seeks to add to this body of literature, accounting in detail for
how political processes can shape and transform the design of incentive-based environmental policies.
In a previous article, we [29] analyzed the factors explaining the political dynamics of the adoption
of three incentive-based forest conservation programs, the National Program of Forest Conservation
for the Mitigation of Climate Change—Programa Bosques—in Peru, the Socio Bosque program-in
Ecuador, and the System of Incentives for Environmental Services—SISA—in the state of Acre, Brazil.
Here, we revisit the Programa Bosques and Socio Bosque programs to zoom in on their
policy-design processes. We show why and how context-specific political and bureaucratic constraints
affected their design, focusing especially on how those constraints led to deviations from
efficiency-oriented recommendations in the literature. The two programs were chosen for being
both well-known and comparable examples of large-scale PES programs with clear potential for
REDD+.
Section 2 presents the conceptual framework used in our analysis. Section 3 describes the
history and analyzes the processes that led to the design features of the programs. Section 4
concludes the paper, discussing how the findings are relevant for forest conservation and REDD+
policies. The Supplementary materials provide a factual description of the programs, supporting the
understanding of Sections 3 and 4.
2. Conceptual Framework
Some articles have utilized institutional frameworks for analyzing PES schemes [30,31],
but few have explicitly drawn insights from public policy theories focusing on the motivations
of governments [24,32]. In this section, we present a conceptual framework for our two case studies
that is derived from different public policy theories. Drawing eclectically on various theories of policy
science, our framework does, in Ostrom’s words, “provide the most general list of variables that should
be used to analyze institutional arrangements” [33] (p. 26).
Policy design is more than a technical exercise of matching appropriate responses to given
problems. It is a complex and eventually ambiguous product of interactions and interdependencies
occurring, as posed by Howlett [34], at three levels of decision making (see Figure 1). At an abstract
level, we label “overarching preferences” (by Howlett, called “macro-level”) the general statements
of “government aims and ambitions in a specific policy area” and the “long-term preferences of
government in terms of organizational devices to be used in addressing policy aims” (p. 75). At the
level of “operational policy objectives” (Howlett’s “meso-level”), we observe “the specific types of
governing instruments to be used to address program level objectives” (ibid). In this article, however,
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our focus is on “specific, on-the-ground micro requirements to attain policy objectives the settings of
policy tools required to attain policy targets.” (ibid). Choices at this level of “specific design decisions”
(“micro-level”) will determine the details of how a policy instrument will ultimately be shaped.
That does not mean we ignore the importance of long-term policy preferences, but that we seek to
analyze policy processes that occurred in a shorter time span. Hence, we interpret long-standing policy
preferences (e.g., an marked focus on social policy in Ecuador) as a given policy context in which
decisions are made. Figure 1 illustrates the framework and Table 1 describes its elements.
 
Figure 1. The conceptual framework. Source: elaborated by the authors.
Table 1. The concepts of the policy theory applied.
Explanatory
Element Summary Description Theoretical Tradition References
Electoral
opportunities
and risks
Politicians try to maximize power and rank short-term interests
over long-term consequences. Policy design aims at maximizing
electoral votes. Bureaucrats seek to maximize agency budgets,
career advancement, and self-favored policies.
Public Choice Theories [35–37]
Actor identities
Expands the actors’ motivations from pure utility maximization
towards their idiosyncratic characteristics, e.g., education,
commitment to service, expertise, tenacity, and political skills.
Multiple Streams
Framework (Policy
Entrepreneurs),
Street Level
Bureaucracy
[38,39]
Political,
administrative, and
technical feasibility
The institutional context in which decisions are made. Political
feasibility factored into design decisions as a guide to action, or as
an explanation for previous behavior. Administrations prefer
policies that are less costly to design and run, especially in
low-priority sectors with limited resources and personnel.
Institutionalism [34,40,41]
Bureaucratic
dynamics
Relations between government agencies involved in a policy area.
Coordination capacity, internal turf battles, and jockeying for
influence will often influence the design processes.
Institutionalism,
Organizational Theory [42,43]
Lesson-drawing
Policymakers will often look at other jurisdictions to draw ‘tried
and tested’ policy options. Lesson-drawing occurs as a more or
less intact adoption of a program already in effect in another
jurisdiction, as the combination of several policies, or as simple
inspiration/ intellectual stimulus.
Institutionalism [44,45]
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3. The Design of Public PES Schemes: Socio Bosque and Programa Bosques
This section describes how academic recommendations for cost-efficient PES were considered
in the design of each program, and analyzes the underlying decision-making processes. Table 2
summarizes the section. A detailed description of the programs is provided in the Supplementary
materials. Our sources of analysis were personal interviews with current and former policymakers
who were directly or indirectly involved with program design, and a thorough scrutiny of design
documents, as well as triangulated opinions on (and external analyses of) how design decisions were
made and implemented.
3.1. Conditionality, Monitoring, and Baselines
Conditionality means that payments should only be made if environmental services (ES) are
being provided, or a proxy activity clearly linked to the provision of ES is implemented. It is the
defining characteristic of PES programs, the one that distinguishes them from more traditional subsidy
programs [5,46]. Conditionality is the combination of compliance monitoring (“efforts to detect
non-complying participants, typically combining remote-sensing technologies with on-site ground
truthing”) [46] (p. 146), and sanctioning non-compliance, usually by suspending or withdrawing
payments. PES programs should also construct baselines to enable the understanding of what would
have happened without the scheme and to gauge additionality.
Socio Bosque’s design contains clear conditionalities attached to payments. Program planners
emphasized the need for simplicity and clarity of conditionalities, given that long administrative
procedures would put off many potential beneficiaries, and due to concerns with administrative
capacities in the long term (Appendix A: Interview 5). When the program was created, no country-wide
forest monitoring system or forest cover baselines existed. The design teams decided to set up
an extensive monitoring system and a baseline study as one of the program’s core components
(Interview 5), instead of setting up the systems before the beginning of the payments. Specific
property/community baselines were developed as a requirement for enrollment so that compliance
could be monitored.
Monitoring activities were implemented through the analysis of satellite imagery and field
verification of zones which are deemed as being potentially threatened. According to a recent
monitoring report (December 2015), 89.92% of the enrolled area has been analyzed [63]. Also in
2015, field verification identified 6.6% of the areas as non-compliant with the program’s regulations
(ibid). Additionally, a country-wide baseline has been completed and published after the start of the
program [64].
The creation and design of Programa Bosques were inspired by the Juntos conditional cash transfer
(CCT) program [29], so the inclusion of conditionalities was integral to Programa Bosques (Interview
12). The rationale for the definition of the conditionalities was to ensure that communities would not
perceive the incentive as a hand-out, and that they should be easily understandable (Interview 12).
The envisaged forest cover monitoring system was not complete at the beginning of the program,
as satellite images of enrolled communities were not yet available. The images were later acquired,
on a yearly basis, with the support of the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ).
To monitor compliance, a participatory mapping was made together with the communities, including
the definition of the zone to be put under conservation, later to be complemented with satellite
images. The first cash transfers were provided upfront, without considering forest cover dynamics.
The communities used that money to implement sustainable productive activities (see Section 3.6 below,
and the Supplementary materials). By the end of the first year, compliance monitoring was performed:
if the communities had complied with all conditionalities, they would be eligible for the second
payment—and so on for the following years (personal communication, R. Giudice, 8 April 2018).
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Data on conditionality enforcement has not yet been consolidated, but according to our
personal communication with program staff, some sanctions for non-compliance have been imposed.
Ten communities were evicted from the Program between 2011 and 2014, and a few more were
suspended for one year and rejoined in the following year. The main reason for eviction has been the
use of cash transfers for reasons not included in the investment plan, which details how beneficiaries are
planning to use the money transferred from the program to carry out productive projects expected to
improve their welfare. Other reasons were deforestation beyond the allowed threshold (0.3% of the area
committed for conservation over the 5 years of the conservation agreement [65]) and receiving a fine
or sanction from another forestry regulatory office (personal communication, R. Giudice, 8 April 2018).
While conditionalities were swiftly agreed upon in both programs, several contextual factors
explain the decision to provide initial upfront payments and only condition-subsequent payments on
compliance. Both programs have the dual objective of conserving forests and reducing poverty (see
Section 3.2) and intend to achieve those objectives by implementing ICDP-like sustainable productive
activities (see Section 3.6). Therefore, upfront payments to initiate those activities are an integral
part of the programs’ intervention strategies. Additional factors help to explain that design feature.
In Ecuador, the idiosyncratic characteristics of President Rafael Correa were relevant, as he pressured
for quick government action in various policy areas. From the beginning of his mandate, he was trying
to implement fundamental changes in Ecuadorian institutions. One of the core changes observed
in the country was the strengthening of the executive power’s capacity to formulate public policies,
to the detriment of other institutions such as Congress [66,67]. At the base of his political changes was
a new constitution, which the president hoped to approve in a referendum. The public debate on the
constitution overlapped with the design process of Socio Bosque. The constitutional referendum
happened in September 2008 and Socio Bosque officially started in November 2008. To ensure
support, Correa intended to demonstrate a commitment to quick and bold action by the government.
Therefore, the political context in which the design team worked urged for a quick start of the payments
(Interview 5).
In Peru, a similar pressure for quick completion of the design process existed, but the political
feasibility and bureaucratic dynamics were more relevant factors. First, the government aimed to mend
its relations with indigenous populations, which were strained due to confrontations between police
forces and indigenous populations known as Baguazo [29,68]. A dragging design process would delay
the beginning of payments, which was understood to be potentially counterproductive to that aim
(Interview 21). In addition, the Environment Ministry (MINAM) was a new entity in the government
(created in 2008) and sought to demonstrate efficiency to a skeptical Council of Ministers (Interview 24).
3.2. Poverty Reduction
PES have been considered attractive to conservation practitioners and policymakers as
a possible win-win solution for tackling environmental problems and contributing to poverty
alleviation concomitantly [69]. There are, however, often tradeoffs between both objectives [46,51].
From an efficiency perspective, those who should receive payments are the ones who pose a credible
(or, at least, credibly projected) threat to the provision of ES [7,47]. For that reason, several researchers
note that poor land users, who usually have small plots and few means to seriously threaten themselves
and/ or protect their environment against outsiders, will often not be the most efficient providers
of ES [48,52]. Programs that target payments to poorer populations risk having higher costs and
low environmental additionality. For that reason, many authors have stressed that the PES schemes
should not be promoted as poverty reduction tools [48,52,53]. In other words, “poverty alleviation is
an important side objective, which can be pursued through timely interventions, but it should never
become the primary objective” [7] (p. 22). On the other hand, some authors argue that the existence
of interdependencies between effectiveness and equity outcomes [70] can make poverty reduction
a necessary condition for ES provision [71].
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Contrary to most recommendations in the literature on cost-efficient PES, poverty reduction
was a central concern in Socio Bosque’s design, as it was in its adoption [29]. Several of the
design provisions in Socio Bosque aim to benefit poor population segments. The decision to include
communities in the program was driven by the goal to provide them with cash transfers [72]. Welfare
concerns also guided the definition of a poverty parameter for targeting, and the interest in fostering
potential income-generating activities also motivated the inclusion of ICDP-type activities (see below).
The program, however, was not able to reach many of the poorest inhabitants of forests because, for
legal reasons, it can only enroll participants with formal land titles (Interview 5).
The design process had a limited formal participation of national actors outside of the
government [73,74], except for the partnership with Conservation International throughout the design
process and informal contacts with some potential beneficiaries, as well as local governments already
implementing PES projects (Interview 5). The lack of participation design was justified by the program
designers with the voluntary enrollment in the program, allegedly deeming the participation of civil
society actors unnecessary (Interview 5). Additionally, the design team understood that a consultation
process would hinder the program’s quick deployment, as there were pressing requests from the
president’s office to get the project started quickly ([73], interviews 5, 12).
Poverty reduction concerns were also central to the design of Programa Bosques. Similar to
Socio Bosque, they were key factors in design decisions on targeting, payment system definition
and, crucially, the introduction of ICDP-type activities (Interview 21, 23). We could not, however,
find evidence on the extent to which these design elements were thoroughly discussed by the design
team, or if they straightforwardly adopted Socio Bosque’s design model. The design process of
Programa Bosques also did not count with the wide participation of non-government stakeholders.
A few meetings were held with the NGO Inter-Ethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian
Forest (AIDESEP) to discuss some of the initial drafts of the program (Interview 22), but we could
not infer how much of AIDESEP’s input had been adopted. The design team also reasoned that since
participation in the program is voluntary, a thorough participatory process would make the design
process unnecessarily time demanding (Interviews 21, 22, 23).
The centrality of poverty reduction concerns in both programs is, perhaps unsurprisingly, the most
outstanding deviation from policy recommendations. Improving the living conditions of the poor
has been the main overarching declared objective of Latin American governments for many years,
and more markedly since the 2000s, with the emergence of leftist-populist governments all over
South America [75,76]. Even before those developments, CCT programs started proliferating in Latin
America. Studies found that voters tend to reward governments that implement targeted social
assistance programs [77–79], at least in the short term [80]. Subsidies for forest conservation can,
in addition, also legitimately benefit geographically marginalized rural populations that are otherwise
hard to reach for central states.
Additionally, pro-conservation action could be popular with an environmentally conscious
electorate. Our respondents agreed that conservation remains a low priority for voters, although there
were no consistent studies or opinion polls found on the voters’ preferences to back that perception.
However, there is a documented increasing trend in environmental movements’ activity and in the
public environmental awareness in the region [81–83], which may have influenced the adoption of
the programs, despite it not being explicitly recognized by respondents. In any case, an increased
environmental awareness in the public does not necessarily mean that forest conservation would
overtake welfare issues as a priority for voters. Hence, governments should have a political interest in
associating conservation and welfare policies. It is fair to say that both programs have been designed
with the intention of being perceived as a hybrid of environmental and social policies, with the latter
probably being in the driver’s seat.
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3.3. Spatial Targeting in Selecting Participants
Since funds for PES schemes tend to be limited, it is crucial to carefully determine where
interventions will take place and which actors will participate in them. Spatial targeting of PES
should consider both benefits and costs in site selection [51], mainly focusing on areas with
a high-ES density [46,55], high deforestation risk [55,56], and low costs relative to the service
levels [84]. Appropriate targeting is relevant to ensure higher additionality of a PES scheme and
its cost-effectiveness [46,55].
Socio Bosque “has not specifically targeted enrollment to generate increased outcomes in
prevented deforestation and provision of environmental services” [85] (p. 104) but developed
targeting (prioritization) criteria in their operational manual to define who would be enrolled first.
The prioritization criteria used are the level of threat, proxies for environmental service provision,
and poverty levels [86] (see Supplementary materials for detailed targeting criteria). Prioritization was
not intended to be applied from the beginning of the program, but only after there was more demand
for participation than the supply of funds available for new enrollments, which happened in 2012 [87].
The targeting process at Programa Bosques is divided into two steps. The first is the selection of
which provinces are the priorities for conservation. Three criteria are considered at this stage, (a) the
total area of primary forests, (b) deforestation rates, and (c) the poverty incidence rate. The second is
the selection of which communities within the previously prioritized Provinces should take priority
in participating in the program. The indicators used in this phase are (a) the total area of primary
forests, (b) the percentage of conserved primary forests, and (c) the closeness to transport routes [88]
(see Supplementary materials for detailed prioritization criteria). The selection of the initial Provinces,
at the Valley of the Apurímac and Ene Rivers (VRAE) region, however, did not follow the prioritization
criteria and was instead motivated by the government’s interest to benefit a region with a history of
poverty and political conflict (Interview 21). Furthermore, according to information provided by the
GIZ-Peru staff (personal communication, R. Giudice, 8 April 2018), the criteria for prioritization of
communities has not been homogenously followed by the program. In 2011, for example, the program
prepared a ranking of 102 communities based on the prioritization criteria, with the first 50 being
considered a priority for enrollment. In that same year, 27 communities voluntarily applied for
enrollment, of which 17 were enrolled by the end of that year. Only 10 of those 17 were among the list
of 50, and five were not even ranked within the list of 102 communities.
Targeting is, politically, one of the trickiest aspects of the design of a PES program, as it will
ultimately define who participates—and eventually benefits. Consequently, Ecuador and Peru
developed targeting schemes for selecting participants, but enrolled participants with a wider range
of characteristics. Respondents indicated technical reasons for their selection of targeting strategies.
Some of the data for the whole country that were required to implement targeting were lacking.
For that reason, the start of program implementation would allegedly have to be delayed for a few
months while the programs were urged by higher authorities to deliver payments as soon as possible
(Interview 5, 17). There were also concerns about political feasibility and medium-term electoral
strategies of the governments. Targeting conservation incentives to maximize cost-effectiveness may
generate a perception of unfairness if the targeting criteria discriminated against poor landholders
or good forest stewards. A perception of unfairness, justified or not, may jeopardize program
acceptance, undermine the government’s popularity in the intervention area, and cause rifts among
the population. Additionally, the number of enrolled participants and the size of the forest areas under
the programs are arguably regarded as the most important early measures of success for the programs
since measurements of actual deforestation reductions, additionality, or improvements in incomes of
enrolled beneficiaries are, at the time of writing, incipient at best.
3.4. Selection of Plot-Level Conservation Areas
Once the participants were selected, their contractual conservation areas also needed to be
defined. When landowners self-select those, they will likely choose from the start those that are least
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threatened (remote, inaccessible, steep, etc.), where deforestation risks are minimal. Payments would,
thus, make no difference: the so-called adverse selection bias [89] would apply. One PES design
recommendation is, therefore, to make conservation agreements for the entire land area of participants,
so as to counteract self-selection bias.
In both Ecuador and Peru, however, the participants themselves define what part and share of
their land would be enrolled in the programs, whereas deforestation could legally continue on other
lands. Respondents argued that the decision to allow communities and individuals to self-define
conservation areas was taken to maintain coherence with the voluntary nature of the programs
(Interviews 5, 8, 24).
Electoral interests are likely to have also played a role here. A top-down definition of eligible areas
could have been erroneously perceived as a violation of land use rights, especially when community
conservation agreements were made—a problem also observed with the ejidos in Mexico [90].
The design teams reckoned that, even in a context of voluntary enrollment, a perceived interference
in land use decisions would discourage participants from enrolling (Interview 5, 17). In Ecuador,
the team was indeed aware of reports of previous activities in which communities felt discouraged to
participate when they perceived that their freedom to make land use decisions would be hindered
by conservation incentive projects, as described in Profafor and GIZ [91]. Another study [92] that
analyzed the factors affecting desire to participate in Socio Bosque, focused on páramos areas. It found
that “a fear of land expropriation” was one of the most important factors triggering a lack of desire to
participate, together with “insufficient incentive payments to cover opportunity costs” (p. 128). Similar
notions were reported in a study of the Ecuadorian Amazon region, where concern with expropriation
was also reported, with a “fear that at the end of the 20-year contracts, the forested land would revert
to the government. As stated by a male non-participant, ‘some neighbors fear Socio Bosque is a trick,
a way for the government to take possession of your land’” [93] (p. 7).
3.5. Payment Differentiation
The PES literature recommends differentiating payments according to variable ES benefits
and costs of ES provisions across participating landowners [51]. For the latter, payments may
conveniently be aligned with landowner opportunity costs, if these can be approximated [59]. Payment
differentiation is likely to increase the environmental effectiveness of a PES scheme [94] and may also
make the distribution of benefits more equitable if differential ES provision costs among participants
are used as an equity criterion [46].
Opportunity costs were not calculated for the definition of payment levels in Ecuador. The project
team considered that “different levels of incentives depending on the specific location of a landowner
would be a cause of intense social debate and would not be politically viable” [72] (p. 535), and that
a lengthy process to estimate opportunity costs would reduce the political momentum for program
adoption [73]. Opportunity costs and other design parameters were discussed during consultations
with international PES experts, including individuals from the Mexican and Costa Rican programs,
at an expert meeting held in Hacienda Cusin (Otavalo), just a few weeks prior to the launching of
the program. The experts suggested several alternative ways to use opportunity costs for payment
differentiation, including a straightforward road zoning proxy system (Interview 13). Representatives
of the Costa Rican delegation allegedly argued that the explicit use of opportunity costs could be
politically complicated and unnecessary. As a reason, they suggested that such a differentiation is
hard to communicate and could lead to complaints about undue favoritism. The Socio Bosque team
thus decided not to follow the recommendations provided by the academic specialists (Interview 2)
on opportunity costs. There was, consequently, no thorough answer on the definition of the specific
payment values used by Socio Bosque. Respondents stated that the design team took into consideration
budgetary possibilities and tried to offer the highest possible payment for participants (Interviews 2, 5).
However, since one of us (Wunder) participated as invited PES specialist in the expert meeting to
inform the design of Socio Bosque, some triangulation of the interview information is possible here.
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The meeting was held just a few weeks prior to the launching of the program, which was politically
timed to occur around the time of the constitutional referendum (see above). In practice, significant
design choices such as payment differentiation were, at this stage, no longer possible, nor was strong
advice in that direction necessarily desired by the ministerial staff. National experts from Conservation
International, closely working with the Ministry on program design, voiced also a clear framework
for what was or was not politically feasible at this stage of the process. This caused some friction
with some of the international experts, feeling their participation from the outset was being used as
a legitimizing procedural tick-off, rather than a genuine technical input into program design—which,
in all major respects, had de facto already been predetermined.
Nevertheless, the meeting perhaps raised some awareness among Socio Bosque stakeholders
about the importance of opportunity costs, which influenced the future implementation process.
The area-based payment differentiation was devised as a proxy for opportunity costs, with the
“assumption that opportunity costs decrease when the area increases, since access becomes more
difficult in larger areas”, but “was also a political decision to maximize the limited budget that was
available” [95] (pp. 1173–1174). Likewise, the changes in the payments structure introduced in October
2011 showed at least an implicit recognition of potential efficiency gains from taking opportunity
costs into consideration. The program added a differentiation between individual and collective
lands, and between páramos and other vegetation types, as well as adding a special category for
properties under 20 ha. The new structure increased per-hectare payments for communities and
kept original values for individual landowners, except in the under 20ha new category [96,97] (for
additional information, see Supplementary materials). Changes were also due to a decrease in the
rhythm of new participants signing up, especially in páramos areas [95]. The initial values were loosely
based on the incentive values of similar programs implemented in other countries (e.g., Mexico and
Costa Rica) and on the budgetary possibilities of the program (Interview 5).
The Programa Bosques did no adopt a differentiated payments structure, although it reportedly
drew explicitly on lessons from Socio Bosque. The interviews and program documentation did not
yield solid evidence for specific reasons why an undifferentiated payment structure was chosen, or why
opportunity costs were not considered. According to the respondents in Peru, the specific amount of
the payment was defined largely for the sake of simplicity, with the value of 10 Soles per ha/year being
deemed as easy to understand and communicate, and within a realistic budgetary range (Interviews
21, 23). However, in an exchange with international scientists (including co-author Börner) prior
to launching the program, government representatives evoked similar fairness arguments against
payment differentiation as in Ecuador.
3.6. ICDP-Type Components
PES were conceived as “alternatives to the more indirect pro-poor investments for transforming
livelihoods such as ICDPs” [98] (p. 134). ICDPs have been significantly widespread since the 1990s,
with the aim of promoting conservation by providing “alternative sources of products, income,
or social benefits” [60] (p. 1718). ICDPs, however, have shown a mixed track record, at best, in terms
of achieving their proposed conservation objectives and, crucially, provide payments that are not
conditional on the objectives set [60,99]. Additionally, combining PES with development support can
confuse program goals, inflate costs, and eventually compromise conservation outcomes [7,48,60].
Nevertheless, the ‘PES-positive’ literature sees possible benefits for ICDP-like activities, if they are
approached creatively, especially by adapting conditionalities [7]. Additionally, some activities that can
be promoted under a PES scheme, “for example switching to agroforestry or silvopastoral practices”,
may “become profitable for the landholder after some years of implementation”, inducing “the
landholder to adopt the environmentally friendly practice” [51] (p. 149).
Both Socio Bosque and Programa Bosques, however, included ICDP-type components in their
design, which they call productive projects or activities (see Supplementary materials). That means
that the incentive provided cannot be freely utilized by the communities, but must be invested in
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activities intended to generate income, making the program ultimately a source to finance small-scale,
community-led ICDPs. The explanation for the lingering interest in ICDP-type activities is manifold.
Program designers believed that the payments should not appear to be handouts, but must become
seed funds for the construction of long-term solutions for the communities’ socioeconomic issues
(Interview 5, 23). From a technical standpoint, the fact that the money is given to a community,
with a political/hierarchical structure of their own, tying payments to reportable productive activities
was seen as the best way to accountably spread benefits inside the community, counteracting elite
capture and misuse. However, the subsequent implementation shows that these expectations were not
always met. Early analyses of Socio Bosque show that productive activities have not always ensured
transparent and informed decision making in communities [74] and that “some communities are
having difficulties distributing the costs and benefits of participation in Socio Bosque fairly” [100]
(p. 8), reporting evidence of “intracommunal power imbalances and elite capture” [95] (p. 1180).
In Peru, bureaucratic intra-governmental dynamics also played a role. The ability to demonstrate
the investment of payments in productive activities came to be an important asset in negotiations
with the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), which was much more willing to approve budgets
to a program with a stimulus to economic activity than a transfer for ‘not doing something’ (i.e.,
avoiding deforestation) (Interview 24). This led the design team to look to Socio Bosque’s concept
of investment plans attached to the payments (see Supplementary materials). The persistence of
ICDP-type components, therefore, shows that the idealized view of PES as a poverty-environment
“win-win” solution [69] was relevant for the design of the programs, especially to ensure the support
of non-environmental agencies.
4. Conclusions
As we have seen, the centrality of development, welfare and poverty reduction considerations
aimed at ensuring local and intra-bureaucratic support as determinants of policy design choices have
produced a notable deviation from a set of commonly applied PES policy recommendations. The strong
presence of ICDP-type components in the programs is also questionable with regard to cost-efficiency.
Crucially, failure to account for heterogeneity in ecosystem service provision and opportunity costs
in the design of payments leaves ample scope to the adverse self-selection of non-threatened forest
areas into the program, allowing for several of the enrolled areas to generate sub-optimal conservation
benefits in relation to the resources invested. Indeed, a preliminary study suggests that Socio Bosque
“has provided little conservation additionality in terms of the prevented deforestation” [85] (p. 112);
a more recent rigorous study showed the program to reduce deforestation by 1.5% in the areas that
received the program’s direct payments [101], while Börner et al. [102] show that Programa Bosques
is designed suboptimally both in terms of conservation effectiveness and net benefit distribution.
Additionally, an evaluation of the socioeconomic impacts of Programa Bosques shows that, despite the
increase in the scale of production, there is no increase in the value of product sales by the beneficiaries,
due to the low returns to investment and limited market articulation [103].
On the other hand, the environmental components of the programs also had more indirect positive
outcomes. In Peru, the deforestation monitoring capacity has been strengthened through the activities
of Programa Bosques [104,105]. Likewise, the program has improved the cooperation of MINAM with
provincial governments on environmental issues. Socio Bosque has also helped to improve information
on forests in the country, and the program became a blueprint for other environmental policies in the
country (e.g., mangrove protection and biocommerce). Moreover, the changes in the payment structure
of the program show a move towards an implicit recognition of opportunity costs as an element to
improve the efficiency of the scheme.
Our findings are to some extent in line with the literature that highlights the importance of local
contexts in REDD+ and PES [10,15,16,25,106]. Karsenty and Ongolo [9] discussed the difficulties of
implementing REDD+ in “fragile states”, and we showed that even in better-functioning democracies
and administrations, political and bureaucratic constraints may get in the way of cost-efficient
83
Forests 2018, 9, 725
PES and REDD+ design. Despite the “globalist, homogenizing nature of REDD+ guidelines” [26]
(p. 78), reviews on implementation show a patchwork of conceptualizations, guidelines, and forms of
institutionalization [10,15,107]. However, we agree with Angelsen [4] (p. 238), that “the core idea of
REDD+” remains “to apply conditionality and make payments to countries (and projects) based on
performance or results”. To prevent REDD+ from becoming simply the ‘conservation fad’ that some
authors identify [108,109], efficiency-oriented recommendations must remain central to what program
designers, especially within the REDD+ policy mix, should strive for [46,51], without losing sight of
the potential equity risks [14].
The design of the programs has shown several politically and administratively sensitive issues
that will be at the heart of the design of many ‘multi-objective’ REDD+ program. The active
promotion of non-carbon benefits for REDD+ and PES means that any discussion on the design
of programs will experience similar political repercussions and pressures as the ones we found in
Socio Bosque and Programa Bosques. PES and REDD+ are marred with tradeoffs and risks [10,14,69],
which will require explicit recognition and action [4]. Transparent priority setting in public policy,
independent decision-making capabilities, funding for agencies responsible for REDD+ or PES
programs, and sound technical provisions are jointly needed to ensure that the schemes efficiently
generate emissions reductions.
It is likely that governments will remain the main promoters and funders for PES and REDD+
in the foreseeable future. Our findings help explain why the policy-making dynamics, such as
intra-governmental conflicts and power imbalances between sectors and agencies, are key factors
leading to the prevalence of multi-objective REDD+. It remains to be seen how governments will
balance pressures for non-carbon benefits and equity considerations by ensuring the necessary
cost-efficient emissions reductions, which will certainly be required for eligibility in future REDD+
funding schemes. Instead of reproducing an unrealistic “win–win ecological modernization
discourse” [15] (p. 133), governments will likely better fulfill their REDD+ agendas by recognizing and
addressing the political tradeoffs inherent to multi-objective REDD+.
It is clear from our findings that not enough emphasis is placed on adapting technical
recommendations to the contexts in which they must be turned into real policies. Indeed, better
knowledge of what constitutes a favorable public policy environment for effective REDD+ can
help to avoid investments in doomed policy programs. Without doubt, for PES programs to be
cost-effective REDD+ vehicles, intra-governmental conflicts and imbalances as well as the short-term
planning horizons of politicians and bureaucrats, will have to be jointly addressed with technical
challenges. Strategies to enhance program efficiency, therefore, should be based on a careful evaluation
of context-specific political and institutional constraints, if both environmental and social objectives
are to be reached.
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Appendix A. List of Respondents
Ecuador
1. Foreign technical cooperation staff
2, 3, 4. Socio Bosque staff
5, 6. Former high-level Environment Ministry (MAE) decision makers
7, 8, 9, 10. NGO technical cooperation staff
11. Local NGO staff
12. Environmental Policy specialist
13. Former high-level MAE decision maker
14. Environmental Policy specialist
Peru
15, 16. Foreign technical cooperation staff
17, 18, 19, 20, 21. Programa Bosques staff
22. Former Programa Bosques director
23. Former Programa Bosques staff
24. Former high-level MINAM decision maker
25. Former Programa Bosques staff
26. MEF staff
27. Social Development ministry staff
28. High-level MINAM decision maker
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Abstract: The capacity of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) forests to sequestrate carbon
has attracted interest from the international community to protect forests for carbon storage and
alleviate rural poverty by establishing REDD+ (Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation). Using information gathered from interviews, focus groups, field observations,
and policy document analysis, this paper demonstrates that REDD+ is not well adapted to the
institutional structures of forest governance in the DRC, including both statutory and customary
tenure. The lack of harmonization between these systems has created a situation of competition
between state and customary authorities. This has created opportunities for powerful actors to ‘shop’
between the two systems to attempt to legitimize their expanded use and control over forest resources.
As the REDD+ process evolves from the preparation to the implementation phase, competing
institutional structures may negatively impact the effectiveness of REDD+, as well as the distribution
of costs and benefits. While the newly enacted community forest law provides an opportunity to
recognize customary rights to forestland, the lack of functional local government at the district and
village levels has prompted REDD+ pilot project organizers to establish new village organizations
for REDD+.
Keywords: forest tenure; property rights; authority structures; REDD+; the DRC
1. Introduction
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) hosts some of the world’s most carbon-rich and
biodiverse forests, covering more than 60% of the national territory with an estimated 17 billion tons of
carbon sequestered [1]. The current deforestation rate in the DRC is estimated to be 0.27% per year [2].
This has motivated the international community to develop several incentive-based policies that aim
to increase the provision of public goods from the forest (carbon and biodiversity) by explicitly valuing
these goods and incentivizing their protection through different means, including under the umbrella
of REDD+ (Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation). The full expression
behind the acronym is ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, plus the
sustainable management of forests, and the conservation and enhancement of forest carbon stocks
(REDD+)’. REDD+ is a global climate policy instrument designed to provide financial incentives to
tropical forest countries and land owners to reduce carbon emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation and protect forest carbon stocks. It is assumed that policies like REDD+ will effectively
and efficiently conserve forests as well as improve the livelihoods of forest-dependent communities
where poverty tends to be pervasive [3–5]. Whether these goals can be achieved depends greatly on
the institutional structures that affect forest practices at the local level.
The implementation of REDD+ requires a clear definition/allocation of property rights as a basis
for implementing measures and defining who is entitled to compensation. This is not an easy task in the
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Forests 2018, 9, 662
DRC, where the forest is governed by a statutory tenure that co-exists with customary tenure. Colonial
and post-colonial policies on forest governance have been based on the substitution of customary tenure
systems with statutory tenure systems to pursue the creation of a modern economy based on market
principles [6–8]. This transformation has resulted in conflicts between state agents and traditional
leaders around who controls (and should control) access to the forests and its resources [9,10]. Although
policy debates in recent years have swung back towards recognizing, adapting, and formalizing
customary forest tenure, institutional pluralism (in this paper, we used the term ‘institutional pluralism’
instead of ‘legal pluralism’ to denote the existence of two or more institutional structures in one social
space [11]), including the presence of different authorities, has maintained and contributed to a general
fluidity of the institutional framework for forest governance [7,12].
This paper aims to assess the importance of both customary and statutory forest tenures,
the adaptations they produce among local actors, and implications of these aspects for the
implementation of REDD+ in the DRC. The paper responds to the following questions: (1) How
does institutional pluralism affect local forest use? (2) What are the effects of this pluralism on
the implementation of REDD+? The empirical data for this study come dominantly from two
REDD+ pilot project sites in the Equateur province along from an analysis of policy documents.
By doing this, the paper provides empirical evidence to the scholarly literature on REDD+ on the
complexity surrounding REDD+ implementation in a fragile state with competing tenure systems.
This contribution is relevant for policy action given the fact that tenure security is crucial for effective
forest stewardship and REDD+ implementation [13,14].
In the following, Section 2 provides the theoretical framework of the paper by drawing on
institutional theories of forest governance. Section 3 presents the geographical context and the research
methods. Section 4 presents the nature and dynamics of both customary and statutory tenure of forest
governance in the Équateur province. Section 5 analyzes adaptations of local actors operating within
the institutional structures described in Section 4. Section 6 discusses the findings in relation to the
development of REDD+ projects in the DRC. Section 7 summarizes the main findings and recommends
future policy actions.
2. Conceptualizing Tenure and Property Rights to Forests
Forest tenure is a social contract, whether defined in customary or statutory terms, that determines
who can hold and use the forests for how long and under what conditions [15]. Tenure encompasses
property rights, understood as the control over a benefit stream and the ability to call upon the
collective to stand behind one’s claim to this benefit stream ([16], p. 15). Tenure, therefore, embodies
both property rights and the authority structures that enforce and legitimatize claims or control over
benefit streams. Customary tenure in this context is typically a set of rules that governs community
allocation—access, use, and transfer of forests—as enforced by customary authorities in accordance
with the customs and traditions of the community. On the other hand, statutory tenure is a set of rules
and regulations enshrined in formalized legislation, decided by a legislature, that determines who can
use the forests for how long and under what conditions [17]. While Freudenberger (ibid.) made the
distinction that customary tenure depends on unwritten rules, and statutory tenure on written ones,
the key point involves differences in authority structure.
Property rights to forests are recognized not as a unitary concept of ‘ownership’ but as a ‘bundle of
rights’ often involving groups of people with multiple and simultaneous rights and hence, a shared
interest in a common resource [18–21]. This bundle of rights may be broken down along a continuum
from access, to withdrawal, management, exclusion, and alienation rights [22]. Property rights are
also differentiated among a variety of rights holders conceptualized into three categories—states,
communities, and individuals [23,24]. The authority that defines the bundle of rights specifying
property is crucial to the sense of legitimizing or enforcing these rights in practice. Hence, different
strategies for accessing and benefitting from forest resources transcend statutory property rights and
may rely on different types of authority [25].
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In this paper, we use the environmental governance framework developed by Vatn [26]
to conceptualize tenure and property rights to forests in the context of institutional pluralism.
These structures of forest governance include actors and institutions (Figure 1). Institutions include
rules regarding political decision-making—constitutions, gubernatorial decrees, collective choice rules,
or customary laws. These decisions create the second type of institution—i.e., those governing the
economic process—like property rights. Such rights comprise three elements: user rights, control rights,
and alienation rights. User rights are typically access and withdrawal rights, as defined by Schlager
and Ostrom [22]. Control rights, also referred to as second-order rights, determine use rights and
include management, exclusion, transaction, and monitoring rights [27].
 
Figure 1. A framework for analyzing forest governance (adapted from [26] 2011, Tapir Academic Press).
Alienation rights are the rights to rent, sell, or transfer rights to others.
Central to our analysis are political and economic actors. Economic actors include local farmers,
loggers, and the state as the forest owner that collects revenue through the allocation of timber
concessions, but also civil servants when obtaining income from bribes. Political actors include
the government, politicians, government agencies involved in forest management, administrators,
and traditional authorities who define and enforce the rules of use and the control of forest resources.
The political actors are central to our analysis because they have the authority to define and enforce
property rights. On the other hand, the economic actors have day-to-day access to the forests and
choose which political actors to support and enforce their claims.
In this context, there are two principal types of political actors: state authorities and traditional
authorities. The coexistence of the two allows economic actors to choose which authority structure
to support their claims. The power of state authorities is enshrined in either the constitution, laws,
or gubernatorial decrees, while the power of the traditional authorities is based on customary laws,
i.e., rules sanctioned by local customs and traditions that are negotiated and renegotiated over time
and space [7,28].
The ways that political actors access their positions are complex in the DRC. State authorities
are appointed through elections and political appointments, the latter often based on patron–client
relationships [29]. As formal institutions are generally weak, patron–client relationships define who
holds political positions. This is true in the forestry sector as well [30,31]. Traditional authorities
are appointed through rules based on cultural processes linked to the inheritance of genealogical
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rights [32]. Economic actors may interact with political actors through exchange (the state and logging
companies or traditional authorities and local loggers) through command (by state and individuals or
communities), by granting formal property rights, or by following local/customary rules [26].
To understand how economic actors deal with these overlapping institutional structures that
compete for access to forest resources in Équateur province, we employed the institutional bricolage
approach developed by Cleaver [33]. It describes the process by which “people consciously and
non-consciously draw on existing social formulae to patch or piece together institutions in response to
changing situations” ([34], p. 10). Through this process, actors create space to interpret and re-interpret
existing institutions, enabling them to interact, negotiate, and compete with each other to access forest
resources [33,35]. To create the necessary space to act, actors need to possess certain power resources
or mechanisms of access [33]. These power resources are attributes that enable or constrain actors to
influence access to forest resources. In forest governance, an economic actor may draw upon different
power resources to make claims over forests such as their socio-political position—for example,
an official position, formal function, or kinship relations—a social network, economic resources such
as wealth, or personal attributes such as knowledge, eloquence, self-confidence, and strength [33].
The environmental governance framework and institutional bricolage framework were selected
because they complement each other and provide a better understanding of how institutions and
actors operate in practice. While the former focuses on the structural view of power in analyzing
institutions, the institutional bricolage approach emphasizes an agent perspective on institutionalized
power—how actors operate in relation to institutions.
In the DRC, REDD+ strategies and pilot projects are developed in the context of competing
institutional structures for forest governance which are not very different from other Congo Basin
countries [36–38]. Consequently, any intervention aimed at promoting sustainable forest management
and conservation will have to take into account the existing formal and informal rights over forest
resources and the roles of all actors involved. This paper assesses the nature and dynamics of these
two conflicting institutional structures of forest governance, how local actors respond to them when
legitimatizing use and control rights over forests, and how this might influence the effectiveness of
REDD+ on the ground.
3. Geographical Context and Research Methods
The data for this paper were collected from two REDD+ pilot sites in the Équateur province
of the DRC (Figure 2). The province was divided into five new provinces in July 2015 following
the implementation of the decentralization reform of 2006. The data for this analysis were collected
following the political and governance structure of the old province before the division. The province
has a total area size of 403,292 km2, and hosts 28 per cent of the total forest area in the DRC [39].
The population of the province was estimated to be 3,574,385 inhabitants in 2008, distributed into
two main ethnic groups—the Bantu and the Batwa—also known as the Pygmies. The Batwa form
only about 20 per cent of the total population and are located in the Southern part of the province.
The Bantu is divided into different sub-ethnic groups, such as the Bangala, the Ngwaka in the north of
the province; and the Mongo, Ntumba, and Ekonda in the south of the province.
The first pilot site was located in Buya 1 village of Bikoro territory, southwest of the old Equateur
province, which is now the new Équateur province. This village has an estimated population of
about 3000 inhabitants, with about 300 households located just 42 km from Mbandaka, the seat of
administration for Équateur province. The main ethnic groups are the Mongo and Batwa Pygmies.
The Batwa Pygmies living in the village are not considered customary landowners; they are migrants
from the Ingende territory. The village is made up of the clans (A clan is a group of families that
share actual or perceived kinship and descent. In the Équateur province and other provinces in the
DRC, clans are very important traditional forest management groups)—Ekole, Esangele-Nkoy and
Djipanga—and migrants from other districts and territories of the province. Its dominant vegetation is
94
Forests 2018, 9, 662
equatorial swamp rainforest that is inundated year-round, making road construction and maintenance
difficult [40].
The second pilot site was located in the Bokumu Mokola village of the Gemena territory, northwest
of the old Équateur province, which is now the Sud-Ubangi province. Bokumu-Mokola/Bongo village
belongs to the Bominege tribal chiefdom, located about 60 km from Gemena town. The village has an
estimated population of 2700 inhabitants, with about 280 households made up of one ethnic group
known as Ngwaka. The pilot site is made up of five clans—Boyabakona, Boyagbandolo, Bobanda,
Bogbando, and Boyangadaka. Here, the dominant vegetation is dense, humid, equatorial lowland
rainforest that transits into evergreen savannah woodland and grasses in the north. The populations
of both pilot sites rely heavily on the forest for their livelihoods via slash and burn shifting cultivation,
the extraction of non-timber forest products (NTFPs), fishing, hunting, and the production of charcoal.
Figure 2. Map of the two pilots in Équateur province: (a) Bikoro territory, Buya 1 project village;
(b) Gemena territory, Bokumu-Mokola project village. Source: Chapman (2016).
Table 1 offers an overview of the statutory and customary authority structures. All villages
belong to a particular politico-administrative district unit, which, in turn, belongs to a territory and
thence, a province. These politico-administrative units are established by statutory law and were
reinforced in the 2006 decentralization reform. This reform demanded the establishment of elected
local government structures at the different politico-administrative levels. To date, this has occurred
only at the provincial level, with the other units still lacking local government structures. Each of these
politico-administrative units, from the village to the territory, is thus still governed by a representative
with executive power to implement and enforce state laws and resolve local conflicts. On the other
hand, people in the study area also belong to traditional jurisdictions known as tribal chiefdoms,
known in in French as groupements. These traditional jurisdictions include the villages and clans and
are governed by tribal chiefs. The main function of the customary authorities is to exercise control and
manage forestland allocation based on customary rules. The relationship between tribal chiefdom as a
customary institution and statutory forestland tenure is analyzed in the next section.
The paper combines data from policy documents, interviews, focus group discussions. and field
observations from field research conducted in May–July 2013, July–August 2014, and July–August 2015.
National and provincial policy documents and administrative texts were examined, and seventy-two
in-depth interviews were conducted in French and Lingala with six different types of actors:
customary authorities, local administrative authorities, staff of the different intervening agencies,
executive members of the village associations, staff of the REDD+ pilot project, and logging operators.
The interviewees were selected from the actor and institution mapping list established during the
project’s baseline study. They were all contacted and interviewed in person at different times based on
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their availability during the field research. The interviews were transcribed and analyzed manually at
different stages of the field research process and the corresponding author was the principal researcher
who conducted the interviews. Our intention was to gather information on the different institutions
that influence forest practices and how actors adapt to these institutions when legitimatizing their
rights and access to forests.
Table 1. Characterization of the study area.
Characteristics Bikoro Pilot Site Gemena Pilot Site
State authorities
Territorial administrator, district
administrator, village administrative chief
government agencies, tribal chief
Territorial administrator, district
administrator, village administrative chief
government agencies, tribal chief
Traditional authorities Tribal chief, customary chief, notables,and customary landowners
Tribal chief, customary chief, notables,
and customary landowners
Dominant ethnic groups Mongo, Ntumba, Ekonda, Pygmies 20% Ngakwa
Grass root associations Peasant development organizations (OPDs) Religious groups
Intervening agencies
World Food Program (WFP), Food and
Agricultural Organization (FAO), Oxfam,
Bureau Diocésain du Développement
(BDD), World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF)
Humana People to People Congo (HPP),
Communauté Evangélique de l’Ubangi,
Mongala, Gemena (CEUM)
Forest use
Conversion of forests for agriculture,
logging, charcoal production, non-timber
forest products (NTFPs). Presence of
logging concessions
Agriculture, logging, charcoal production,
NTFPs. Presence of agricultural concessions
Forest type
Dense humid equatorial rainforest
accommodating a large portion of swamp
forests inundated all year round.
Dense humid lowland rainforest
accommodating evergreen savannah
woodland and grasses.
To capture local actors’ insights on how these institutions shape forest practice, and how they
respond to them when legitimatizing their practices, we organized nine focus group discussions
with ten members in each group. Five groups in the project village in Bikoro (Buya 1), consisting of,
respectively, men, women, customary landowners, migrants, and Pygmies, and another four groups in
the project village in Gemena (Bokumu Mokola) consisting of men, women, customary landowners,
and migrants were convened. The focus groups considered issues related to local people’s rights to
resources and benefits and their interactions with local authorities when making decisions about forest
rights and conflict resolutions. Field observations were collected on the availability and quality of
social infrastructures like roads, schools, healthcare and community activities, rights to land, material
resources, places for village meetings, and the way local people engage in these meetings.
4. Forest Tenure Systems at Play in Equateur Province
Here, we examine the nature and dynamics of customary and statutory tenure systems in the
Équateur province.
4.1. The Nature and Dynamics of Customary Tenure to Forests
Customary forest tenure is traditionally grouped under a tribal chiefdom (in French: groupement)
governed by a tribal chief (in French: chef de groupement). This tribal chief is the highest customary
authority in the study area. Each tribal chiefdom is made up of many villages, with the tribal chief
being custodian to all forestlands in the chiefdom. The main duties of the tribal chief are to protect the
people and the land and to bring fertility to the soil and rivers. Their succession is rotational among
the dominant clans of the chiefdoms. Each village that belongs to the tribal chiefdom is governed by a
customary village chief. Each village is made up of more than one clan, and the village customary chief
is selected from the clan that established the first rights on the village forestland. The customary chief
position is based on inheritance among male members of the lineage. Each of the clans are headed by a
notable, with acquisition based on inheritance among male members of their lineage. The members of
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the clans are considered customary landowners (in French: ayant droits). These different levels are
based on their current geographical location, since some clans now extend to other villages within or
beyond the tribal chiefdoms.
The customary system of forest management follows a decentralised model where clans of
the village constitute the operational units for production and control of the forest, and customary
authorities play a role in the supervision and management of disputes. Each tribal chiefdom has a
traditional council headed by the tribal chief with the village customary chiefs as representatives.
Similarly, each village has a traditional council headed by a village customary chief with the notables
as representatives. The latter makes decisions about village land allocations and enforces property
rights over the village forests, while the chiefdom’s council makes decisions around land allocation.
The legitimacy of the customary authority resides in a cultural belief system transferred from generation
to generation. There are also traditional mechanisms of sanctioning these authorities if they misbehave.
Rights holders are classified into three categories: collective (customary authorities),
clans (group of families), and individuals. User rights belong to members of clans. This group of
right holders claim (exclusive) use rights to all forest resources in the territory of the village. Tradition
considers customary landowners to be descendants of the male founder of the clan. He established the
territorial rights of first occupation through migration and the establishment of a lineage.
Customary landowners perceive the forests to be a common physical and cultural inheritance from
the ancestors. These user rights are passed from generation to generation through the genealogical line
of the male descendants of the founder of the clan (see [7]). Non-clan members living in the village
may be granted user rights to forest resources upon request. Non-clan and complete outsiders may
negotiate access and use rights with the customary chief and notables to harvest high-value forest
resources such as poles/sticks, timber, and charcoal. Converting forestland into farmland is a decision
made among the clans that make up the village. Each member family of the clans receives land for
farming. Non-clan members negotiate use rights to farmland with customary landowners either by
renting a parcel of land, sharecropping, or other forms of social exchange.
Control rights belong to the customary chief, notables, and clan members. The village customary
chief manages and controls access to the villages´ communal land and makes decisions about its
allocation. The notables manage and control access to the clans’ forestland and allocate land to the
family members of the clans for different uses and also resolve internal land conflicts within or between
families. Once land has been allocated to the families of a clan, each family establishes productive
rights through labor investment. In the Congo Basin, clearing the forest for cultivation and making
any labor investment to manage forest resources for productive purposes are the most robust and
long-term forms of appropriation associated with exclusive permanent user rights, also known as
usufruct rights (see [7,41]). Families that have control rights to forestland may exclude non-family
members from using the land for cultivation. However, clan members can still use resources over
which the families have not established permanent use rights, e.g., harvesting firewood, gathering
non-timber forest products and medicinal plants, and hunting.
According to customary law, it is forbidden for clan members to sell forestland as it is considered
the collective property of the clan. Leasehold, renting, or sharecropping of forestland is allowed.
The enforcement of customary rules of access and use are based on local norms. These unwritten rules
are overlapping, flexible, and subject to negotiation and renegotiation depending on factors such as
the persons involved, the place, even the season.
Today, with the increased presence of state agents and local administrative authorities,
the authority of the customary chiefs and notables has weakened. This is especially the case in
Bikoro. Information from the interviews and focus groups revealed that the enforcement of customary
rules to forestland that are not supported by local government representatives is limited. Many wealthy,
well-situated, and knowledgeable—i.e., powerful—village members now use local state agents and
authorities to establish access to forestland that was once governed by customary tenure. They prefer
to report conflicts over land held under customary tenure to local state authorities, like the district
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chief or a state agency, like the police, rather than reporting them to the customary chiefs and notables.
In doing so, they undermine the authority of the customary leaders.
During the men’s focus group discussion in Buya1, a village member noted, ‘if you report
conflicts over land to the customary chief, the solution is based on our culture and the accused is
not well sanctioned’ (interview, village member in Buya1 village, 2014). Many participants of the
focus groups supported this statement. The presence of local state authorities encourages resourceful
village members to circumvent customary authorities by establishing social relations with local state
authorities (see [42]).
In the Gemena pilot study, customary tenure to forestland was shown to still be strong and the
power of customary authorities over forestland was uncontested. This region is characterized by
ethnic homogeneity, and local people tend to reject state institutions because they do not relate to their
cultural beliefs, norms, and routinized ways of doing things. The presence of state authorities is also
limited due to poor roads and few extractive activities.
4.2. The Nature and Dynamics of Statutory Tenure to Forests
Statutory forest tenure was established in the 2002 Forest Code, which states that all forests are
owned by the state (Art. 7, [43]). Article 10 of the Forest Code classifies the forests in three broad
categories: classified forests, protected forests, and permanent production forests. The classified
forests are designated for environmental protection and may include nature reserves, forests located in
national parks, botanical and zoological gardens, hunting areas, urban forests, etc. In protected forests,
user rights are less restricted compared to classified forests. The Forest Code also recognizes customary
forest tenure in the protected forests, which was reinforced by the 2006 Constitution. Protected
forests may also serve as community forests, since they can be granted to communities upon request.
In contrast, permanent production forests are designated for the allocation of logging concessions and
forests already used for timber production, identified via a public survey process (Art. 23, [43]).
The 2002 Forest Code recognizes the right of communities with customary claims to the forests to
use the forests for their subsistence. It also allows communities with customary rights to extract timber
from protected forest through artisanal logging permits (Art. 111–112, [43]). Communities may apply
for such permits for a maximum of fifty hectares per year on their own or through a private artisanal
logger following an agreement between the community and the logger (Arrete 035, [44]). Individuals
of Congolese nationality can apply for artisanal logging permits to harvest timber from the protected
forest using long saw or a chainsaw [44,45].
The Forest Code and its administrative texts also grant long-term logging rights (control rights)
to concessionaires to exploit timber from production forests. The logging rights to concessionaires
are granted for a period of twenty-five years through a bidding process that allows both Congolese
and non-Congolese nationals to participate (Art. 83, 85–86, [43]). These logging rights mandate
the concessionaires to establish a management plan and to consult communities with customary
rights to forests that overlap their concessions to negotiate and sign an agreement for socioeconomic
development (Art. 89, [43]). The concessionaire must identify these communities and their legitimate
authorities through a legally required socioeconomic survey. An administrative text further provides
a model for these agreements by, e.g., defining what should be negotiated between the parties
(Arrete 028, [46]). However, this text fails to provide guidelines on how to negotiate the social
agreement. Hence, in the past, logging compensations were typically granted on a voluntary basis to
the customary authorities while excluding the majority of community members [47]. To ensure equity
in benefit sharing, a ministerial text known as Arrêté 023 was adopted in 2010 and provides a new
model for the implementation of social agreement (Arrete 023, [48]).
The Forest Code further recognizes community use rights within logging concessions for
subsistence but restricts commercial activities and any use deemed incompatible with logging activities
(Art. 44, [43]). The Forest Code also allocates control rights to communities through its provision for
community forest concessions in protected forests (Art. 22, [43]). The law for the implementation
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of community forests was enacted in August 2014. It advances provisions for communities to
have concessions of up to 50,000 ha on a perpetual basis, but the guidelines and procedures for
implementation are still under process.
The Forest Code grants the Ministry of Environment, Nature Conservation and Tourism (MECNT)
the authority to make decisions on forest allocation and management, to issue logging permits
to concessionaires, and to approve any forest management plans and the quantity of timber to be
harvested. The Forest Code and its implementing regulations, coupledwith the decentralization reform,
recognized the authority of provincial governors to issue artisanal logging permits in the provinces
upon examination of the application and subsequent recommendations made by the provincial and
district forest administration. These authorities are mandated to monitor and enforce all the provisions
to the Forest Code and its implementing regulations.
In practice, enforcement of the Forest Code and its implementing regulations is very weak. First,
the forest classification is not implemented and there is inconsistency in the Forest Code. Second,
forest law enforcement is massively under-resourced in the DRC. Enforcement officers represent
just 1% of the total staff of the MECNT, and most are based in cities, many miles from the logging
concessions they are tasked with monitoring. In addition, very few forest officers have any education
beyond secondary school, and access to civil service employment is typically based on political
patronage [49,50]. Third, low salaries, which are paid late or irregularly, weaken the quality of
their work. Fourth, bribery and corruption at both the national and local levels is a significant
barrier to forest law enforcement [51,52]. Fifth, many local authorities and communities know very
little about the details of the Forest Code and especially the new institutional structure created by
Arrêté 023. Finally, conflict between the central and provincial authorities regarding the new division
of powers in the management of forest royalties and artisanal operations affects forest law enforcement
(see also [12,29,52]).
5. Competing Tenures and Forest Practice in Equateur Province
Here, we describe how the institutional pluralism explained above plays out for two major forest
uses—timber extraction and charcoal production—in the study area. We have chosen these two uses as
they demonstrate the different ways that local actors adapt to the overlapping institutional structures
to legitimatize their forest practices or to make claims on forests.
5.1. Timber Extraction
Artisanal logging permits are granted only to Congolese nationals to exploit timber in protected
forests specifically, distinct from the categories of general production or classified forests. Since the
classification of the forest estate is not enforced or locally formalized, artisanal logging takes place
in uncategorized forests, often including forest concession areas, which thus creates confusion and
conflict between concessionaires, artisanal operators, and communities. In an interview with the
district MECNT administrator of Gemena territory in July 2015, it was revealed that no artisanal
logging permits were issued by the governor for 2014–2015. According to him, many of the artisanal
loggers in Gemena operated either with authorization letters issued by MECNT officials in Kinshasa
or the territorial administrator or without permits.
Information gathered from interviews with five different artisanal loggers operating in the
REDD+ pilot site in Gemena revealed that it is difficult to get artisanal logging permits from the
governor or MECNT in Kinshasa, as they do not have the needed ‘social capital’—e.g., political
connection or social network—to do so. Two of the loggers interviewed operated with receipts issued
by the district administration of MECNT. These receipts documented that they had paid taxes to the
administration to log timber species and, according to them, this is accepted as if it was a logging
permit by both customary authorities and local forest officers controlling timber extraction. The other
three loggers interviewed operated without permits. They negotiated their logging rights through
customary chiefs and the customary landowners and state administration with informal payments.
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These loggers also noted that many artisanal loggers in Gemena operated without permits. They also
established social relations with local politicians and military personnel to improve and maintain their
negotiation leverage.
Data from interviews and focus group discussions revealed that all artisanal loggers, both with
and without permits (tax receipts), had to negotiate their access and use rights to the forest through the
customary authority and landowners prior to logging. The negotiation process varied and depended
upon the area of forest to be logged and/or the size of the tree’s species. The loggers negotiated access
rights with the customary authority by providing gifts (alcohol, food, tools, and building materials),
including 300–500 USD. If the forest area to be logged had already been allocated to any clan of the
village according to customary arrangements, the loggers had to negotiate use rights to the forest
with the members of that clan as well by providing payments and gifts. The logger was entitled to
the timber species, but the ownership of the forestland remained with the clan (men and customary
owners’ focus groups at both pilot sites in 2015).
At the Bikoro REDD+ pilot site, three different types of artisanal loggers were identified.
One group had logging permits issued by either the governor of the province or top officials at
the MECNT in Kinshasa. This group of loggers was considered powerful because they had the material
resources, knowledge, and social networks to obtain such logging permits. A group of less well-situated
loggers used tax receipts issued from the provincial and district administration of MECNT to establish
rights. Those with the weakest relations operated without permits but built social relations with
customary authorities and negotiated their way through the administration, either with side payments
or by using their social capital, i.e., political loyalty, local networks, and family ties. At the local level
(the village), all loggers negotiated their access to the forest with customary authorities and customary
landowners. Once the resourceful loggers had negotiated access rights with the customary authorities,
they were often reluctant to negotiate their use rights to forests with the customary landowners.
A typical example of this occurred in Penzelle village in 2011–2013, where a powerful artisanal
logger operated in the village together with a Chinese partner. The forest area logged was noted as part
of a forest concession allocated to a Lebanese logging company (ITB). This artisanal logger operated in
the village using heavy machinery without making any agreement with the customary landowners.
The local people were unable to influence the logging operation because they were informed that
the logger had strong connections both to the governor of the province and the mayor of Mbandaka
municipality. The supervisors of the logging operation (two Chinese men) refused to be interviewed
by us and asked us to contact the governor of the province or the mayor of Mbandaka municipality.
5.2. Charcoal Production
The situation of charcoal production differs strongly from logging. Charcoal production has
become a lucrative economic activity in the Équateur province due to increased demand from the
principal cities, including Kinshasa. Charcoal production is considered an activity under the use
rights of communities. The Forest Code and its administrative texts make provisions for circulation
permits for producers and transporters of woody forest products including charcoal. The local forestry
department is authorized to issue these permits at the area of extraction and requires inspections at
production sites. The local forestry department is also responsible for issuing sale permits to charcoal
merchants and collecting tax. The 2006 decentralization reform transferred the authority to issue sale
permits for fuelwood and charcoal to the Directorate of New and Renewable Energy at the Ministry of
Energy. This Directorate is also responsible for collecting taxes from charcoal sold in the markets.
Data from interviews with local MECNT officials in Mbandaka and Bikoro as well as local
administrative authorities revealed that charcoal production is largely regulated by customary
institutions and authorities despite the Forest Code provision (MECNT district administrator pers
comm.). This provision is little known and seldom applied. Charcoal production takes place in shifting
cultivation areas of the forest, fallow land, and in primary forests. The producers are mainly customary
landowners living in these villages, although there are some migrants who engage in this activity as
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well. According to these officials and the customary authorities alike, charcoal production is not a
primary livelihood activity among local people.
Data from interviews and focus groups in the Bikoro pilot nevertheless indicated that many
households are engaged in charcoal production. The presence of the Lebanese logging company in
Bikoro provides cheap transportation for charcoal to Kinshasa on the boats that transport its timber.
Also, the road that links Bikoro and Mbandaka has reduced transportation costs (including for charcoal)
to the town. Bikoro has also witnessed an influx of charcoal merchants in recent years. Many of them
pre-finance the production process, provide material support to local producers, and hire labor from
the Pygmy population.
The migrants or the merchants who finance the process of charcoal production negotiate use their
rights to forest with the customary authorities and customary landowners by either buying trees or
renting parcels of forestland to produce charcoal. Many non-clan members living in these villages use
forestland to which they have use rights for cultivation to produce charcoal during forest clearing.
Information from focus group discussions in the Buya 1 village revealed that many clan members are
now restricting non-clan members’ rights to produce charcoal on forestland secured for cultivation
because of the increasing value of charcoal in the market. Clan members are now demanding non-clan
members who want to produce charcoal to negotiate use rights to cut trees standing on forestland
secured for cultivation.
At the Gemena pilot site, few customary landowners are involved in charcoal production because
of poor roads. The few charcoal merchants operating in the area rent parcels of forestland or buy
trees from the customary landowners, including the customary authority, while others pay customary
landowners to produce charcoal for them. At the Gemena pilot site, the customary rules prohibit
clan members and non-clan members from cutting trees that bear caterpillars for charcoal production.
The customary rules are not as strong in Bikoro, since many customary landowners reported the
disappearance of trees bearing caterpillars due to logging and charcoal production.
All charcoal merchants are required to have a sale permit, but many operate without them.
Many sale taxes are imposed on these merchants by government officials at the markets, at road blocks,
and at exit locations. Many transporters and merchants, however, do not pay these taxes but negotiate
with government officials at road blocks and exit locations with side payments. Data collected from the
interviews and field observations revealed five different government officials that collect taxes from
the sale of charcoal. This includes officials from the provincial Ministry of Environment, Ministry of
Energy, local territorial and district state authorities, and police department authorities. These different
authorities impose different taxes on charcoal transporters and merchants. Similar findings have also
been reported in other regions of the DRC [53,54].
In Bikoro, officials of the local MECNT coordination unit collect a sales tax for each bag
(about 60 kg) of charcoal to be transported to Kinshasa on the boat of a logging company. Many local
producers avoid paying this sales tax by selling their products to charcoal merchants that come to
villages. Local producers who transport charcoal to the markets in Mbandaka, however, pay tax.
Many of them also complained about taxes imposed on them at the market by various local officials.
6. Institutional Pluralism: What Are the Implications for REDD+?
The above demonstrates the competing relations between the customary and state authorities in
legitimatizing and enforcing forest property rights at the local level, especially around timber extraction.
Given such an institutional landscape, actors engaged in forestry invent different ways of dealing with
the plurality of power centers at the local level to ensure claims to forest resources—a phenomenon
known as forum shopping [18]. Their ability to choose which authority structure to legitimatize their
forest use depends, however, on the power resources they possess, i.e., material resources, knowledge,
and social relations. In such an institutional landscape, there are no effective checks on the powers of
the elite relative to the poor and marginalized; actors with more power resources influence those who
govern (see [42]).
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How then can REDD+ be implemented in an institutional landscape with competing authority
structures? Power and authority are very important regarding access to resources, as they largely
determine who can benefit from resources regardless of whether they have tenure rights or not [55].
Many scholars have pointed out the importance of forest tenure for REDD+ implementation,
since REDD+ is set up to reward those who maintain or enhance carbon sequestration in the
forest [14,56,57]. As REDD+ is a payment-based mechanism, rights holders to forest carbon should
be the ones who are both compensated and held accountable for fulfilling or failing to fulfill
their obligations.
Many civil society organizations operating in the DRC believe that REDD+ affords the opportunity
to expedite and enhance the tenure security of forest-dependent communities through reform [58,59].
Others claim that REDD+ interventions might increase state control over forestland while risking the
exclusion of some categories of forest users [60,61]. More generally, expediting forest tenure reforms
might not guarantee effective and legitimate REDD+ implementation if the authority structures that
define and enforce rules are weak and if the process involves top-down government imposition
of tenure security through land titling as a prerequisite for the participation of local communities.
Through such a process, poor communities are likely to be excluded [62].
Based on our findings, implementing REDD+ in a context of institutional pluralism is challenging,
since the current situation has different rights holders using different authority structures to legitimatize
their claims to resources. Some scholars have proposed the application for a unitary and fixed
institutional structure, enforced by state authorities, as a means for delivering REDD+ outcomes [63,64],
but this approach might affect the existing bundles of rights to forests, and thus, the sustainability,
of REDD+ generally [65,66]. Such an approach also might fall short in a context where the state lacks the
capacity or resources to define and enforce property rights, as seen in this study. State authorities can
lose people’s confidence when a lack of accountability prevails, when government officials represent
private rather than public interests (as seen above), andwhen appropriate institutional and enforcement
protocols can be evaded or corrupted by bribery.
Although our demonstration of the multiple and overlapping institutional structures described
above provides a more accurate understanding of forest practices and thus, a greater flexibility
for adapting to changes and uncertainty, the lack of harmonization or coordination between
those overlapping institutional structures will likely affect the distribution of REDD+ benefits.
Customary rules enforced by customary authorities might deliver reasonable outcomes from REDD+
in traditionally homogeneous communities such as Gemena, but are less likely to succeed in areas
where there has been significant in-migration such that founding lineages no longer predominate or
have lost some authority (see [67,68]).
Customary tenure mirrors the cultural and social values of the community, where the forest
is regarded not only as an economic or an environmental asset but also as a social, cultural,
and ontological resource that embodies the spirit of the society. The legitimacy of customary authorities
largely flows from the community, and their accountability is also based on local norms and customs.
In this context, people that share a common background and social history are more likely to trust and
respect the customary authorities. Such trust and legitimacy risks decrease if there is perception of
corruption and partiality or in situations where customary authorities may not have the knowledge or
confidence to deal with pressure from powerful external interests and market penetration. In such
circumstances, people may turn to other authority structures (state or international bodies) hoping to
get support for their rights claims, even if they fear the loss of autonomy and flexibility that this may
entail [69,70]. In addition, customary tenure often favors the rights and benefits of the first occupants,
i.e., genealogical and differentiated rights between customary landowners and those considered
outsiders. This is more visible when forest resources become more coveted and where the rules
of use, exchange, and inheritance become more intricate. In the context of REDD+, non-customary
landowners and tenants—including vulnerable groups like the Pygmies and women—may be excluded
from REDD+ benefits. This is because women and Pygmies do not have decision-making power and
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control over land and forests in the Équateur province [71,72]. This appears to be the case for the
distribution of logging compensation in Bikoro territory, as previously documented [42,71].
Since people in our study areas attach considerable trust to customary tenure to secure their
rights to forest resources, the formalization of customary tenure in the DRC using the kind of
community-based models seen in Tanzania (see [73]) offers a promising opportunity for addressing
REDD+ implementation tenure issues in the DRC. Similarly, the DRC’s enactment of a community
forestry law in August 2014 could further ground attempts to formalize customary rights to
forestland [74]. Under this approach, the property rights are perpetually recognized but limited
to use and control rights only.
As the modalities and procedures of community forestry in the DRC are under development,
early REDD+ pilot projects are applying various mechanisms to recognize customary tenure in their
activities [58,59]. They are initiated in the process of introducing REDD+ to these communities using
procedures of Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC). (FPIC is an important set of principles in
the REDD+ social safeguard standard that establishes the rights and conditions for local people’s
engagement in negotiating the terms of REDD+ interventions that affect their wellbeing and their right
to give or withhold their consent to these terms.). While it is typically assumed that local influence on
tenure clarification and rights recognition is assured [75], in practice, this process is costly and requires
time for proper dissemination of information about REDD+ [57]. In our case study, the REDD+ pilot
project organizers conducted the FPIC and started demonstration activities in the communities without
yet signing a contractual agreement with the local population. In addition, information about the risks
and costs of the project as well as issues related to land rights and forest tenure were not provided or
discussed during FPIC. When introducing REDD+, many pilot projects conduct land use planning by
engaging the local people through a participatory land use mapping exercise that charts customary
use rights. This includes the development of operational rules for resource use and collective choice
institutions for management and exclusion.
Because of a lack of harmonization or coordination between the customary and statutory
institutional structures of forest governance in the DRC in conjunction with an absence of functional
local government at the district and village levels, many REDD+ pilot project organizers—including
those in our case study—have facilitated the establishment of a new village organization for REDD+
implementation. This new village organization is called the Local Development Committee, also known
in French as Comité Local de Développement (CLD). This new village structure accords with the legal
mandate (Law No 08/012 of 31 July 2008 elaborating the decentralization reform in Art 3 of the 2006
constitution) stating that if no local government is in place, a project like REDD+ must establish an
CLD. An executive manages this new village organization for REDD+.
While the mechanisms used to create an CLD and executive committee vary among the REDD+
pilot projects, for our case study, household heads sat as members of the CLD and provided the
electorate for electing the executive committee. This excluded women from participation, since more
than 80% of the household heads in our case study were men—see also Samndong [76]. In the ERA
REDD+ project in Mai-Ndombe, all the members of the village general assembly are considered
members of the CLD, and members of the executive committee were elected from the village general
assembly [77]. As a mechanism for harmonizing and coordinating this new REDD+ organizational
structure with customary institutions in order to build local trust and legitimacy, the president of the
CLD in Bikoro is the village customary chief, while the president of the CLD in Gemena is one of the
customary landowners. This is also the case for the ERA REDD+ project in Mai-Ndombe, where all of
the presidents of the CLD in every village are customary landowners.
While it is still too early to assess the effectiveness of the new village structure for the delivery of
REDD+ outcomes, the representativeness and accountability relations of the authority structure in this
REDD+ village organization will depend greatly on the social processes and local power dynamics
influencing the distribution of REDD+ benefits. This structure is different from the existing structure
as it is established through a democratic (if not complete) process, while the existing structure is based
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on local norms and customs. This recognition of the customary chief and customary landowners in
allowing them to head the executive committees of these REDD+ organizations might prompt and
empower the customary institutions to be more democratically accountable, thus transforming local
norms and customs and minimizing the effects of the current pluralist situation. However, if these
authorities are not accountable to the local people, it may simply reinforce elite interests and the
exclusion of some segments of the population.
While clarifying property rights to forests might be a pre-condition for enabling benefits from
REDD+ to occur, the success of these rights is conditional upon the level of ethnic heterogeneity. In the
case of the Bikoro pilot site with its high ethnic heterogeneity, such a measure might favor the dominant
ethnic group and hence, additional measures could be needed to secure benefits to other ethnic groups.
In situations where these rights are weakly enforced, some people might apply different strategies to
access and benefit from REDD+ depending on their relationships with the authority structures and
their ability to influence decisions.
7. Conclusions
This paper documents that the forest in the Équateur province is governed by both statuary and
customary tenures. The statuary tenure was introduced by colonial and postcolonial authorities to
override customary tenure and enforce state control over forestland and thus, generated a situation of
institutional pluralism. While customary tenure is flexible and subject to negotiation, statuary tenure
is based on legislation with less flexibility and room for negotiation. The lack of harmonization and
coordination between these two tenure systems has created a situation where the state and customary
authorities compete to legitimize forest practice at the local level. This has created room for local actors
who move across these institutional landscapes to patronize authorities who favor their particular
use of forest resources. In this way, empowered local actors (local powerful people—mainly logging
operators with permits) can draw on state authorities to support claims to forests or legitimize their
use rights, while less empowered local actors instead build relationships with traditional authorities to
secure their access and use rights to forests. The situation is exacerbated further by the inconsistency
of the statuary tenure and its weak enforcement. As such, local state authorities can reshape statuary
tenure provisions before they arrive at the local level as a way of favoring their personal interests.
Although such an institutional landscape provides greater flexibility for adapting to changes and
uncertainty, any implementation of REDD+ benefits under these institutional conditions will greatly
affect their distribution.
For REDD+ to be effective and legitimate at the local level, there is a need to address tenure
insecurity and the basis of conflicts over forest access and use. The competing forest tenure systems in
the DRC imply that a ‘one size fits all’ approach to REDD+ is doomed. While recognizing customary
tenure seems a better approach for addressing tenure in REDD+ implementation, such an approach
first requires land tenure reform. Early actions towards addressing tenure in REDD+ through the
establishment of collective choice institutions and land use planning may seem more demanding than
a top-down approach, but the former affords a better chance of delivering effective and legitimate
REDD+ outcomes at the local level. At the same time, however, the authority structure(s) that undergird
collective choice institutions to define and enforce REDD+ rules and benefit distribution locally must
also be empowered to be more democratic and accountable in order to avoid elite capture and to
ensure legitimate outcomes for REDD+.
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Abstract: Community based approaches are becoming the norm in environmental governance
initiatives. One prominent example of this is Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest
Degradation (REDD+), a climate change mitigation strategy that aims at reducing carbon emissions
caused by deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries. REDD+ policies generally
evoke communities as both potential beneficiaries of REDD+ and as agents for its implementation.
However, it is unclear what REDD+ policies are really referring to when they talk about communities.
Drawing on critical social science literature about the idea of community, this article advances a
performative perspective to analyze how communities are articulated in international and national
REDD+ policy, and reflects on the potential implications of these articulations. Results reveal that
international policy documents, including those of the major non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
engaged in REDD+, tend to present an interpretation that corresponds to Agrawal and Gibson’s
myth of communities as small, localized, and homogenous social units that share social norms.
On the other hand, national policy documents reveal enormous variety in the communities that are
actually targeted in national REDD+ policies in terms of resources, governance structure, and social
cohesion. One conclusion that could be drawn from this is that the dominant uniform interpretation
of communities in REDD+ policy, and in much academic and NGO literature, is clearly unrealistic.
However, this does not mean that it is inconsequential. We conclude our article by discussing the
performative effects of the identified articulations of community.
Keywords: performativity; REDD+ policy; myths of community; forest governance; climate change
1. Introduction
The need to involve communities in the implementation of the international policy initiative on
Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) is widely stressed in both
policy and academic literature on the subject [1–8]. (Indeed, much of the literature that is critical of
REDD+ bases its complaints on the failure to adequately involve communities in decision making,
or to adequately reward them for their REDD+ efforts [9–11]. However, what is implied by the term
‘community’ (or ‘local community’, as it appears in the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) sources) is not discussed in any of these texts, which simply assume the
presence of entities called ‘communities’ in or around forested areas. These communities are widely
referred to in the context of REDD+ safeguards, i.e., the need to protect rights to use the forest and to
receive social benefits (even poverty alleviation). However, they are also frequently portrayed as the
stakeholders who will be responsible for management of local REDD+ initiatives.
In this paper, we explore how communities have been imagined in REDD+, and we examine what
impact these framings may have had not only on the policy, but also on the communities themselves.
We start by observing that the definition of ‘community’ was problematized very well twenty years
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ago by Agrawal and Gibson [12], who observed that proponents of a community approach to natural
resource management usually consider ‘community’ to mean a place-based, small, spatial social unit,
with a homogeneous social structure and shared norms. They provided a historico-philosophical
explanation for this perception and then criticized it claiming communities tend to be made up of
different actor groups with varying interests, the implication being that ‘shared norms’ may be a
myth. Despite this, such myths continue to be evoked by powerful external actors who propagate
it to justify interventions based on problematic assumptions about community approaches being
pro-poor, efficient because they incorporate local knowledge, and a fulcrum for democratic change
amongst others [13,14]. However, while there has been vigorous debate on the issue of the efficacy of
communities in managing natural resources [15–17], there has been relatively little debate on what
‘community’ actually means in the context of REDD+ specifically.
The notion that communities may be a central pillar in the implementation of REDD+
fundamentally rests on the idea that the rural population, or that part of it that has access to forest
resources, is organized into communities which could in principle gear up to carry out activities under
the REDD+ banner. This assumes that communities have a number of characteristics, for example
leadership with local legitimacy and organizational mandate, as well as the skills needed (which could
be bolstered through capacity building), although it is well recognized that community involvement
in REDD+ may also require improving the security of land tenure [18–21]. It also seems to imply
that where forests are inhabited, there is ‘wall-to-wall’ presence of communities. However, it may
be questioned whether presence of human life necessarily implies presence of communities, in the
sense that people consider themselves to be members of a particular place-based ‘community’ which
can decide upon and undertake a series of actions, either communally or through coordination of
individual effort. While this may well be true for some communities in some circumstances, it may be
questioned whether the entire rural population, particularly in areas that are well integrated into the
global economy, feels that it belongs to communities of this kind. Moreover, much human-used forest is
very clearly not under any sort of control by communities. Global estimates of the proportion of forest
land recognized as owned or managed by communities vary from 22% to 30% [22,23]; other forest
areas may be used by the local rural population as an open access resource; often this is officially state
or (large scale) private property.
Given the significance attributed to REDD+ as an integrated approach to climate adaptation and
mitigation in developing countries [24], it is urgent to examine how communities are envisioned and
articulated in REDD+, as well as the implications. We start by examining the role of communities
as presented in official policy documents of the UNFCCC on REDD+, and in materials written
by the international organizations providing support for REDD+. We then turn to the national
documents on REDD+, analyzing in detail eight of the most recent and more advanced REDD+ country
programs as submitted to the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) program of the World Bank
for financing. This enables us to trace different meanings ascribed to the term ‘community’ in different
contexts, which we believe is important to deepen understanding of how ‘communities’ can become
engaged in REDD+. Before we present the findings, we first discuss our performative perspective and
methodological approach.
2. Communities: A Performative Perspective
As discussed in the previous section, the idea of communities, defined as small spatial units with
homogenous social structures and shared social norms, is problematic, and this can be viewed in
at least two different dimensions. The first relates to representation, being the way in which ideals
of community fail to represent the reality of communities. Agrawal and Gibson [12] highlight the
ideological character of the idea of community and of the way in which communities are evoked in
current natural resource management policies. Confronted with the failure of the state to conserve
forests and nature, and the negative social consequences of many state-led policies, as well as
piggy-backing on wider trends to participation and democratization, communities have emerged as an
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attractive and appropriate target for policies. This reflects a belief that community involvement could
“promote desirable collective decisions” thereby enhancing the effectiveness, as well as legitimacy
of these policies [12] (p. 636). However, this community ideal falls short of capturing the reality of
communities and particularly the diverse actors, interests, and norms that constitute them and Agrawal
and Gibson suggest that this may result in disappointing effects of community based natural resource
management policies. Specifically, it makes these policies vulnerable for elite capture and may result
in them reproducing or even enhancing existing power inequalities [25]. Whilst much of the REDD+
academic literature, alongside much of the official REDD+ documentation, attaches great importance
to communities, this last point is increasingly being recognized. Several recent contributions have
highlighted risks of elite capture within communities, and the risk that the lion’s share of benefits will
go to those who by tradition or by circumstance have a greater share of the resources and power over
community decision making [26–30].
This leads us to the second dimension of the problematic of communities, which relates to
performativity. Quite apart from the question of whether policy discourses that evoke the myth
of communities are realistic, it must be recognized that they are not innocent or inconsequential.
As Igoe and Fortwangler [31] (p. 66) explain: “while these discourses may not accurately describe
the realities of the problems that these interventions are meant to resolve, they are nevertheless
effective for mobilizing significant revenues and extending state control over people and natural
resources”. This suggests that they are performative in the sense that they produce effects that cannot
be understood with reference to their representational accuracy [32]. This argument has amongst
others been applied to the process of nation building. Scott [33] (p. 3) explains that representational
devices, such as maps, rework reality to fit with the ideal: “They did not successfully represent the
actual activity of the society they depicted, nor were they intended to; they represented only that slice
of it that interested the official observer. When allied with state power, they would enable much of the
reality they depicted to be remade”. Anderson’s well-known book ‘Imagined Communities’ makes a
similar point. To Anderson, Nation States can create their constituencies by presenting authoritative
and attractive visions, in media, maps, or museums, which people can evoke and make their own [34].
However, as the many examples in Scott [33] show, this constitutive power of visions does not
mean that these visions become reality exactly as imagined; they often create unintended effects and
they can fail even on their own terms. Performativity means that there will inevitably be overflows [35],
that is to say, unpredictable and contingent surprises [32,36]. Studies of participation and engagement
using the concept of performativity have highlighted how identities and interests of participants do
not pre-exist but are formed in the participatory practice, often with unintended and unpredictable
outcomes [25,37]. Thus, a performative perspective on policy invites us to consider what policies
do and how they produce effects. Importantly, this is not the same as asking how effective policies
are. Instead of an evaluative perspective that judges the performance of policies using a yardstick,
such as the stated objectives of a policy, or criteria for good governance, performativity is tied to a
practice-based perspective [38,39] and does not assume the existence of yardsticks or policies outside
the practices they judge or intervene in. This interpretation of performativity finds its roots in Science
and Technology Studies [40,41], and recognizes that policies and their outcomes are entangled and
that they are both constitutive of and constituted in practice. Applied to the notion of community,
a performative perspective suggests that communities do not simply exist, passively waiting for
REDD+ to engage them. Instead, REDD+ performs communities, it brings them into being in practice
in specific, contingent, and context specific ways. According to Marres [42], this argument can be
traced back to pragmatist philosophy and particularly to Dewey’s ‘The Public and its Problems’ [43].
Marres [42] suggests that the formation of publics (communities in the case of REDD+) is not just
about will formation (articulating the interests of the communities), but also issue formation (shaping
the meaning of REDD+ and the problems it addresses).
In other words, a performative perspective offers insights into the workings of a policy, which go
beyond evaluating its representational quality (does the policy adequately reflect reality) and its
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effectiveness (does it achieve stated objectives) and allows for critical examination of the intended
and unintended political implications of policy prescriptions. Consequently, this paper asks how
REDD+ performs communities, that is, what visions of community do REDD+ policies at various
levels articulate and with what potential consequences?
3. Method
To understand how communities are envisaged in the international policy on REDD+, we examined
three sets of literature; Firstly, all the official policy decisions, as well as submissions made by parties and
observers, which were made during the negotiations on REDD+. These are available on the UNFCCC
website [44]. This represents a relatively concise body of centralized literature, which can readily be
overseen. Secondly, literature from NGOs and support organizations, which in contrast is vast and
widely dispersed. Although we could not make an exhaustive or all-inclusive study, we attempted to
distil the main lines of discussion in this material in as far as they refer to communities in REDD+.
Thirdly, for the analysis of how communities are framed in national level REDD+ planning,
we used as examples the eight countries which had submitted so-called Emissions Reduction Programs
(ERPs) to the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) in final or draft form by the time
this study was carried out (end of 2017). These are the most complete expressions of the rationale of
national REDD+ thinking available and can be compared since the reports follow a common format
requiring among other things, the identification of stakeholders and an explanation of the causes
of deforestation and degradation, as well as how the interventions planned are consistent with this.
The countries that had submitted final ERPs at the time of this research were: Chile, Mexico, Vietnam,
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Costa Rica, whilst Ghana, Mozambique, and the
Republic of Congo (R. Congo) had entered draft ERPs. In all cases, except for Costa Rica, these plans
were not for the entire country, but for selected geographic areas only.
The ERPs were studied using the textual analysis software Atlas-ti. A full document search was
made for all mentions of the word ‘community’ or ‘communities’ (including ‘local communities’ and
‘indigenous communities’). Uses of terms that were irrelevant for our purposes (e.g., international
community, donor community, plant community, and proper names) were ignored, as were those
parts of the text that were provided by the World Bank (i.e., embedded in the format) and sections
that were copies of standard texts from other sources, such as the UN Declaration on Rights of
Indigenous Peoples. The reference lists at the end of the reports were also excluded from the analysis.
The remaining uses of the term ‘community’ were coded using a set of alternative signifiers, which are
explained in the results section of this paper. Words which could have similar meanings to ‘community’
(e.g., village, indigenous group, commune, agrarian nucleus) were also checked and compared. All the
reports were in English, but where a version in an alternative language (e.g., French, Spanish) was
available, the equivalent terms were also identified to ensure consistency.
4. Communities as Articulated in UNFCCC REDD+ Policy
The Paris Climate Agreement [45] includes in Article 5 explicit reference to ‘policy approaches
and positive incentives for activities relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation, and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of
forest carbon stocks in developing countries’. The initiative is generally known as REDD+. In this
context, no direct mention of communities is included, though the preamble to the Agreement lists
the need to consider obligations, such as support for the rights of indigenous peoples and of local
communities, and Article [8], on adaptation, refers among other items to support for the resilience
of communities. However, the need for engagement and participation of ‘local communities’ and
‘indigenous peoples’ (IPs) in various ways is clearly expressed in earlier UNFCCC policy decisions
on REDD+. In these decisions, the term ‘communities’ is mentioned ten times, particularly in the
context of recognizing their needs [1]. The documents specify it will be important that REDD+ ensures
communities’ sustainable livelihoods, develops safeguard information systems that show respect for
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their rights and their knowledge, provides options for adaption to climate change which take into
account their traditional and indigenous knowledge, and engages them in monitoring and reporting
(Table 1). There is strong emphasis on consultation and the use of community knowledge to arrive at
better REDD+ interventions, which, at minimum, will do no harm to their livelihoods. More recent
decisions also recognize the potential of communities to be involved in the implementation of these
interventions. The influence of IP lobby groups, which joined with civic environmental movements to
form a front for issues relating to social justice during the climate change negotiations [46–48], is evident
in the repeated use of the combo ‘local communities and indigenous peoples’ and undoubtedly served
to increase the prominence of ‘communities’ in these policy texts.
The views of the UNFCCC negotiating Parties on the engagement of communities in REDD+
can also be traced through the submissions that have been entered on different topics throughout the
process. What is most noticeable is that, as with the policy developments outlined above, there has
been a progression in how the role of communities has been seen. Whilst the call for benefits to flow
to communities has been present in broad and unspecific terms throughout the negotiation process,
quite quickly contributions turned to focus on the need to engage communities in the generation of
information (monitoring) of carbon stocks and of the effectiveness of REDD+ efforts locally. This was
followed by calls for community monitoring of safeguards, including those that refer to respect for
knowledge and rights of IPs and members of local communities, promotion and support for effective
participation of communities (e.g., through Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC)), and protection
and conservation of natural forests, whilst enhancing social and environmental benefits considering
the need for sustainable livelihoods. Although there have been sporadic references to direct incentive
payments to communities (e.g., by Colombia, [49]), most refer to community benefits in general,
without committing to cash payments as such, and the most recent submissions have focused on
the need for non-carbon benefits to communities, possibly financed in addition to carbon. Overall,
whilst there are clear calls for the participation of communities in the sense of providing information
and receiving some benefits (and above all, not being disadvantaged by REDD+), there is no clear
picture given in either the national submissions or in the UNFCCC policy texts on whether and
how communities would be engaged in the actual implementation of REDD+ post planning phase,
presumably in part because this would interfere with national sovereignty on the matter.
Additionally, is it noticeable that there is no definition at all in these policy texts of what
‘community’ means, barring one remark from COMIFAC (the Commission of Central African Forests)
which suggests that the definition should be left to individual countries according to their national
circumstances [50]. Clearly, social institutions vary greatly between countries and trying to impose
a single definition would be impossible. However, it is apparent that the term is intended to refer
to groups of people resident in or near forests who are dependent on these forests for part of their
livelihoods, whether or not they have formal tenure, rather than to individuals who own forest land
as private property. However, in reality many rural communities are made up of smallholders
(operating essentially as private land owners) or at least include some quasi-private situations.
Farmers within communities usually operate as individuals even where there is no formal tenure (i.e.,
usufructure systems are common). Therefore, whilst use of the term ‘community’ implies some kind
of group or communal decision-making system, there is no implication in the texts that a community
necessarily possesses and/or manages areas of communal land as this may or may not be the case;
nor is any particular size of community or form of community governance suggested. The phrase
‘local communities’ as noted above is almost always paired with, but clearly seen as different from,
‘indigenous peoples’. The latter term is well recognized, e.g., in the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples in relation to territories owned by or claimed by groups who identify themselves as
being of a specific local ethnicity, and it is safe to assume that the term ‘local communities’ is considered
to have a broader, more catch-all meaning. To conclude, the UNFCCC does not provide a definition of
communities but does envision them as being able to benefit from REDD+, and as potential agents in
the planning, implementation, and monitoring of REDD+ without a clear specification of how exactly
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the communities are to accomplish this. This formulation appears to have been chosen to ensure that
REDD+ is directed at the poorer, more traditional, users of rural land and forests, rather than profiting
large land owners. This was partly in response to concerns that arose (among others, from international
NGOs and Indigenous Peoples’ (IP) organizations, see below) when REDD+ was proposed, with a view
to ensuring that REDD+ would be socially equitable. However, the formulation makes no reference to
possible inequalities within communities and how individuals within communities would be engaged.
Table 1. References to communities and indigenous peoples in the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) decisions on Reduced Emissions from Deforestation
and Forest Degradation (REDD+).
Decision Paragraph Text
Bali, 2007
FCCC 2/13 Preamble
Recognizing also that the needs of local and indigenous communities
should be addressed when action is taken to reduce emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries;
Copenhagen,
2009
FCCC 4/15
Preamble
Recognizing the need for full and effective engagement of indigenous
peoples and local communities in, and the potential contribution of
their knowledge to, monitoring and reporting of activities relating to
decision 1/CP.13, paragraph 1 (b) (iii);
3
Encourages, as appropriate, the development of guidance for effective
engagement of indigenous peoples and local communities in
monitoring and reporting;
Cancun, 2010
FCCC 1/16
72
Also requests developing country Parties, when developing and
implementing their national strategies or action plans, to address,
inter alia, the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, land
tenure issues, forest governance issues, gender considerations and the
safeguards identified in paragraph 2 of appendix I to this decision,
ensuring the full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders,
inter alia indigenous peoples and local communities;
Appendix 1, para. 2c
(Safeguard C) Respect for the knowledge and rights of indigenous
peoples and members of local communities, by taking into account
relevant international obligations, national circumstances and laws,
and noting that the United Nations General Assembly has adopted
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples;
Appendix 1, para. 2d
(Safeguard D) The full and effective participation of relevant
stakeholders, in particular indigenous peoples and local
communities, in the actions referred to in paragraphs 70 and 72;
Appendix 1
(Footnote to Safeguard D) Taking into account the need for
sustainable livelihoods of indigenous peoples and local
communities and their interdependence on forests in most countries,
reflected in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, as well as the International Mother Earth Day;
2011, Durban
FCCC 5/17 Para. 1.3
Further agrees that enhanced action on adaptation should tak(e) into
consideration vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems,
and should be based on and guided by the best available science and,
as appropriate, traditional and indigenous knowledge;
2012, Doha
FCCC 3/18 Para. 3.6 (f)
Invites all Parties to enhance action on addressing loss and damage
associated with the adverse effects of climate change by undertaking,
inter alia (f) Involving vulnerable communities and populations,
and civil society, the private sector and other relevant stakeholders,
in the assessment of and response to loss and damage;
2015, Paris
FCCC15/21
Preamble, ToR for Doha
WP review of Article 6 of
the Convention
Reaffirming the importance of taking into account indigenous
peoples, local communities and non-governmental organizations in
activities related to Article 6 of the Convention.
5. Communities as Articulated by International Support Agencies and NGOs
The position of intergovernmental support organizations and NGOs on the role of communities
in REDD+ is, in comparison to the UNFCCC and its Parties, much more detailed. In a formal
submission to the UNFCCC [49], the UN Convention on Biological Diversity calls for the development
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of self-sufficiency in REDD+ of indigenous and local communities. Similarly, the UN Forum
on Forests calls for community forestry under REDD+, for the involvement of communities
in meaningful decisions on state forests, and as one of the first, for attention to the role and
importance of tenure. Crucially, a community approach to implementation appears to be at the
heart of the UN REDD+ program (a support and funding program jointly managed by United
Nations Development Programme, the Food and Agriculture Organization and the United Nations
Environmental Programme, which has a specific community based sub-program co-financed by the
Global Environmental Fund Small Grants Program. The World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership
Facility (FCPF), one of the major funders of REDD+, follows a charter which requires testing ways
to sustain or enhance livelihoods of local communities and conserve biodiversity, whilst its Forest
Investment Program (FIP) has a dedicated mechanism that provides grant funding for indigenous
people and local communities to engage in the implementation of REDD+ processes. Conservation
International states that the participation of indigenous peoples and local communities is crucial
to the successful development and implementation of REDD+ mechanisms, and has developed a
community manual to support such efforts [51]. However, perhaps more than any other agencies, the
CGIAR organizations have been influential in shifting the nature of much discourse on REDD+ from
its earlier focus on international results-based finance to national governments, to one in which the
central issue is what communities can do at the local level. This can be seen in the work of the Centre
for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), which championed the idea of the ‘3Es’ (effectiveness,
efficiency and equity) as the standard against which REDD+ implementation should be held [52],
and followed this up with in its global comparative study and global database of community level
REDD+ projects [53]. This type of thinking is also present in the work of The World Agroforestry
Centre, ICRAF, with its Local Perspectives on REDD+ [54] and arguments that REDD+ projects which
involve communities are more likely to save forests [55]. For: “Who can manage forests better than
those living within or beside them? with REDD+ redefining the forest management and conservation
landscape, community forest management can contribute to reduced forest emissions and increased
forest carbon stocks [6] (pp. 201–202)”.
Yet despite this focus on the importance of communities in REDD+, these texts also fail to explain
or explore what they mean or imply by ‘community’. They use the term as if it were self-evident (e.g.,
the otherwise very extensive REDD+-related glossary at the end of Angelsen et al. [51], for example,
does not include an entry for ‘community’). This follows earlier practice in highly influential
publications on communities and forests, such as White and Martin [22], which also talked about
communities without critical analysis of what this means. It is quite difficult to read between the lines to
determine how communities are actually being imagined here. In terms of organizing natural resource
management and REDD+, involvement of communities is seen as a ‘third way’ (other than regular
government channels and the private sector). There are underlying pragmatic efficiency reasons for
this, as the quote from Agrawal and Angelsen above indicates, but also ideological/political reasons
related to the idea that the rights of poorer, small scale users to control their local resources need to be
protected and bolstered to ensure that REDD+ does not give advantage to the more powerful elements,
such as larger landowners and corporations. Along with this, it seems that the whole rural population
is implicitly conceived as being made up of communities, and secondly that these communities
are imagined largely as Agrawal and Gibson [12] suggest, although the list might be broadened.
Specifically, communities appear to be envisaged as relatively small territorial and placed-based
social groupings (1) that are positioned outside the normal hierarchy of government administration,
(2) that have some form of internal, communal decision making procedure which may be based on
traditional/indigenous rules or on other norms and procedures, (3) that may or may not have formal
rights to land and forest and may or may not have communal forest land, and that (4) under favorable
conditions, are expected to be able to act as a unit to manage the forest to meet common goals.
Whilst this last expectation does imply the ability to work towards common goals, it is less clear
whether communities are understood in these texts to have homogeneous social structures and shared
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norms [12,56]. The shared norms which supposedly help communities to manage common properties
are usually understood to be rooted not just in shared ethnicity, religion, and history, but also in the fact
that members have similar livelihoods strategies, seen as contributing to internal harmony. The way
that the REDD+ discussion on equity has developed offers interesting insight into this issue. Although
there have been a number of interesting discussions on the meaning of equity in REDD+ in academic
literature [57–60], the main focus at the policy level has been on safeguards and benefit sharing (see
Table 2 for the case of UN-REDD). FCPF requires countries to provide and justify a benefits distribution
plan that respects customary rights to lands and territories and that reflects broad community support
“so that incentives are applied in an effective and equitable manner, and shared with those stakeholders
most critical to protecting forests (the benefit sharing plan will provide details on the benefit-sharing
process, related distribution criteria and timelines and types of beneficiaries)” [61]. Moreover, there is
emphasis in these texts on the need to be gender inclusive and to protect the interests of marginalized
groups (i.e., usually seen as marginalized communities), thus a generally pro-poor approach. However,
they do not really peek into questions of equality (for example, as regards to size of landholdings)
within communities and there is no requirement to carry out a class analysis at community level.
This failure to attend to heterogeneity within communities, suggests that these texts do assume some
degree of social homogeneity. This also applies to NGO literature, which critiques the social inclusivity
of REDD+ programs. The Rights and Resources Institute [62] for example, deals with generalized
issues such as community rights and community tenure, but does not broach questions of equity and
fairness within communities. To our knowledge, this has been addressed, and only in the context of
benefit sharing, in just two countries, Nepal [63] and Vietnam [64,65], where a formula to differentiate
needs of the family (Nepal) or their individual contribution to increasing carbon stocks (Vietnam) has
been used. We note that these benefit distribution systems relate to rewards for increases in carbon
storage, rather than for decreased deforestation, which is much more difficult to link with individual
behavior or position (see Skutsch et al., [60] for a detailed explanation). We also note in passing that
lack of equality within communities does not necessarily mean there are no shared norms. In many
communities, inequality is the norm and is accepted as such.
Table 2. Criteria relating to social equity established by the UN-REDD program on Social and
Environmental Principles (SEP).
Criterion Definitional Text
Criterion 4
Ensure the full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders in design, planning
and implementation of REDD+ activities, with particular attention to indigenous
peoples, local communities and other vulnerable and marginalized groups
Criterion 7
Respect and promote the recognition and exercise of the rights of indigenous peoples,
local communities and other vulnerable and marginalized groups to land, territories and
resources, including carbon
Criterion 8 Promote and enhance gender equality, gender equity and women’s empowerment
Criterion 12 Ensure equitable, non-discriminatory and transparent benefit sharing among relevantstakeholders with special attention to the most vulnerable and marginalized groups
Criterion 13 Protect and enhance economic and social well-being of relevant stakeholders, withspecial attention to the most vulnerable and marginalized groups
6. Communities as Articulated in National Policy Documents
The eight Emissions Reductions Program documents revealed a range of uses of the term
‘community’, which in most cases was applied in several different senses even within one country
document (Table 3). The term is used much more often in some countries (e.g., Mozambique) than
in others (e.g., Costa Rica), even taking into account the length of the reports, and that six distinct
meanings can be identified, as explained below.
116
Forests 2018, 9, 638
Table 3. Meanings of the term ‘community’ in the Emissions Reduction Programs (ERP) documents
submitted to the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility FCPF (frequency of occurrence in %). N—number
of relevant references to the term ‘community’ in the national report; PP—pages; N/PP average
occurrence of the term ‘community’ per page of the document.
Country RuralPop
Indigenous
Cultural
Group
Village
(Without
Decision
Making
Power)
Autono-mous
Decision
Making Unit
IP
Territorial
Decision
Making
Unit
Lowest
Tier
Administered
Not Clear N PP N/PP
Mexico 9.9 1.9 0.6 85.2 0.0 0.0 2.5 162 285 0.56
Chile 27.8 7.7 0.0 0.0 18.0 39.2 7.2 194 358 0.54
Costa Rica 53.6 3.6 3.6 10.7 25.0 0.0 3.6 28 164 0.17
DCR 13.9 1.9 0.0 36.5 0.0 34.1 13.5 208 297 0.70
R. Congo 44.6 2.9 13.7 37.7 0.0 0.6 0.6 175 349 0.50
Ghana 46.1 2.3 12.5 38.3 0.0 0.0 0.8 128 254 0.50
Mozambique 28.9 0.2 4.3 66.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 515 272 1.89
Vietnam 8.6 3.4 88.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 266 182 1.46
The first important finding is that ‘community’ is very frequently (and some cases, predominantly)
used not to refer to a group of people, their organizational form or governance, but simply to refer
to the rural population. Examples are ‘community awareness raising’ and ‘increasing community
income’—where what is meant here is not community (in the sense of shared or communally decided),
but the rural people in general, and this use is repeated in many reports, e.g., ‘the resilience of
communities to climate change’; ‘access of communities to forest resources’; ‘develop viable alternative
livelihoods for local communities’; ‘sustainable community livelihoods’; ‘bushmeat is a primary source
of income for communities’, etc. In all such cases, terms such as ‘rural families’ or ‘the local population’
could equally well be used instead of ‘community’, since the reference is not to any specific organization,
institution, or social grouping. We see here ‘community’ being used as shorthand for ‘people’.
A second meaning of the term community is found in reference to indigenous peoples or
indigenous cultures in general (i.e., not to specific communities such as local organizations). Statements
such as ´Indigenous Law No. 6172 set forth that the indigenous reserves remain the property of
indigenous communities´ Costa Rica ERP is a typical example of this. Thirdly, it is often used to refer
to ‘villages/settlements’, i.e., the physical areas in which groups of people live (e.g., ‘forest-fringe
communities in the ER program area are ethnically diverse’ (Ghana ERP)). In this sense, it implies
a presence of people living together in groups, but without reference to any particular form of
governance; however, we mostly used the term ‘villages’ to classify references to communities where
there does not appear to be clear authority present that would enable the community to take charge of
REDD+ implementation (e.g., ‘Communities/villages are not legal administrative entities in Vietnam
so are without decision making powers’ (Vietnam ERP)).
However, in many cases, the term ‘community’ clearly relates to a form of governance, when it
refers to communities in the sense of having a defined leadership system and mandate which could,
for example, enable it to take charge of local implementation of REDD+. Here we discerned three
more meanings of community. Firstly, there are communities that are independent of the government
hierarchy, in the form of autonomous decision making units (e.g., ‘internal organization among
ejidos and communities, resulting from the weakening of their internal governance mechanisms,
such as their general assembly, and their internal bodies, such as the ejido commissioner and the
board of protection, are one of the main barriers to ensuring a successful development of activities’
(Mexico ERP)). Then there are communities that specifically occupy indigenous peoples’ reserves (i.e.,
‘different’ from the majority of the rural population). For example, ‘This diminishes the land use rights
of local communities and leaves notably indigenous communities—those outside dedicated areas
within concessions—in limbo’ (ERP Republic of Congo). Finally, there are communities that belong to
the (lowest tier of) the government hierarchy (e.g., ‘The administrative organization comprises two
former districts, 8 territories, 23 sectors, 66 communities, 4 towns and thousands of villages’ (ERP
DRC)). In allocating each mention of ‘community’ to these different categories, we have endeavored
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to be as consistent as possible, and we included a ‘not clear’ category for cases where there was
significant doubt.
The six different meanings associated with the term ‘community’ are shown in Table 3, in terms
of the frequency with which they occur in each report (%). In Mexico, the term is exclusively
used to refer to ejidos and comunidades indigenas, two different forms of communally organized
agrarian nuclei which have legal land tenure over defined territories and clearly defined internal
decision-making systems; they are independent of the government administration. Farmers and
forest owners not living within these areas, but who might be engaged in REDD+, are in contrast
referred to as smallholders or ‘other landowners’. In Chile, ‘community’ is used both to refer to
the lowest level of the formal government hierarchy, i.e., the commune (meaning municipality or
county) and to indigenous communities living in areas over which they have communal tenure by
law. In Costa Rica, it refers mainly to communities in indigenous territories, although other types
of communities (‘peasant communities’, ‘other rural communities’) are sporadically mentioned in
the report without further specification, as well as small landowners and farmers, who as in Mexico,
are not considered to belong to communities. In Vietnam, ‘community’ most often refers to informal or
traditional groups of people living in villages within the communes, which represent the lowest tier
of the formal administrative system. Although there are traditional leaders in these villages, they do
not enjoy formal powers, for example, the Civil Code does not permit these communities to own land
as a group and they are not legal entities, so they cannot have bank accounts. The situation in the
African countries is less clearly defined. In the DRC, R. Congo, and Ghana, communities are framed in
the context of the traditional and customary system of chiefs. These traditional governance systems
may fuse with the formal government system, for example in DRC, chiefs are usually appointed
by the government as administrators at the village level. The DRC REDD+ document identifies the
county or municipal level as the ‘community’ and smaller population centers nested within this,
sometimes as ‘villages’ and sometimes (confusingly) also as ‘communities’. In Ghana and the R. Congo,
there are autonomous local level communities whose local leaders have some authority to make
decisions about land use etc., although much of the land is in private hands through usufructure rights.
Ghana already developed overarching umbrella institutions called Community Resource Management
Areas (CREMAs) and envisages similar organizations for REDD+ called Hotspot Interventions Areas
(HIA), which will be governed by a local governance board of land owners, land users, local authority
entities, and community leaders (including leaders of minority groups), as the key players in the
REDD+ strategy. This means that the ‘community’ is not seen as the focus in quite the same sense
as in many other countries. Moreover, the target of the entire strategy is the individual cocoa farmer,
not the community as a group. In Mozambique, the term ‘Local Communities’ (usually, but not always,
capitalized) is specified in the Land Law to mean groups of people with communal title to the land
and authority over its use.
In summary, we see that there exist quite different representations of communities in these
different segments of policy making. These are all implicit rather than explicit, and while the national
reports are more specific about the form their communities take, none of the sources really examine
the nature of communities and their internal workings. There is an unquestioned assumption that a
community approach will be efficient and will produce benefits for the rural people, with an underlying
coda that suggests that all rural people are equally poor.
7. Discussion
At first sight, the different sets of REDD+ documents seem to represent communities in rather
different ways. The policy texts developed at the level of the UNFCCC through national submissions
and negotiations are not very specific about what defines a community, although they represent
them as groups of people living in forest areas, which may or not have legal tenure over these
resources. These texts appear to have been quite strongly influenced by lobby groups representing
IPs, and most of the references to communities relate to safeguarding IP and community rights,
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including the right to consultation, and emphasize their role as beneficiaries, whilst there is little
reference to how they may be involved in the direct implementation of the policy. Given the lack of
specificity, one could question why terms such as ‘rural people’ or ‘small farmers and forest users’
were not used instead of ‘communities’. Evidently, ‘communities’ implies a level of organization
and a means of communication which could be used directly by REDD+. The fact that ‘communities’
do not exist everywhere is simply bypassed, for convenience. The agencies that are promoting
strong community involvement in the actual implementation of REDD+, including FCPF, UN-REDD+,
and many international NGOs and research organizations do not provide a clear definition or critical
discussion of communities either. However, as we have shown, these organizations also appear to
imagine the entire rural population as made up of local territorially coherent communities, which are
not part of the governmental administrative system, but are independent entities with their own
decision-making systems. In these texts, a community approach appears in some ways to indicate a
‘pro-poor’ approach, since communities are considered to be ‘poor’. However, it is noticeable that
very few cases actually consider inequality within the community. This may reflect the dilemma
mentioned already at the end of Section 5, i.e., the development industry in general supports the idea
of self-determination at community level but at the same time demands equality, and these may be
incompatible objectives. Interestingly, while these texts attribute great significance to communities
in relation to REDD+, they also acknowledge that communities often do not have formal rights to
forest or tenure over land and that they lack legal and technical skills for participation in REDD+,
which means that the capacity of these communities to contribute to REDD+ may be limited.
In contrast, the individual country reports revealed quite a range of interpretations of ‘community’,
reflecting their own national circumstances. Firstly, it was evident that in very many cases the term
‘community’ is being used not in the sense of a type of organization, but simply to refer to rural people
in general, as a form of shorthand. Secondly, in at least two cases (Chile and DRC) ‘communities’ is a
term, which, among other uses, is routinely used to mean municipalities or counties, i.e., the lowest
tier of the government administration, which is very different from the view held by NGOs and
support agencies, which clearly see communities as outside the normal government system. Thirdly,
although in some countries ‘communities’ does imply place-based social groups that have the mandate
to make their own decisions as territorial units, in others, this is not so clear. The role envisaged for
communities varies, in some there is more emphasis on communities as beneficiaries, whilst others
contain at least some practical suggestions for how they may be engaged in implementation. However,
there is almost no reference to how existing social inequalities within communities might influence
outcomes. In these national reports, the inequalities that are mentioned are only in terms of ethnicity
or gender.
Thus, we may conclude that the first two sets of literature on REDD+ policy articulate a vision
of communities that resembles Agrawal and Gibson’s myth. We see an implicit assumption in the
documents that all rural people are members of communities, which in principle could have the
characteristics necessary for participation in REDD+. Community level REDD+ is seen as being for the
general benefit of everyone without any reference to existing social inequalities within communities,
other than gender and sometimes ethnicity (the euphemism ‘marginalized groups’ is often used in this
context). Moreover, the engagement of communities is clearly seen as contributing to the effectiveness
and legitimacy of REDD+. Importantly, this is done without clearly specifying how exactly, given their
limitations, these communities will be able to live up to these expectations.
The interesting point is that the country reports display a whole range of different visions of
community. In some cases, a wall-to-wall concept is employed, in others, only specific groups of
people in specific areas are targeted; the forms of community governance vary and are more explicit in
these reports. Aside from this, the function of communities in REDD+ is represented in terms rather
similar to those used in the global texts. In that literature, there are expectations that communities
can be capacitated to carry out REDD+ activities, and that this will promote an equitable, efficient,
and legitimate approach to REDD+.
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These observations raise questions about why, given the evident lack of community capacity in
reality, and the social inequalities that quite clearly exist within communities, the idea that engaging
communities in REDD+ will not only be effective but also egalitarian, continues to be evoked. While we
agree to some extent with Pasgaard [66], that this can reflect pragmatic use of rhetoric to further the
positions of actors at all levels, we suggest that in fact this formulation has a strong ideological appeal,
which stems from particular political positions and social and environmental justice principles. It is
also strengthened by lack of faith of many observers in government efficiency and sincerity regarding
rural poverty alleviation, as well as by the general trend, also found in many official government rural
development policies, towards the idea that local participation in decision making is positive and
even necessary.
Apart from the concerns discussed above related to the realities and capacities of communities,
this leaves the legitimacy of community-led decision making and implementation unaddressed.
Following the majority of published literature on participation (for overviews and critical discussion
see [25,37,67]), there is an implicit belief in REDD+ documentation on the global level that strengthening
the relative bargaining power of rural people in the modern-day situation is unquestionably benign.
Whilst we recognize that in some places there are strong alternative (traditional) forms of governance
at the local level, particularly in the case of communities that identify themselves as indigenous people,
taking this for granted overlooks the fact that in many cases community empowerment in REDD+ is
likely to end up being inegalitarian or even undemocratic (see [68] for the case of REDD+ in Nigeria).
A second reason for the persistence of this myth is more pragmatic. The prior experience of
the agencies that are promoting REDD+ is largely confined to projects such as community forest
management and PES. These programs have been carried out in communities which possess at least
some of the idealized characteristics described above, and which see themselves as management units.
They are communities which were identified by government agencies or NGOs as potential partners or
candidates for this kind of intervention, precisely because they possess these attributes. Although they
may not represent the more general condition of the rural population, it has been expedient for some
of these agencies to continue their programs in these kinds of communities and expand them with
REDD+ objectives, and moreover it clearly influences the way these agencies conceive the situation and
the possibilities for intervention in rural areas. However, there are many rural settlements where this
kind of social organization is missing and where such initiatives have never been attempted because
there is no mechanism for communication and negotiation, or where the label ‘community’ has been
applied by external agents, but does not reflect local realities [14]. Therefore, all the literature on
community level natural resource management is based on an inherently biased sample and this bias
is being reproduced in REDD+. CIFOR’s Global Comparative Study on REDD+, which used existing
community forest management and payment for environmental services projects as proxies for REDD+
is a clear example of this. It is a bias which is extremely difficult to overcome, since programs such as
REDD+ depend on being able to communicate both about and with local forest users. If these are not
arranged into clusters with a recognizable contact point, i.e., in the form of ‘communities’, it is difficult
to visualize how communication could be managed.
This brings us to our final point. The community myth persists because it performs, i.e., it does
work. Pasgaard and Nielsen [14], for example, show in a case in Cambodia how conservation rhetoric
is used at all levels, from local leaders to donor organizations, essentially to further own interests,
and Blaikie [13] has a similar story for Botswana and Malawi. The propagation of the idea that
community is central to REDD+ could be seen as an example of this. However, at the same time,
the ideological attractiveness of performing communities in this way has enabled consensus about
the direction of REDD+ (as unspecific as this direction may be). It has also worked to reinforce the
legitimacy of NGOs and other agencies that collaborate with communities, where these do in fact exist
and to advocate for their rights, resulting in the potential for new project funding for collaborative
work under the banner of REDD+. Therefore, although the visions of community in REDD+ may
not be real in a literal or material sense, they are clearly a reality that actors have chosen to believe
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in and from which they stand to benefit. This means that they are real in their consequences [69].
Whether or not REDD+ will be able to shape the reality of actual communities according to its vision is
an open question. Past experiences in community based natural resource management does suggest
that this is possible. The initiation of community-based arrangements and institutions can re-order
social relations and remake communities to fit with this myth. This is in fact the basis of the Ostrom
tradition in institutional analysis and natural resource management. Moreover, in a recent analysis of
the Payment for Environmental Services program in Mexico, McCall et al. [70] find evidence that the
presence of this program, which provides relatively easy money to communities that can justify a case
for it, may in fact have served as an opportunity and incentive for communities to create, or revive,
the necessary decision making apparatus which may have earlier fallen into abeyance due to historical
circumstances, i.e., it has formed the modern ‘community glue’. Newton et al. [7] have also made the
case for how REDD+ is strengthening existing CFM initiatives in Nepal.
Policies are often built on myths, which does not always invalidate them or even necessarily result
in failure. Policies built on myths can sometimes transform the situation they are designed to address.
However, the power of myths lies not only in the ideals they imagine, but also in what they obscure,
and so there will always be unpredictable outcomes. The strong attachment to the community myth
could be the fuel through which REDD+ becomes a widespread catalyst for positive change, but it
may also cause blindness in terms of the practical implications for communities, which will ultimately
do them a disservice.
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Abstract: To date, numerous public- and private-sector efforts, commitments, and initiatives to reduce
commodity-driven deforestation have emerged. In and of themselves, these elements—namely
REDD+ programs, jurisdictional approaches (JAs), and private sector commitments—are necessary,
but they are not sufficient to reduce deforestation. When operating together, however, these efforts
have the potential to significantly reduce commodity-driven deforestation. This research aimed
to determine whether and where REDD+ programs, JAs, and private sector commitments overlap
in what are termed “trifecta jurisdictions”. Considering that each element possesses features that
can enhance and complement those of the others, the authors hypothesized that—but did not
ascertain whether—trifecta jurisdictions present the greatest potential to reduce commodity-driven
deforestation. A total of 13 trifecta jurisdictions and six bifecta jurisdictions—where two of the three
elements are present—were identified by: compiling a dataset of REDD+ programs, JAs, and private
sector commitments; evaluating all potential options against established criteria; and categorizing
them according to trifecta or bifecta jurisdiction status. The fact that a majority of trifecta and bifecta
jurisdictions are located in countries with the most tropical tree cover loss is also significant in that
it highlights the presence of these elements where most needed, and how high deforestation rates
might be attracting REDD+ program, JA, and private sector commitment activities. Although many
of the REDD+ programs, JAs, and private sector commitments are relatively nascent and their ability
to collectively reduce deforestation is not yet clearly evident, this article posited that synergistic
potential is greatest in trifecta and bifecta jurisdictions and that efforts should be made to greater
align these elements.
Keywords: REDD+; jurisdictional approaches; private sector commitments; commodity-driven
deforestation; trifecta jurisdictions; supply chains; public-private partnerships
1. Introduction
In the lead-up to 2020—a year that marks the deadline for many companies to meet the
deforestation and sustainability goals to which they have committed—it is critical for key government
and private-sector entities to begin implementing solutions that will prove most effective for combating
deforestation resulting from the production of key commodities like soy, cattle, timber and pulp, palm
oil, and cocoa [1,2]. Commercial agriculture in tropical forest countries is known to be the driver
of 40% of deforestation and continues to be a driving force of large-scale deforestation [3,4]. In fact,
tree cover loss in the tropics has been rising steadily over the past 17 years. According to recent
Global Forest Watch data, 2017 was the second-worst year on record for tropical forest loss; the tropics
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alone experienced 15.8 million hectares of tree cover loss that year, an area the size of Bangladesh [5].
Historically, the private sector has approached solving deforestation one supply chain at a time. In light
of evident limitations of certification systems (such as the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil and the
Forest Stewardship Council) and other approaches that have been used to reduce commodity-driven
deforestation, the adoption and evolution of REDD+ as a government driven process leading to
results-based payments has begun facilitating the shift of focus away from supply chain-specific
approaches, and toward the development and implementation of jurisdictional approaches (JAs) [6,7].
JAs, which will be discussed further in Section 2.3, are integrated, multi-stakeholder planning
initiatives at the landscape level that are aligned with subnational or national political jurisdictions to
facilitate sustainable economic development and advance environmental commitments to reducing
commodity-driven deforestation [8]. A trend seems to be emerging in which government, the private
sector, non-governmental organization (NGO) actors, and other stakeholders involved with tackling
commodity-driven deforestation are increasingly exploring JAs as potential avenues to overcome the
shortcomings of discrete approaches to curb deforestation [9].
Jurisdictional approaches, alongside REDD+ programs and private sector commitments, number
among the most promising tools to eliminate commodity-driven deforestation. It should be noted
that, while some believe that JAs represent a combined form of REDD+ programs and private sector
commitments, in this analysis each of these elements is distinct, as described below:
• REDD+ programs: These programs are governed at the provincial or national jurisdictional (not
project) levels, focus on results-based payments for verified carbon sequestration, emphasize
public policy, and address deforestation generally (not just commodity-deforestation).
• Jurisdictional approaches: JAs focus more on the role of public-private partnerships for reducing
commodity-driven deforestation and avoiding economic and deforestation leakages.
• Private sector commitments: These pledges are made in various forms—such as zero deforestation
commitments and certification standards—by individual companies to reduce deforestation in their
supply chains.
Facing mounting pressure to broadly and effectively reduce commodity-driven deforestation,
governments and companies alike are striving to identify the most promising solutions. Given that in
and of themselves, these elements are not sufficient to reduce commodity-driven deforestation at scale,
REDD+ programs, JAs, and private sector commitments need to operate in conjunction to significantly
reduce commodity-driven deforestation; each element has the potential to support, complement,
and enhance the others to ensure their medium to long term success [10,11]. Pursuing this line of
thinking, this paper explores the questions: How many current REDD+ programs (subnational and
above), JA initiatives, and private sector commitments overlap in the same jurisdictions? How can
these jurisdictions be characterized? This article hypothesizes that efforts to reduce and eliminate
commodity-driven deforestation at a landscape level will be most successful in jurisdictions where
all three elements—REDD+ programs, JAs, and private sector commitments—are in place; these
jurisdictions are referred to as “trifecta jurisdictions” (Figure 1).
This article begins with providing an overview of the linkages between REDD+ and
commodity-driven deforestation, the successes and limitations of private sector approaches to reduce
commodity-driven deforestation, and the characteristics of JAs. The next section describes themethodology
of the analysis, followed by a discussion of the findings. More detailed descriptions of the REDD+programs,
JAs, and private sector commitments analyzed in this article can be found in the supplementary materials.
The concluding section provides insights into the relevance of the results and how they can be used to
advance action to reduce commodity-driven deforestation in key jurisdictions.
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Figure 1. Elements of a trifecta jurisdiction.
2. Background
2.1. REDD+ Programs
The linkage between commodity production and deforestation began before REDD+ was formally
introduced in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiation
process in 2005 [12]. Previous to the entrance of what is now jurisdictional REDD+ into the UNFCCC
process, project level REDD+ started as early as 1997 with the Noel Kempf Mercado Climate Action
project in Bolivia [13]. Initial thoughts about applying REDD+ as a tool to address deforestation
in supply chains revolved around disagreement at the global level over two questions posed by
developing countries: (1) Why should they not be allowed to clear forest for development purposes,
when a portion of forest clearing was done to plant commodities to meet growing demand from global
supply chains? (2) And if they were not going to clear forest, who was going to compensate them for
the opportunity cost? [14].
After eight years, UNFCCC negotiations on REDD+ culminated in the Warsaw Framework for
REDD+ (WFR). TheWFR provides an overarching framework andmethodological guidance for REDD+
implementation and payment for results at the federal level. Because of concerns about deforestation
leakage from smaller project type REDD+ into neighboring areas—such as soy-related deforestation
leakage from the Brazilian Amazon biome to the Cerrado biome for example—UNFCCC negotiators
at COP16 defined the scale of REDD+ to be at the national level and only subnational level in the
interim [15]. The jurisdictional or government-level scale of the WFR ensures that REDD+ programs
are the focus of national strategies, rather than an amalgamation of distinct projects. The WFR requires
that National REDD+ Strategies describe how the drivers of deforestation will be addressed and
encourages all countries, organizations, and the private sector to take action to reduce the drivers [16].
However, no explicit type of demand-side actions to address the drivers are required of developed
countries or of consumers of deforestation driving commodities [16].
To better tackle the specific and unique nature of commodity-driven deforestation, many initiatives
are now exploring how to link REDD+ programs to other initiatives to reduce commodity-driven
deforestation. For example, many multilateral REDD+ programs, such as the Forest Carbon Partnership
Facility (FCPF), Forest Investment Program (FIP), and the UN-REDD Program, created to help countries
prepare for and implement REDD+, have supported efforts to address the commodity drivers of
deforestation in REDD+ countries [17–19]. Additionally, platforms like the Tropical Forest Alliance
2020 (TFA 2020), Consumer Goods Forum (CGF), and New York Declaration on Forests (NYDF)
came to the fore to help catalyze linkages between public and private sector actors seeking to reduce
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deforestation [1,2,20]. Finally, the Norwegian International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI)—one
of the major REDD+ donors—supported several NGOs to study “Commodity Supply Chain Initiatives
of Relevance to REDD+” between 2013 and 2015 [21].
Although REDD+ programs are demonstrating progress, REDD+ is still considered to be “a great
idea, but hardly tried” by many [22,23]. The need to comply with stringent donor or government
criteria has delayed the implementation of REDD+ programs, as has the ability to overcome vested
interests related to business-as-usual [22,24]. REDD+ programs must also tackle other difficult
governance challenges that accompany improving land tenure and benefit distribution, which can
be complicated by local circumstances [25]. Lastly, the ability of REDD+ to effectively address the
underlying drivers of deforestation can be hindered by the unique and specific nature of deforestation
drivers, and the broad reach of potential trade impacts that such actions might have [26].
2.2. Private Sector Commodity Supply Chain Initiatives
As of June 2018, 473 companies globally have committed to curbing deforestation in supply chains
linked to palm oil, soy, timber and pulp, and cattle [27]. Such commitments have taken various forms,
including targets related to purchasing certified products, supply chain traceability, moratoria on areas
or suppliers linked to deforestation, certification schemes and sectoral standards, and other goals to
improve sustainable management or reduce deforestation. The surge in private sector commitments
is helping elevate the importance of forests, forge linkages between key stakeholders throughout
supply chains, and focus attention on key deforestation drivers [28]. The certification approach, in
particular, including the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), Roundtable on Sustainable PalmOil (RSPO),
and the Soy Moratorium, continues to serve as a primary tool of many private sector commitments
and has demonstrated mild success in curbing deforestation by setting a precedent for achieving
traceability, producing responsibly, and establishing important platforms to discuss and determine
best management practices [29–31].
Despite these benefits, there is no clear evidence that these private sector initiatives are having
their intended impacts. The many shortcomings, specifically of certification systems, have become
particularly evident [32]. Various socio-economic and environmental limitations such as economic
leakage, low and selective adoption, poor forest governance, minimal market uptake, high expenses
for small holders, lack of government buy in, and unintended social consequences all undermine the
potential of private interventions to aggregate towards meeting broader aspirational goals to reduce
commodity-driven deforestation [6]. Moreover, limited geographical coverage induces geographical
leakage effects, while the focus on specific commodities does not allow for a comprehensive approach to
land use changes and precludes potential indirect feedback effects [6]. Additionally, continued demand
for conventional cheaper commodities might undermine supply chain action. Regarding certification
systems, the limitations of this approach have also become more apparent. For example, despite the
rapid expansion of FSC certification, evidence suggests that the certification system has had very little
positive impact on deforestation [33]. The success of RSPO, on the other hand, has been challenged
by lax implementation and weak commitments to sustainable palm oil production [34]. The Soy
Moratorium’s success has also been questioned due to potential leakage of soy-related deforestation
from the Amazon biome to the Cerrado Biome [35]. Overall, there are myriad uncoordinated
corporate initiatives with different objectives, measures, and timelines whose implementation is
hardly monitored [6]. The effectiveness of such a highly fragmented approach to halting deforestation
is questionable at the very least.
2.3. Jurisdictional Approaches
As noted, there are various public and private platforms, programs, and initiatives that have
ushered in a wave of commitments to halt deforestation. However, the lack of coordinated and
integrated strategies has made it challenging to meet demands for agricultural products without
further deforestation and economic leakage. While individual company, NGO, and government
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actions have helped pave the way towards curbing commodity-driven deforestation, lasting and
significant progress will likely require implementation at scale through jurisdictional-level planning
and cooperation among key stakeholders [36].
The JA aims to do just that by aligning and coordinating the conservation, supply chain sustainability,
and green development interests and actions of various stakeholders within a jurisdiction—a country
or a politically defined area (such as a state or province) with defined governance [37]. The JA is
a more inclusive and comprehensive solution than project- or supply chain-specific strategies that
focuses on tackling deforestation from all angles. This government-led, multi-stakeholder process,
which includes companies, producers, purchasers, civil society, local communities, and other local
stakeholders, facilitates deforestation reduction across entire landscapes [9]. The JA focus on government
is fundamental to the success of this strategy. Recognizing the value and importance of government
involvement and action at scale, companies are beginning to consider JAs in order to meet their supply
chain sustainability commitments.
By engaging key public and private actors, JAs combine strong governance and policy
interventions with supply chain efforts aimed at reducing commodity-driven deforestation [32].
Through aligning multistakeholder goals, JAs present opportunities for these actors to work together
in public-private partnerships to address issues that could undermine supply chain efforts aimed at
tackling deforestation such as leakage, which means deforestation problems are simply shifted to
other places, commodities, or ecosystems [32]. Furthermore, the results generated by JAs can easily be
linked to results-based payments for REDD+, and can benefit from finance for phases 1 (readiness)
and 2 (implementation) of REDD+. The scalability of JAs, and knowledge and experience sharing that
accompanies collaboration at scale, helps ensure widespread and potentially long-term impacts.
Despite the potential of JAs to contribute to efforts to reduce deforestation, there are several
challenges that could hinder their success. In order for JAs to be effective, strong governance needs to
be in place at the appropriate scale [36]. Additionally, not only do all stakeholders involved need to
coordinate and align their goals and efforts, they also need to be inclusive of all potential actors that
could impact or be impacted by JA performance, such as those involved with REDD+ programs [38].
Another potential issue is that, by operating at a jurisdictional scale, recognition of good actors and
identification of non-compliant actors—who may simply shift operations outside of the jurisdiction in
question so as to continue deforesting—may be challenging.
3. Trifecta Jurisdiction Analysis Methodology
As demonstrated in the previous section, REDD+ programs, JAs, and private sector commitments
face many challenges. When combined in trifecta jurisdictions, however, these challenges can be
overcome, and the synergies between the three elements can facilitate more effective and lasting
commodity-driven deforestation reduction (Figure 2). To answer the questions underpinning this
analysis—where do REDD+ programs, JA, and private sector initiatives overlap in the same jurisdiction,
and how can these trifecta jurisdictions be characterized—the trifecta jurisdiction analysis methodology
was developed.
The first step of the methodology entailed creating several criteria to ascertain which REDD+
programs, JAs, and private sector commitments qualified for analysis. Then a comprehensive data set
of all potential REDD+ programs, JAs, and private sector commitments to be taken into consideration
was compiled. These initiatives were then assessed and categorized according to the established criteria
to determine which would be eligible for analysis. Finally, eligible REDD+ programs, JAs, and private
sector commitments were organized by jurisdiction to determine whether and where these initiatives
overlapped in trifecta jurisdictions (Table S1) or bifecta jurisdictions (Table S2), and to identify which
areas might be of interest for deeper analysis; more detail about the REDD+ program, JA, and private
sector commitment initiatives included in this analysis can be found in the supplementary material.
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Figure 2. Element-specific challenges that can be overcome through collaboration in trifecta jurisdictions
and the benefits such alignment can yield.
3.1. Criteria for the Selection of REDD+ Programs
Four different criteria were used to determine which national and subnational REDD+ programs
were eligible for this analysis. The first criterion reflected whether a country had a UN-REDD national
program in place, the second whether a country had made significant progress in multilateral programs
such as the FCPF, and the thirdwhether a country had submitted a forest reference emission level/forest
reference level (FREL/FRL) to the UNFCCC’s Lima Info Hub [23]. These three criteria reflect how far
along REDD+ implementation is in various countries. A REDD+ program was deemed eligible for
analysis if two of the first three criteria mentioned were met. The fourth criterion reflected whether
a subnational jurisdiction is engaged in bilateral REDD+ program agreements, such as the German
Development Bank’s (KfW) REDD+ Early Movers (REM) Program; those that are were also considered
eligible [39].
3.2. Criteria for the Selection of Jurisdictional Approaches
As the JA concept continues gaining traction, more and more initiatives at the jurisdictional scale
are being developed. To be included in this analysis, jurisdictional approaches needed to prioritize
government leadership and involvement. In other words, subnational or national governments had to
be involved in the JA from its inception, and continue to play a key role throughout implementation.
The second criterion was that a JA needed to revolve around reducing deforestation resulting from the
production of one or several of the key commodities of focus: soy, cattle, cocoa, palm oil, or timber and
pulp. These commodities were selected due to their impact on deforestation. Lastly, there needed to be
documented action or progress demonstrating that each JA was underway.
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3.3. Criteria for the Selection of Private Sector Commitments
Although many companies have made commitments to reduce or eliminate deforestation from
their supply chains, for this analysis, corporate commitments were only considered if they met
three criteria. The first criterion required that company commitments, strategies, or announcements
indicating an intent to reduce deforestation, create sustainable supply chains, or source responsibly be
published in a publicly accessible way. Second, corporate commitments needed to be tied to one of the
key commodities. The last selection criterion referred to information on the geographical location of
the action. A simple statement that the action was intended, but without information on where the
action was occurring, was not considered sufficient.
4. Results
4.1. Trifecta Jurisdictions
According to the trifecta analysis, there are a total of 13 trifecta jurisdictions in which all three
elements are in place (Table 1). Of those, 12 are at the country level, while one is at the subnational
level. Five of the jurisdictions are located in Latin America, six in Africa, and two in Southeast Asia.
When comparing trifecta jurisdictions to a list of the top 30 tropical forest countries with the most tree
cover loss from 2001 to 2016 (Table A1), 11 of the trifecta jurisdictions are in the top 30. The top five
countries on the list (Brazil, Indonesia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malaysia, and Paraguay in
order) are all trifecta jurisdictions; if Mato Grosso were a country, it would have been ranked fourth
on the list. This is an important finding, because it indicates that coordinated efforts are occurring
where there is significant deforestation. The fact that trifecta jurisdictions are located in areas with
the most tree cover loss could also mean that high deforestation is attracting REDD+ program, JA,
and private sector commitment action. This does not indicate, however, the degree to which these
elements are aligned; further analysis is needed to ascertain the extent of coordination, as explained in
the discussion section.
Table 1. All trifecta jurisdictions, including commodities of focus and geographies of interest.
Trifecta Jurisdiction Cattle Soy Palm Oil Cocoa Pulp-Timber Geographies of Interest
Brazil   Amazon and Cerrado biomes 1
Colombia     Orinoquia
Côte d’Ivoire    Southwest and Tai Regions
Democratic Republic of the Congo     Mai Ndombe
Dominican Republic  Country
Gabon  Country
Ghana   Brong-Ahafo and Western Region
Indonesia   Sumatra, Riau, West Papua, and Kalimantan
Malaysia  Sabah
Mato Grosso, Brazil   Mato Grosso
Nigeria  Country
Paraguay   Atlantic Forest region
Republic of Congo   Country
Total 5 5 9 7 2 –
1 Although the Amazon and Cerrado biomes include Mato Grosso, the state is treated as an individual jurisdiction
because of progress specific to Mato Grosso.
In terms of commodities, of the 13 trifecta jurisdictions, nine include explicit private sector
commitments or JAs with a focus on palm oil, and are underway across the world. Cattle, the largest
source of commodity-driven deforestation and one that is traded less globally comparatively, is being
addressed in five jurisdictions (two of which overlap in the Brazilian Amazon biome, which extends
into Mato Grosso) [40]. Soy efforts are also focused in Latin America, where there are four jurisdictions
of note (two in Brazil, one in Paraguay, and one in Colombia). Cocoa was also a focus in seven
jurisdictions (four in Africa, one in Asia, and two in Latin America). Of note is that key commodities
are being tackled by JAs and private sector initiatives underway in the five countries experiencing
the most forest cover loss. Palm oil is the focus in Indonesia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
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and Malaysia; cattle and soy in Brazil and Paraguay; and timber and pulp in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo and Côte d’Ivoire.
4.2. Bifecta Jurisdictions
Those jurisdictions in which two of the three elements are present are known as bifecta
jurisdictions (See Table 2). Of the six bifecta jurisdictions identified in this analysis, one is subnational
and five are national. REDD+ and JA initiatives are underway in all six of the bifecta jurisdictions.
There are no geographically specific private sector commitments present in any of the bifecta
jurisdictions, however.
Table 2. All bifecta jurisdictions, including commodities of focus and geographies of interest 1.
Bifecta Jurisdiction Cattle Soy Palm Oil Cocoa Geographies of Interest
Acre, Brazil  Acre
Ecuador    Country
Mexico   Country
Nepal  Terai Arc Landscape
Peru    Pachitea Basin, San Martin, and Ucayali
Zambia  Eastern Valley
Total 5 1 3 2 –
1 As stated above, all bifecta jurisdictions listed have a REDD+ program and JA in place, but lack geographically
specific private sector commitments.
Considering the relevance of the bifecta jurisdictions in the list of top 30 countries with forest
cover loss from 2001 to 2016, five of the six bifecta jurisdictions are represented; Nepal was the only
country that did not make the list. If the Brazilian state of Acre were a country, the sub-national
jurisdiction would have ranked 26th on the list. Regarding commodities driving deforestation, cattle
was a focus in five of the jurisdictions (Ecuador, Mexico, Nepal, Peru, and Acre), with palm following
in three of the jurisdictions (Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru). Soy (Zambia) and cocoa (Peru and Ecuador)
were also covered to lesser extents.
5. Discussion
The trifecta jurisdiction concept is nascent, considering that implementation of many REDD+
programs, JAs, and private sector commitments has only just begun. As such, at this stage it is difficult
to determine the extent to which these elements are aligning; this analysis aimed to determine where
the three elements are occurring so as to flag areas of interest and importance, but did not set out to
ascertain the extent or nature of any alignment. Further clarity about the potential success of trifecta
jurisdictions is essential, however, considering the limitations of each distinct trifecta jurisdiction
element. Analyzing the production of export commodities, the extent of deforestation due to the
volume of commodity production, and the presence of large corporates active in export production in
trifecta jurisdictions could shed light on how the elements are aligning and the potential impact of
this alignment.
Our results indicate that of the 19 trifecta and bifecta jurisdictions, 16 of the countries represented
are found in the top 30 tree cover loss list. More interestingly, trifecta jurisdictions are located in the top
five tree cover loss countries. These results reinforce our assumption that much of the REDD+ program,
JA, and/or private sector work is occurring in areas where deforestation is most prevalent and that,
therefore, there is a need to continue encouraging public and private entities to work together to tackle
commodity-driven deforestation. An area that demonstrates the potential of trifecta jurisdictions to
curb commodity-driven deforestation is Mato Grosso, Brazil (a trifecta jurisdiction); see Box 1 for
a more in-depth explanation of what is occurring in this trifecta jurisdiction. Although this article
posits that trifecta jurisdictions are the most likely to succeed in reducing, and eventually eliminating,
commodity-driven deforestation, future analysis is needed to determine the validity of this hypothesis.
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Box 1. A description of the trifecta elements in Mato Grosso, Brazil.
Box 1: Mato Grosso, Brazil—A Trifecta Jurisdiction
Mato Grosso, Brazil is one of the jurisdictions where a REDD+ program, a JA, and pri-vate sector
commitments overlap; in other words, Mato Grosso is a trifecta jurisdiction. With regards to REDD+, in addition
to adhering to the national REDD+ strategy and FREL data that the Brazilian government submitted to the
UNFCCC REDD+ platform, the Mato Grosso state government passed a law to create a state REDD+ system
in 2013 [41,42]. Additionally, Mato Grosso signed a results-based payment agreement with the REM pro-gram
in 2017 [43]. Mato Grosso has also been a pioneer when it comes to JAs. In 2015, the governor of Mato Grosso
launched the Produce, Conserve, Include strategy (PCI), a state government-led multistakeholder strategy that
aims to keep 6 GtCO2 emissions from forests out of the at-mosphere by 2030 [44]. To contribute to climate change
mitigation and adaptation, the PCI aims to restore 6 million ha of degraded pastures, reduce deforestation by
90%, increase agricultural production, and include smallholders and indigenous communities. Many private
sector entities have been active in the PCI. Companies such as Amaggi, Lou-is-Dreyfus, and JBS, support Mato
Grosso’s PCI strategy through engaging in sustainable sourcing agreements, supporting the development of
technical capacity, promoting sus-tainable practices to increase productivity, and providing conservation and
financial bene-fits to ranchers. Amaggi, for example, has been actively working with the PCI governance entities
to develop a strategic forest restoration plan for Mato Grosso that is in line with both state and private sector
goals [45].
Compared to the neighboring state of Pará, which faces similar drivers of deforesta-tion and had a similar
deforestation trend, Mato Grosso seems to have gained traction in reducing deforestation while increasing
agricultural production. Using 2015 as a starting point for when the PCI, private sector commitments, and REDD+
programs were all in place—or when the trifecta elements were all in effect—it is evident that Mato Grosso
has realized a reduction in its annual deforestation rate by 2.5% (deforestation rates totaled 2153 km2 in 2015,
and decreased to 1561 km2 in 2017), while deforestation rates in the neighboring state of Pará jumped from
2153 km2 in 2015 to 2433 km2 in 2017; an increase of about 13% (Figure A1) [46]. While too early to state that
the difference in deforestation reduction performance between Mato Grosso and Pará equates to proof that
trifecta juris-dictions are more successful in terms of reducing commodity-driven deforestation, it does show a
promising trend toward a greater decrease of deforestation in one of the trifecta jurisdictions identified as likely
to perform in the future.
Data demonstrating the collective impacts of these elements on commodity-driven defor-estation
in trifecta jurisdictions is also limited at this stage. Although it is difficult to pinpoint howmuch of a role
the synergies between trifecta elements have contributed to or could contrib-ute to commodity-driven
deforestation reduction, in areas where private governance systems coordinate and integrate efforts
with public governance and involve all local stakeholders within the jurisdiction, the likelihood of
decreasing deforestation at a large scale is greater. Findings from Heilmayr and Lambin support our
hypothesis and indicate that governance regimes with greater collaboration between environmental
and industry stakeholders can achieve better environmen-tal outcomes [47].
6. Conclusions
The purpose of this analysis was to determine whether and where REDD+ program, JA,
and private sector initiatives overlap in trifecta and bifecta jurisdictions, and to discuss what
potential impact this overlap could have on reducing commodity-driven deforestation at a broad scale.
The underlying hypothesis driving this analysis is that, because REDD+ program, JA, and private
sector efforts each possess features that can enhance and complement those of the other initiatives,
jurisdictions with all three elements in place will perform the best at reducing commodity-driven
deforestation over the medium to long term. More analysis will be needed in the future, however,
to determine the extent to which this hypothesis is valid. Additionally, analyses could be done
on how different initiatives complement each other so as to understand the intricate dynamics of
this collaboration, and to identify any other elements that might need to be in place to further
catalyze performance. Such analyses would be invaluable in the areas of interest—trifecta and bifecta
jurisdictions—flagged in this article.
This analysis identified 13 jurisdictions where all three of the initiatives believed to be essential
in combating commodity-driven deforestation are underway. By identifying where these “trifecta
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jurisdictions” are located, this analysis has highlighted those areas we hypothesize to have the most
potential for effectively curbing commodity-driven deforestation. Although it is too early to tell how
these jurisdictions are performing in terms of reducing commodity-driven deforestation, monitoring
whether the alignment of the trifecta elements is having an impact will be helpful in determining the
most effective strategies for reducing commodity-driven deforestation.
As time passes, and more action is taken to curb commodity-driven deforestation, the trifecta
elements will continue catalyzing and complementing one another. Private sector actors, government
members, NGOs, producers, traditional communities, and other local stakeholders need to realize
that reducing commodity-driven deforestation requires collaboration across sectors and at a broad
scale. Trifecta jurisdictions could facilitate that coordination. By determining where REDD+ programs,
JAs, and private sector commitments are overlapping and discussing the potential significance of this
alignment, this article aims to further discussions regarding how to most effectively and efficiently
reduce commodity-driven deforestation.
Supplementary Materials: The following are available online at http://www.mdpi.com/1999-4907/9/10/609/s1,
Table S1: A comprehensive list of all trifecta jurisdictions identified in this analysis, Table S2: A comprehensive list
of all bifecta jurisdictions identified in this analysis.
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, C.M., B.L. and P.U.; Methodology, C.M., B.L. and P.U.; Data curation
B.L., J.C., P.U. and C.M.; Formal Analysis, C.M., B.L. and P.U.; Writing-Original Draft Preparation, C.M., B.L. and
P.U.; Writing-Review & Editing, B.L., C.M., P.U.; Visualization, B.L., C.M., P.U. and J.C.
Funding: This research was supported by Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI).
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
Appendix A
Table A1. Top 30 countries with the most tropical forest loss between 2001 and 2016.
Country Ranking Trifecta Bifecta
Brazil 1 
Indonesia 2 
Democratic Republic of
the Congo 3 
Brazil_Mato Grosso 4 
Malaysia 4 
Paraguay 5 
Bolivia 6
Colombia 7 
Mexico 8 
Myanmar 9
Madagascar 10
Mozambique 11
Peru 12 
Laos 13
Angola 14
Vietnam 15
Côte d’Ivoire 16 
Tanzania 17
Venezuela 18
Thailand 19
India 20
Zambia 21 
Papua New Guinea 22
Brazil_Acre 22 
Cameroon 23
Ghana 24 
Ecuador 25 
Central African Republic 26
Republic of Congo 27 
Nigeria 28 
Gabon 29 
Ethiopia 30
Source: Global Forest Watch [46].
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Figure A1. Deforestation rates for Mato Grosso and Pará, Brazil between 2014 and 2017.
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Abstract: Almost a decade since the establishment of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
Degradation (REDD+), this study investigates the extent to which REDD+ projects are delivering
on the promise of co-benefits and the elusive ‘triple-win’ for climate, biodiversity, and local
communities. The Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCB) is among several leading
REDD+ certification standards that are designed to support the delivery of social and environmental
co-benefits, and ‘socially-just’ carbon. This study uses an in-depth content analysis of 25 subnational
REDD+ project documents to assess the extent to which REDD+ project objectives align with
Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) targets, and evaluates the reporting of progress towards
meeting these objectives. Currently the CCB standards address a relatively small subset of SDG
targets. Despite this, we find that REDD+ projects aspire to work on a much broader set of SDG target
objectives, thus going beyond what the CCB Standards require for REDD+ validation. However,
although reviewed REDD+ projects have these aspirations, very few are actively monitoring impact
against the goals. There is a gap between aspiration and reported progress at the goal level, and for
each project: on average, only a third of SDGs that are being targeted by REDD+ projects are showing
‘improvement’. The analysis shows which global goals are most frequently targeted, and which
are the least. It also allows an analysis of which projects are following through most effectively in
terms of monitoring progress towards the SDGs. This assessment provides insights into the priorities
of REDD+ project proponents, suggesting that REDD+ has unfulfilled potential to elicit positive
change in relation to the SDGs. Our analysis also shows that there is considerable potential for the
safeguarding bodies to do more to ensure that real improvements are made, and reported against,
aligning REDD+ projects more strongly with global development agendas.
Keywords: REDD+; CCB Standards; Sustainable Development Goals; climate change; community;
biodiversity; development; forests
1. Introduction
Amidst rapid social, political and environmental change, questions over the use, value, and control
of forests are vital to the protection and conservation of these ecosystems. Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+), was established under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) nearly a decade ago and is a highly visible intervention
in global forest conservation. REDD+ is primarily a Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) system,
which economically rewards resource managers for the secure provision of ecosystem services [1].
In the case of REDD+, the PES system remunerates forest managers in the Global South for reducing
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deforestation and degradation, thus reducing carbon emissions. Carbon offset credits are ‘sold’ to
(often Global North) buyers [2]. Under the UNFCCC, REDD+ refers to the full range of policy
approaches and positive incentives undertaken by nations to support activities that reduce emissions
from deforestation and forest degradation, and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks through
conservation and sustainable management of forests. The potential for conservation co-benefits from
these forestry activities have provided an important potential new source of international finance
for biodiversity conservation efforts [3]. As evidence continues to support the critical importance of
forests to local livelihoods [4] efforts have been made to ensure that livelihood benefits are realized as
part of REDD+, to avoid adverse unintended consequences on forest-dependent and forest-adjacent
populations in developing countries. The use of market principles to protect tropical forests in order
to mitigate climate change has also raised important concerns about justice for local, indigenous
communities [5,6]. In response, the international development community has developed frameworks
to reduce the risk of negative social and environmental outcomes from REDD+ projects. The ’Cancun
Safeguards’, agreed by UNFCCC parties at the sixteenth session of the Conference of the Parties
(COP16) in 2010, require that ‘free, prior, and informed consent’ is obtained to protect the rights of
indigenous people living in project zones, as well as mandating regular reporting on the progress
of safeguards [7]. These mandatory safeguards still provide flexibility in REDD+ design, allowing
project proponents to respond to local contexts and circumstances. REDD+ has gained widespread
acceptance as a mechanism for developing countries to reduce forest degradation and associated CO2
emissions [8,9], whilst offering unprecedented opportunities to provide community and biodiversity
‘co-benefits’ in project zones—a ‘triple-win’ scenario.
A number of reporting frameworks have emerged to guide best practice in the REDD+ context.
Complementary to the Cancun Safeguards, these include the Climate, Community and Biodiversity
Alliance (CCB) standards, which provide third party certification of REDD+ activities, allowing for
greater confidence in the veracity of claims made by project proponents, especially for investors and
buyers in the emerging market for REDD+ carbon credits [10]. It is hoped that such accreditations
will enhance the monetary and moral value of projects in the global marketplace through the certified
assurance of socially- and environmentally-just carbon—the sought after ‘triple-win’ for climate,
community, and biodiversity [11]. These standards can help governments and project developers
implement activities which contribute (net) positive co-benefits for local biodiversity and communities,
whilst mitigating the potential negative outcomes of REDD+ on these entities [12]. The CCB standards
were established in 2005, featured prominently in the COP16 agreements, and are now amongst the
most widely used of certification standards, with more than 130 projects worldwide having sought
accreditation. To date, CCB has issued 39,201,081 verified carbon units (1 verified carbon unit (VCU)
= 1 tonne of carbon) to a range of forestry programs worldwide [13]. CCB certification is applied for
voluntarily by project proponents and it represents a desirable seal of approval for many communities,
corporate investors, and governments.
The CCB Standards require projects to be evaluated by independent auditors at the validation
(design) stage and verified periodically over the project lifetime. The reporting requirements of
the Standards are designed to promote a high level of transparency and accountability, but do not
specifically state how certain criteria should be addressed, fulfilled, monitored, measured, and reported.
Proponentsmust identify the best way to communicate this information to auditors in project validation
and verification reports—some guidance and template documents are made available by CCB to project
proponents, but they are not always used. At present, most standards suffer from a lack of specificity,
and do not provide a comprehensive framework for assessing the quality of governance and overall
effectiveness of REDD+ projects [14]; the CCB standards have these same challenges. Inevitably,
any attempt to synthesize REDD+ outcomes based on documentation from these audit processes will
reflect the limitations of the verification and monitoring processes themselves, and the extent to which
these processes recognize the complex political economy context within which REDD+ projects are
implemented [14,15]. Recent work on the quality of REDD+ governance at the intergovernmental
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level, with implementation agency- and country-levels has resulted in proposals for governance
standards that could provide greater assurance about the overall legitimacy and accountability of
the mechanism [14]. As the current CCB standards do not explicitly address quality of governance,
our analysis does not assess these specific concerns about how these governance issues might impact
REDD+ effectiveness. Our analysis is limited to project-level plans and outcomes, as reported in design
and verification documents under the CCB standards. Although project level outcomes are clearly
impacted by macro scale political economy issues, project proponents and implementers have less
direct influence on how REDD+ is governed at country and intergovernmental levels. Our current
exercise is analytically specific to the project level outcomes based on these existing standards, and it
remains valid, despite concerns about the overall governance and legitimacy of REDD+ implementation
at a more macro scale.
Alongside the expansion of REDD+ activities in recent years, a new global development
agenda has been established under the framework of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in September 2015, this set of 17 Goals and
169 related targets unite a wide array of social and environmental issues, including education, health,
and biodiversity, with an aspiration to achieve these globally by 2030 [16]. The Goals are increasingly
being used to guide government policy worldwide, and they are also increasingly being adopted by
businesses and other organizations that are keen to engage with the current global development agenda.
The high level of acceptance, and the authority across diverse sectors, that the SDGs have attained make
them a useful evaluative framework for the present analysis, commanding greater recognition and
validity than other alternatives. We recognize that the SDGs framework, while being widely accepted,
has also been subjected to considerable critique since its inception, with commentators suggesting
that this remains a vague and fragmented concept, with little practical value [17,18]. Others raise
concerns of governance: Like the CCB Standards, the SDGs are not legally binding, and governments
must voluntarily support the Goals, and they are responsible for mobilizing policy and practice in
accordance with the Goals, and for monitoring progress. Where accountability systems are weak,
transparency is lacking and private interests are strong, there is risk of the Goals being implemented in
ways which conflict with local needs [19]. Despite these critiques, the SDGs do provide an increasingly
accepted set of targets for assessing progress, and provide a useful framework for the evaluation of a
diverse set of REDD+ projects.
Both REDD+ and the SDGs represent aspirational ambitions for the global community, butmuch of
their potential depends on the ways in which these goals are translated into meaningful (and verifiable)
local actions. The SDGs encapsulate contemporary social and environmental concerns, and they
increasingly guide the development policies of Governments and corporates worldwide [9]. They have
a broad reach, are well-publicized, and are increasingly better understood. The FAO’s recent report,
The State of the World’s Forests [9], recognizes the contributions of forests to all of the SDGs, and it
supports the need for responsible, coherent policy-making mobilized around forest management and
the SDGs [20]. REDD+ has been recognized as an instrument to help achieve the 2030 Agenda [21],
and some projects have started to acknowledge the SDGs in their activities [22]. This analysis draws
on these two global-scale developments—REDD+ and the SDGs—assessing the ways in which REDD+
aspires to produce community and biodiversity co-benefits with relation to the SDGs, and importantly
the extent to which current projects are delivering on these aspirations. Exploring the extent to
which REDD+ projects align with SDG goals and targets in their intentions and outcomes enables
us to identify the potential of REDD+, in order to practically and responsibly contribute to broader
development agendas.
This paper provides an empirically-informed exploration of the synergies between the SDGs and
REDD+ projects, and suggests a method for project proponents to operationalize and document REDD+
outcomes which resonate with global development agendas. Whilst flexibility in REDD+ may allow
location-specific and locally relevant project design, the subsequent diversity of content—including
project objectives, activities, reporting metrics and outcomes—renders the task of comparison between
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and assessment of REDD+ projects difficult [23]. This paper proposes an innovative approach to
address this gap, using the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as an evaluative framework.
It compares and assesses the success of verified REDD+ projects using the documents that were
made available by the CCB, by developing an analytical framework that can handle the diversity of
report content. Specifically, we ask (1) in what ways the CCB Standards encourage REDD+ project
proponents to orient their activities in accord with the SDG targets; (2) how strongly REDD+ project
aims and objectives align with SDGs at the target-level; (3) how successfully REDD+ project activities
address their SDG-related objectives, based on the evidence provided upon project verification, and;
(4) how REDD+ project proponents might better accommodate and crucially meet global development
objectives in their project design and reporting. This exploration comes as a timely contribution,
a decade on from REDD+ establishment and amidst ongoing concerns for environmental and social
justice surrounding REDD+ [6,11,24].
Our analysis shows that REDD+ projects are evidencing strong alignment with the SDG targets in
their proposed activities—and go beyond the requirements of the CCB Standards in doing so. We find
a notable gap, however, between the SDG-related aims of projects and their reported (and measured)
progress in these fields. We conclude that whilst REDD+ aspirations are demonstrably high, this gap
suggests that safeguarding bodies could do more to encourage successful operationalization of REDD+,
to deliver and report on the diversity of co-benefits that are potentially achievable. By broadening
required performance criteria, CCB and other safeguard frameworks could help REDD+ meet its full
potential in relation to broader global development agendas.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Information Sources
An analysis of CCB-verified project documents was conducted for this paper, with documents
downloaded from the Verified Carbon Standards project database (Appendix A Table A1).
The 25 reviewed are REDD+ projects implemented at the subnational scale, within the non-compliance
(voluntary) market with independent verification and certification. These documents are prepared by
project proponents and provided to auditors at each stage of CCB accreditation, including the validation
(design) stage and periodically over the project lifetime, with the first verification being undertaken
within five years. Auditors conduct site visits to project zones and use the documents provided to
them to assess how a project is performing against CCB standards. Proponents must demonstrate how
the ‘with-project’ scenario shows an improvement on the Project Area/Zone conditions in the absence
of the project. Evidencing this requires several stages of reporting: the starting conditions of the project
or study, and stakeholder identification; ‘without project’ and ‘with project projections; potential
negative impacts, risks, and mitigation/prevention; and appropriate methodologies to document the
changes due to the project activities [12,25]. Three editions of CCB standards have now been released,
containing 15, 14, and 17 mandatory criteria in standards 1, 2, and 3 respectively [26–28]. Further,
‘gold standard’ certification can be achieved bymeeting at least one of three further components relating
to climate change adaptation, ‘exceptional’ community benefits and ‘exceptional’ biodiversity benefits.
The Verified Carbon Standard database [13] makes CCB-verified REDD+ project documents
publicly available, of which the following two types were drawn upon in this study:
i. Project design documents: Provide details about how project operations and activities
demonstrate compliance with CCB criteria. These are updated according to discrepancies
highlighted by independent auditors upon validation. An additional validation report indicates
project conformance with CCB criteria, highlighting any discrepancies that should be resolved
in the project design document before a final validation report is published.
ii. Project implementation reports: Provide detail about how project activities are seeking to
deliver net climate, community, and biodiversity benefits, reporting monitoring and project
progress against their original objectives. These reports are produced within five years of
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initial validation, accompanied by verification reports. Verification reports acknowledge
continued conformance with CCB criteria, and they highlight any discrepancies to be resolved
by the project.
A total of 25 projects are reviewed, all of which have been verified according to the CCB Standards
Second (N = 17) or Third Edition (N = 8), demonstrable by available reports as of 2 July 2018 on the
Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) database (Table 1). The online, freely-accessible database is still in
operation and up-to-date despite VCS and CCB Standards now both being under the management
of the organization and carbon quality assurance provider, Verra. REDD+ projects with either the
project design document or project implementation report not available and/or not available in English
are excluded.
Table 1. Sampling strategy for reviewed Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation
(REDD+) projects.
Total Verified Carbon Standard Projects 1441
Total Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCB) Projects (All Types) 94
Total CCB REDD+ Projects 75
Total CCB–REDD+ Projects (Verified) 30
Total CCB REDD+ Projects (Verified, English Project Design Document and English Project Implementation Report) 25
Total REDD+ Projects Reviewed 25
The SDGs are used here as an evaluative framework to enable comparison between projects with
a diverse array of objectives and outcomes, despite these projects having been designed prior to the
establishment of the Global Goals. Through in-depth content analysis of these documents, we explore
the reported impact of the 25 CCB-verified REDD+ projects, as explained in the following sections.
2.2. Matching SDG and CCB Objectives
The CCB Standards were analyzed to reveal the (minimum) SDG targets that CCB-validated
REDD+ projects could be expected to address based on what the Standards require. The analysis
finds SDG-correlates in the CCB Standards, which REDD+ projects need to demonstrate compliance
with in their validation paperwork. Thus, these SDG-correlates should be the minimum SDGs
that CCB-verified projects support. The Standards were analyzed using content/textual analysis,
supplemented by keyword searches corresponding to each SDG target (following a similar approach
to that reported in [29]. For example, the analysis noted direct linkages to SDGs from keywords such
as ‘worker safety’, ‘waste’, or ‘climate change’. Implicit linkages were fewer and they were also noted
where the CCB Standards could be seen as strongly supporting an SDG target. Appendix A Table A2
provides more detail of where and how linkages between the SDGs and the CCB Standards have been
recognized using this explicit/implicit methodology.
2.3. Evaluation of the Objectives
The project design documents of the 25 REDD+ projects were also reviewed using content/textual
analysis, supplemented by keyword searches corresponding to each SDG target [29]. This focused
on their stated objectives and proposed activities, revealing their alignment with SDG targets. Direct
and implicit linkages to SDGs from keywords were again noted. For example, SDG target 12.8,
which ensures ’people have the relevant information for sustainable development and lifestyles in
harmony with nature’ [16] (p. 9) was linked to proposed REDD+ plans to train community members to
engage in sustainable non-timber forest production. Content analysis of both the CCB Standards and
the REDD+ project design documents allowed us to identify three types of SDG targets: (i) those which
are expectedly supported in CCB-verified projects, as these correspond to mandatory requirements of
the CCB Standards; (ii) those which are highly targeted despite not being a mandatory requirement
of CCB accreditation (i.e., REDD+ project proponents are going beyond what is required of them in
143
Forests 2018, 9, 589
support of the global development agenda); (iii) those SDG targets which are not highly targeted,
and which we would not necessarily expect REDD+ projects to contribute to.
2.4. Evaluation of Outcomes
We reviewed the latest project implementation reports available for each project, to assess whether
SDG-related objectives were being followed through in the implementation of project activities.
Content/textual analysis was again used to record project progress at the SDG Goal level. Each REDD+
project’s project implementation reports were read in detail, noting where project activities towards the
17 SDGs had been reported. This qualitative information was converted into quantitative form using
the numerical score system described below, to allow a degree of comparability between projects.
We tracked the progress towards long-term goals using a four-part scoring framework,
which acknowledges that all projects are at different stages along a general pathway of change
that would be expected on the way to achieving an ultimate desired output. Articulating each step
within a longer-term process of change allows projects’ progress to be assessed. A score of 0–3 is given
to each project for each of the 17 Global Goals, where 0 = not targeted; 1 = insufficient information;
2 = monitoring variable(s) have been explicitly identified, and/or monitoring is occurring (results may
be too soon to see); 3 = outcome monitored and improvement reported (Figure 1). This score system
reflects other studies’ hypotheses that early outcomes are often strong predictors of projects’ long-term
impacts [30]. It is these outcomes that are more likely to be picked up upon project verification and
included in project implementation reports. Similar impact assessment frameworks have been utilized
successfully elsewhere [31,32]. The method was considered an appropriate approach here, as it allows
REDD+ projects’ progress to be systematically and quantitatively assessed in relation to the SDG
targets initially identified in the project design documents.
Figure 1. Impact Stages Chain. The 25 project implementation reports were given a score of 0–3
against each of the Sustainable Development Goals to reflect their contribution to the Goals. 0 = not
targeted; 1 = insufficient information is given in the project implementation report; 2 = variable is
being monitored or has been identified (no improvement yet); 3 = variable is being monitored and
improvement is clearly demonstrable.
Our evaluation builds on third-party verification by independent CCB auditors, which we do not
seek to dispute or assess independently—our analysis uses these evaluations to explore the relevance
and efficacy of REDD+ in relation to the global development agendas. This study does not seek to
find the ‘best’ REDD+ project, and we stress that stronger SDG-alignment does not necessarily make a
better project. The impact assessment also allows a qualitative evaluation of approaches, which prove
to be consistently effective in the delivery of project outcomes across spatial and temporal scales.
The CCB advises that the REDD+ project proponents distinguish between project activities,
project outputs, project outcomes, and project impacts, to demonstrate how they plan to progress
from initial project strategies, through activities, to positive impacts in term of climate, communities,
and biodiversity [12]. These causal models—known as ‘theory of change’ models—are useful for
explaining how specific interventions can give rise to specific outcomes and impacts, and to resolve
the challenge of project ‘attribution’ required by CCB for project proponents [23]. Our analysis does
not use this terminology, as the model has not been universally adopted by proponents in project
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implementation reports. It is difficult to make judgments on the stage of impact reached where
proponents have not used this criterion in their reporting.
2.5. Limitations
CCB validation and verification is a time-consuming and financially costly venture for proponents
and auditors alike. Thus, project proponents do not provide complete detail on all project operations
in validation and verification documents, but they often report the minimum that is required to
demonstrate conformance with the CCB standards. Whilst the Standards are designed to promote
transparency, not all activities will be visible in the project documents assessed here. This is an obvious
constraint to the use of the CCB documents as a proxy for project performance, as it is very likely that
SDG-relevant activities are under-reported by project proponents. However, short of independent
audits of each project using an SDG framework, this remains a useful analytical approach to assess
the comparative performance of a large number of relatively mature REDD+ projects in relation to
the SDGs.
3. Results
3.1. Matching CCB-SDGs/Evaluation of Objectives
Currently CCB, standards only address a small subset of SDG targets (Figure 2; see also Table A2).
Figure 2 points to the minimum number of targets that we would expect CCB-verified REDD+ projects
to support. Ten SDG targets would be supported by a REDD+ project seeking no (optional) Gold Level
criteria, or only Gold-Level biodiversity criteria, validated against the CCB Standards, Second Edition.
In contrast, a project validated according to the CCB Standards Third Edition for all Gold Level criteria
would support at least 20 SDG targets. Further descriptive data on the CCB-SDG correlates can be
found in Appendix A (Table A2).
Figure 2. The number of Sustainable Development Goals targets correlating to the Climate, Community
and Biodiversity Alliance (CCB) Standards (Second and Third Editions and Gold Standards) and
the number of SDG targets supported by Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation
(REDD+) projects in their project design documents. Maximum and minimum values, interquartile
range, median line, and cross indicating the mean value of SDG targets that are supported by the
Standards and REDD+ projects.
Analyses of the 25 CCB-verified REDD+ projects show which SDG targets were being considered
and supported in project designs. Despite the relatively limited requirements within the explicitly
stated CCB standards, reviewed REDD+ projects aspire to work on a much broader set of SDG targets
(Figure 2). Figure 2 shows how the number of SDG targets addressed varies between the CCB Standards
and REDD+ projects. The Second and Third Edition Standards make compulsory criteria relating to
only 10 and 14 SDG Targets respectively, across 8 and 10 Goals (respectively). REDD+ projects are on
average supporting 48 Targets across 14 Goals in their project design documents. But this value is
145
Forests 2018, 9, 589
not consistent: Project 20 (ID) aspires to support 68 targets across 15 Goals; Project 22 supports just
22 targets across 10 Goals—just above the 16 Targets that CCB requires for its specific Gold Level status.
Figure 3 describes which CCB Standards criterion have been deemed to be explicitly linked to
SDG targets. Figure 3 shows that many targets for Goal 15 for biodiversity are encapsulated in the
Standards’ overall demand that projects have no negative impact on biodiversity within project zones.
Targets of Global Goal 16 (Justice) and Goal 8 (Decent Work, and specifically 8.8 for worker rights)
are largely covered in the Standards criteria for best practice procedures—which are designed to
complement the UNFCCC REDD+ safeguards (a–d).
 
Figure 3. Numbers of REDD+ projects (out of 25) that have sustainability objectives similar to those
listed as SDG targets. X = targets corresponding to requirements of both CCB Standards (N = 25);
O = targets corresponding to the requirements of the Third Edition only. Gold Level Criteria not
highlighted here; see Supplementary Material. All 169 targets of Goals 1-17 are shown, with or
without labels.
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Figure 3 also summarizes how many projects have presented plans in line with each SDG target,
showing (as expected) that SDG targets which are strongly linked to mandatory CCB Standards criteria
(X and O on Figure 3) were targeted by all projects (of that particular CCB Standards Edition). Overall,
the projects reviewed here demonstrated strong alignment with the SDGs in their stated objectives.
All but three Goals were supported by more than 12 (of the 25 reviewed) projects. Global Goals 3
(Health and Well-being), 7 (Clean Energy), and 14 (Life below Water) are targeted by only nine, nine,
and three projects respectively. Figure 3 points to where: (1) SDG targets which link to optional CCB
criteria on climate, community, and biodiversity, are being frequently targeted in REDD+ project
design documents, and (2) (perhaps more importantly) where SDG targets are being highly targeted in
REDD+ project design documents, to further the requirements of the CCB.
Certain SDG targets are linked to Gold Standard CCB criteria (Figure 3) and so they are only
targeted where deemed applicable by project proponents. Targets 13.1 and 13.b, seeking to strengthen
adaptive capacity to climate change, fall into this category—the gold-level criteria require proponents
to identify the likely regional climate change scenarios and impacts on communities/biodiversity,
and to demonstrate the measures that are been taken to assist communities in adapting to these.
Many REDD+ project zone communities expect to see extreme climate changes over the project
lifetime (increased rainfall, drought severity, temperature rises). Such changes could adversely affect
community wellbeing, which is disallowed by the Standards, and additionally could undermine overall
project success, as causing communities to suffer. Goals 10.2 and 10.3, for equality and inclusiveness
in project participation and outcomes, are also highly targeted, and they are a requirement of the
optional gold criteria for ‘exceptional’ community benefits. Thus, not all projects are required to plan
activities to benefit the entire range of project zone households, but those that aspire to community
gold standard will need to demonstrate their commitment to addressing inequality and inclusiveness.
Perhaps more notable are instances where projects aim to improve areas aligned with SDG
targets which are not CCB criteria (mandatory or optional). Global Goals 2 (Hunger), 4 (Education),
8 (Decent Work) and 12 (Responsible Consumption and Production) are examples of this (Figure 3).
Many REDD+ project proponents recognize unsustainable farming practices (e.g., slash and burn)
as a major threat to deforestation and seek to address these through encouraging more sustainable
alternatives, thus preserving the forest. Global Goal 4 for quality education may be supported in
recognition of the large role that education plays in sustainable community use and management
of the forest environment, and in helping communities cope with changing resources in the context
of climate change. Moreover, many REDD+ project proponents will recognize the value of Global
Goal 8—job, income, and business creation—for project success. Providing secure employment
opportunities in alternative (sustainable) livelihood activities can garner greater support from local
stakeholders for project activities. Goal 12, for sustainable production and consumption, brings these
three together: in educating and employing local people in sustainable NFTP production/consumption,
it is hoped they will be deterred from illegal and damaging (subsistence and/or income-generating)
activities (e.g., poaching, logging). Such support activities, among others, could contribute to projects’
successful longevity and provide benefits to communities and the environment which extend beyond
project lifetimes.
As Figure 3 also identified, several goals (especially Goals 3, 7, and 14) are targeted by only
a few projects. Whether REDD+ project proponents should see themselves as responsible for the
entire spectrum of SDGs, e.g., reducing deaths and injuries from road traffic accidents (Target 3.6),
is debatable, and this is discussed further in Section 4. It is also apparent that certain SDGs, such as
Goal 14 for ‘Life Below Water’, will only be applicable in certain locations (as most REDD+ projects
are focused on terrestrial activities). For example, ‘life below water’, will only be applicable in certain
locations (as most REDD+ projects are focused on terrestrial activities).
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3.2. Evaluation of Outcomes
Analysis of project verification documents, which report on project progress and demonstrate
continued compliance with CCB criteria, tries to differentiate between projects that are and are not
monitoring their SDG-related activities, and those that are monitoring, and that can report strong
positive outcomes from the project implementation period. Although relatively coarse, this analysis
allows for a comparison between hugely diverse REDD+ projects. Table 2 summarizes the progress
made by all verified REDD+ projects against each Global Goal, based on the evidence provided in their
respective implementation reports. It shows that although reviewed REDD+ projects have far-reaching
aspirations in support of the SDGs, very few are actively and systematically monitoring improvement
against the goals. The Table exemplifies the diversity of projects, in their activities, monitoring metrics,
and importantly that they are all at different stages of their implementation pathways.
Table 2. The number of projects (out of 25) that have reached the impact stages (0–3) recorded by SDG.
0 = not targeted; 1 = insufficient info; 2 = monitoring variable identified/variables are being monitored;
3 = evidence of monitoring and improvement.
Sustainable
Development Goal
Impact Stage Example Monitoring Metrics
0 1 2 3
0 6 13 6 No. of people with improved livelihoods or income resulting fromthe project
2 4 12 7 No. of people adopting improved agricultural practices.
10 4 5 6 Mortality rates; incidence of diarrhea, typhoid.
0 5 6 14 No. of children attending school; literacy rates of family members.
6 5 5 9 % women on community councils; no. women employed.
4 9 4 8 No. of hectares of water source protected; % latrine access.
8 8 7 2 No. of households/individuals accessing renewable energy.
1 4 11 9 No. of villagers trained and contracted by the project.
5 8 8 4 No. of individuals with new knowledge/skills in business administration/value-added processing.
4 13 7 1 Income/asset inequality;most disadvantaged communities.
1 8 8 8 Mapping of cultural identity areas; no. of households withupgraded roof materials.
0 6 7 12 No. of rubbish collectiondays/year; no. of ecotourism sites established.
7 12 3 3 No. of beneficiaries of conservation agriculture.
21 1 2 1 No. of fishing restriction zones established.
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Table 2. Cont.
Sustainable
Development Goal
Impact Stage Example Monitoring Metrics
0 1 2 3
0 0 13 12 % change in ha better managed by the project for biodiversity;presence of endangered species
0 5 9 11 No. of grievances;no. of illegal activities recorded
1 13 6 5 No. of public-private partnerships agreed.
Figure 4 visualizes the marked gap between the number of SDGs identified at the design stage,
relative to the various stages of implementation that REDD+ projects have reached. While most REDD+
projects presented plans in line with 14 out of 17 of the SDGs, most only evidence improvement
against five of the Goals. The Figure shows the performance of each project with respect to its stated
objectives based on evidence provided at project verification. There was a marked gap seen between
each projects’ SDG-related aspirations, their identification of monitoring variables, and evidencing
‘improvement’ in these fields. On average, projects were evidencing improvement against 34% of
their initial objectives—meaning that two-thirds of their initial SDG-related activities were either
being monitored, but not yet demonstrating improvement, or that monitoring variables had not been
identified at all (approximately one third each). Some projects demonstrated improvement across a
large proportion of their originally identified SDG-variables (Figure A1). Projects 11 and 12 reported
improvements towards 64% and 70% of the Goals that they initially identified, respectively. Figure A1
makes apparent that these projects are targeting slightly fewer goals (14 and 10 out of 17 respectively),
but they appear to be doing so more efficaciously, and with a specific concern for systematic and
verifiable indicators that allow progress to be monitored.
Figure 5 breaks this information down by SDG, showing there is a gap between aspiration
and reported progress at the goal level. This indicates which goals had been more successfully
addressed by REDD+ project activities, based on where an evidence of improvement (impact score
3) has been provided in project implementation reports. The most notable gap between aspiration
and improvement is visible in Global Goals 7 (Clean Energy), 10 (Equality) and 13 (Climate Change),
with improvement reported by only 15.3%, 4%, and 15% projects respectively. Activities relating to
these Goals were often described in the project design documents, but few projects articulated any
monitoring metrics that were aligned with these activities; even fewer could indicate an improvement.
Global Goals 4 (Education) and 12 (Sustainable Production and Consumption) were highly targeted,
and they had the highest percentage improvement amongst projects (56% and 48% respectively;
Figure 5). These Goals were often supported by projects through the provision of technical and
vocational training for community members, oriented towards alternative livelihood activities—acai
processing, beekeeping, and ecotourism were often mentioned. Proponents might choose to monitor
(including but not limited to) the number of training sessions taking place; the number of community
members with improved knowledge (through surveys); and the non-timber forest products (NTFPs)
production units established. Half of the projects that supported gender in their activities (Global
Goal 5) were also able to report an improvement: higher female participation in project activities was
often reported; some reported providing sexual health clinics; others ensured improved (local) female
inclusion on higher-level councils in project zones. Goal 15 (Life on Land) was unsurprisingly high,
as a mandatory requirement of the CCB Standards is to have a ‘net positive’ effect on project zone
biodiversity. What is not stated is how to monitor this—but demonstrably the majority of proponents
are choosing appropriate monitoring indicators to clearly signal their continued compliance with the
CCB criteria.
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Figure 4. The number of Sustainable Development Goals that are being (A) aspired to in project design
documents, (B) are being monitored or have monitoring variables identified in project implementation
reports (no improvement yet), and (C) monitored and improvement is clearly demonstrable in project
implementation reports, by the 25 reviewed REDD+ projects.
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Figure 5. Numbers of REDD+ projects that target specific SDGs in their project design documents
(solid boxes), compared to the number of projects reporting improvement (=impact score 3; unfilled
boxes) based on project implementation reports. Colors mimic those that are used for SDG icons [16].
4. Discussion
Three years since the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development was established, and with REDD+
now a decade old, this exploration comes as a timely investigation into the progress of subnational
REDD+ projects on-the-ground and the potential of REDD+ to support the global development agenda.
Orienting REDD+ project activities to the SDGs has obvious benefits, with the potential to improve
projects’ overarching success in reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation through the
provision of sustainable co-benefits. To tackle the diversity of REDD+ report content, this study
has utilized the 17 Sustainable Development Goals and 169 Targets as an evaluative framework.
Independently verified REDD+ projects in different stages of their implementation pathway have been
reviewed, revealing the potential synergies between REDD+ and a key component of the contemporary
global development agenda.
4.1. Matching CCB and SDG Objectives
As a leading safeguard framework, the CCB Standards (in association with REDD+) seek to avoid
both the potential negative impacts of project activities on biodiversity and communities and generate
net positive benefits for these entities (Panfil and Harvey, 2014). Since the CCB Standards were created
before the SDGs were agreed in 2015, care is needed in explicitly linking the two. However, links are
important where they can be found: the CCB Standards make demands of REDD+ project proponents
that seek validation, which the SDGs do not—the SDGs being recommendations as opposed to
mandatory compliance targets for signatories. Standards could therefore be valuable in suggesting
forest management approaches that might better enable countries to deliver challenging SDG outcomes
(focused, of course, on the forest sector and allied project activities). Our analysis shows that currently
the CCB standards, which are designed to mitigate projects’ negative effects, only address a small
subset of SDG targets. These targets primarily link to biodiversity and ‘best practice’ procedures.
4.2. Evaluation of Objectives
The reviewed REDD+ projects are aspiring to work on a much broader set of SDG targets than
what the CCB Standards require (Figure 2). The projects demonstrate a strong alignment with the SDGs
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in their stated objectives, with all but three SDGs (Goals 3, 7, and 14) addressed by activities proposed
by over half of projects (Figure 3). These proposals, described in the project design documents,
go beyond the minimum requirements of the CCB Standards—of which there are currently relatively
few—and they demonstrate considerable ambition amongst REDD+ project proponents in relation
to the wider benefits of the activities that they are intending to undertake in and around their field
locations. Importantly, while being demanding, the CCB standards give the project proponents
considerable flexibility in the details of project planning, allowing activities to be designed in ways
that are locally appropriate. This analysis has shown that project proponents are inclined to contribute
multiple and far-reaching co-benefits from their activities, and this indicates the potential use of REDD+
as a vehicle for positive local scale mobilization towards the SDGs.
4.3. Evaluation of Outcomes
Although reviewed REDD+ projects have such high aspirations in relation to the SDGs, very few
are actively monitoring progress and impact against the goals. There is a gap between aspiration and
reported progress for each project (Figures 4 and A1), and at the goal level (Figure 5). On average,
just over a third of projects’ initial objectives are being evidenced as having improved by the projects
upon verification. Earlier examinations of REDD+ [33] reported that, relative to the monitoring
of carbon stock and forest cover, measurement of co-benefits for REDD+ is still in its infancy.
These findings suggest that whilst this is still the case for many REDD+ projects (at least from
those reviewed here), some projects are demonstrating competent monitoring across far-reaching
activities, but are currently failing to demonstrate where improvements have been made (Table 2).
This gap is important. Whilst some changes take time to be realized, 80% of our projects had been in
operation for over three years at their most recent verification. It might be hoped that, in this time,
improvement could be demonstrated in some of the monitoring variables identified. Thus, we deem
the aspiration–performance gap to be indicative of missed opportunities in REDD+ projects, that need
to be appropriately addressed by project proponents, as well as those responsible for setting standards
and monitoring performance against these standards.
Financial constraints likely play a role in creating this gap: project proponents often face a
trade-off between investing funds in actually delivering social and environmental improvements,
as opposed to investing resources into monitoring. This resonates with our observation (Section 2.4)
that SDG-relevant activities are likely to be under-reported by project proponents. While this is
probably true, most project proponents are also likely to be aware that, without explicit monitoring of
progress against baselines or without project scenarios, they cannot credibly claim that they have been
delivering real improvements. Some level of investment in measuring performance, thus, is likely
to be important for projects to demonstrate their wider achievements across a range of social and
environmental indicators.
Another important constraint of the present analysis is the short time period that has elapsed
since the start of most of the projects currently under review, we acknowledge that some SDG-related
parameters (especially those relating to institutional and social change) will only show real
improvements in generational timescales, as opposed to the annual/biennial timescales that are
visible in current verifications and monitoring reports. But, even where it is more appropriate to
expect change to be visible over longer periods, monitoring metrics are important to allow baselines
to be established, so that real improvement can eventually be evidenced. Reflecting this, the scoring
system utilized here rewards projects that have identified monitoring variables, compared to those
that have not.
The analysis also shows which goals are most frequently targeted, and which are the least
frequently. Global Goals 4 (Education) and 12 (Sustainable production and Consumption) are highly
targeted and demonstrate the highest improvement amongst all projects. Goals 3, 7, and 14 are targeted
by fewer projects, but the most notable gap between aspiration and improvement is visible in Global
Goals 7 (Clean Energy), 10 (Equality), and 13 (Climate Change). This analysis has not sought the ‘best’
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REDD+ project, nor is there a presumption that addressing a wider range of SDG targets is necessarily
an indication of a ‘better’ project. The projects reviewed have been in operation for different periods of
time, so it is unsurprising that they differ in their progress. However, it is important to identify where
and how projects have been able to provide strong evidence of improvement, to suggest how projects
might better support the global development agenda, and to provide independently verified evidence
of their progress towards the global goals.
The CCB has recently introduced a monitoring template [34,35] that is designed for project
proponents, to help them highlight important project benefits according to standardized benefit
metrics. We find that the two strongest scoring projects (projects 11 and 12) are verified using the
CCB’s recently introduced CCB/VCS Monitoring Report template, which offers some standardized
monitoring metrics to proponents, some of which are strong correlates to the SDGs—including
improved access to, and quality of, healthcare (Global Goal 3), education (Global Goal 4), and clean
water (Goal 6). These projects are not the only ones to use the new template, nor does it require that
all the suggested variables be monitored—hence, it should not be seen as a prerequisite for success.
It does, however, provide a reporting framework that is consistent and comparable across a wide
range of local interventions. All CCB projects will be expected to monitor the same quantifiable
information when they undergo their next rounds of verification. We might expect that an eventual
programme-wide rollout of the template across all VCS/CCB projects will encourage more proponents
to engage in astute monitoring and targeted activities, generating positive SDG outcomes. It might
also facilitate future comparison between the relative achievements of different projects.
4.4. Policy Implications
This analysis places strong emphasis on the need for clearly articulated and measurable targets as
a key element of successful project implementation, which corresponds with other investigations of
conservation outcomes [25,36]. The introduction of the monitoring template for REDD+ proponents
marks a step in the right direction to ensuring that projects generate lasting co-benefits, and by
directing needed attention towards critical fields. Currently, however, relatively few SDG targets
are mandatory in the existing CCB criteria. Since CCB does not require that specific variables are
monitored, closing the gap between aspiration and improvement relies upon motivated, responsible
proponents who go beyond the minimum reporting requirements for certification. Despite this,
our findings suggest that REDD+ projects already target a diversity of SDGs beyond what is required
by the CCB Standards. Whilst some projects are making demonstrable improvements in the SDG fields,
many projects’ objectives remain abstract aspirations, or else isolated accounts of project activities
that are unable to systematically indicate progress towards these targets. It seems that while REDD+
could be a vehicle to elicit strong positive change in vulnerable communities, these opportunities are
currently being missed—projects with high aspirations are not delivering real co-benefits (or at least
not monitoring and reporting these under the CCB Standards). This is not a criticism of the programme
itself, but the process of reporting and monitoring, which is potentially missing an opportunity to
provide proponents a structure for demonstrating their progress towards the Global Goals.
If the CCB and other safeguarding frameworks were to broaden and tighten REDD+
performance criteria in synergy with the SDGs, the opportunities that REDD+ offers to support
global development—that are currently being missed—might be better fulfilled. This might
involve introducing more obligatory standardized metrics into the new monitoring template,
which align with the entire spectrum of SDG targets, and rewards for project proponents that engage
with these metrics. CCB validation criteria could potentially require proponents to describe why
certain Global Goals are not being supported—recognizing that in many cases this will be because
it is inappropriate, or not relevant to the project zone communities. We are not arguing that it is the
responsibility of REDD+ proponents to tackle all aspects of the contemporary global development
agenda; clearly, individual project-level forest sector interventions cannot realistically address the entire
range of issues that the SDGs identify as global priorities. However, such an approach to reporting
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and monitoring under the CCB, which encourages REDD+ alignment with the SDGs, could maintain
a degree of programmatic flexibility, while also incentivizing proponents to actively engage with the
global development agenda, as is appropriate to local needs and contexts.
5. Conclusions
This paper has used the Sustainable Development Goals as an evaluative framework to assess the
aspirations and achievements of REDD+ projects under the CCB Standards to positively support
broader global development agendas. Our analysis suggests that safeguards, such as the CCB,
which seek to alleviate concerns for social and environmental justice relating to REDD+, are currently
potentially too narrow in their expectations and monitoring requirements, thereby missing an
important opportunity for greater alignment of REDD+ activities with the SDGs. Our analysis shows
that REDD+ project proponents aspire to address a much wider range of social and environmental
issues than what is currently required under the CCB Standards. Thus, such safeguards are falling
short in their requirements (or lack of) for project proponents to demonstrate progress towards these
stated aspirations. Our analysis reveals a gap between what projects aspire to, and what is reported as
being improved upon in project implementation documents. More stringent performance reporting
criteria, relating to the full range of SDGs targets, could be imposed upon proponents by safeguarding
frameworks like CCB, and to facilitate more effective documentation of evidence for the delivery of
positive co-benefits of REDD+ in support of broader development agendas.
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Appendix
Table A1. The 25 CCB-verified REDD+ projects reviewed in this analysis; project design documents
and project implementation reports are made publicly available at http://www.vcsprojectdatabase.
org/#/ccb. Projects were given unique IDs during the analysis.
CCB Project
ID Project Name Region
Standards
Edition
Gold
Standard(s)
CCB
Verifications
562 The Kasigau Corridor REDD Project—Phase IRukinga Sanctuary Africa Second
Climate;
Biodiversity 4
612 The Kasigau Corridor REDD Project—Phase IIThe Community Ranches Africa Second
Climate;
Biodiversity 4
674 Rimba Raya Biodiversity Reserve Project Oceania Second
Climate;
Community;
Biodiversity
2
902 Kariba REDD+ Project Africa Second Climate;Biodiversity 2
904
Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and
Degradation in Community Forests—Oddar
Meanchey, Cambodia
Asia Second
Climate;
Community;
Biodiversity
1
154
Forests 2018, 9, 589
Table A1. Cont.
CCB Project
ID Project Name Region
Standards
Edition
Gold
Standard(s)
CCB
Verifications
934 The Mai Ndombe REDD+ Project Africa Second Climate;Biodiversity 2
953
The Paraguay Forest Conservation
Project—Reduction of GHG emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation in the
Chaco—Pantanal ecosystem
Latin
America Second
Climate;
Community;
Biodiversity
1
958 BIOCORREDOR MARTIN SAGRADOREDD+ PROJECT
Latin
America Second
Climate;
Community;
Biodiversity
1
963 The Purus Project LatinAmerica Second Biodiversity 6
985 Cordillera Azul National Park REDD Project LatinAmerica Second Biodiversity 4
1112 The Russas project LatinAmerica Second Community 2
1113 The Valparaiso Project LatinAmerica Second Community 2
1168 Kulera Landscape REDD+ Program forCo-Managed Protected Areas, Malawi Africa Second
Climate;
Community;
Biodiversity
1
1175 Avoiding planned deforestation and degradationin the Valdivian Coastal Reserve, Chile
Latin
America Third Biodiversity 1
1201 Gola REDD Project Africa Second Climate;Biodiversity 1
1325 Mjumita Community Forest Project (Lindi) Africa Third
Climate;
Community;
Biodiversity
1
1340 Bale Mountains Eco-region REDD+ project Africa Third
Climate;
Community;
Biodiversity
1
1359 Isangi REDD+ Project Africa Second Biodiversity 1
1382 The Envira Amazonia Project—A Tropical ForestConservation Project in Acre, Brazil
Latin
America Third
Climate;
Community;
Biodiversity
1
1403
The Paraguay Forest Conservation
Project—Reduction of GHG Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation in the
Parana Atlantic Ecosystem—Forest Protection in
the La Amistad Community, San Rafael
Latin
America Second Biodiversity 1
1408 Chyulu Hills REDD+ Project Africa Second
Climate;
Community;
Biodiversity
1
1477 Katingan Peatland Restoration andConservation Project Oceania Third
Climate;
Community;
Biodiversity
2
1541 Lacondon—Forest for life REDD+ Project LatinAmerica Third
Climate;
Community;
Biodiversity
1
1622 REDD+—Project for Caribbean Guatemala:The Conservation Coast
Latin
America Third Biodiversity 1
1650 Reduced Emissions from Deforestation andDegradation in Keo Seima Wildlife Sanctuary Asia Third Biodiversity 2
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Table A2. Links between SDG targets and REDD+ CCB Standards criteria, as they appear in the
Second and Third Editions of the CCB Standards. None of the 25 REDD+ projects reviewed by us were
validated using First Edition criteria, so these criteria are excluded from the analysis. Acronyms used
for CCB Standard are G = a general criterion (blue); B = related to biodiversity (green); CM = related to
community; GL = a “gold level” criterion (yellow/gold); N/A = not applicable to Edition (grey).
SDGs
Addressed
SDG Targets Corresponding Criterion in CCB Standards
Edition 2 Edition 3
1.5: “build the resilience of
the poor and those in
vulnerable situations . . . ”
GL2.4: “identify any marginalized
and/or vulnerable
Smallholders/Community
Members . . . (demonstrate) that
measures are taken to avoid, or
when unavoidable to mitigate any
such (negative) impacts.”
GL2.4: “identify any marginalized
and/or vulnerable
Smallholders/Community
Members . . . (demonstrate) that
measures are taken to avoid, or
when unavoidable to mitigate any
such (negative) impacts.”
4.4: “increase the number of
youth and adults who have
relevant skills . . . for
employment . . . ”
G4.3: “provide orientation and
training for the project’s employees
and relevant people from the
Communities . . . building locally
relevant skills and knowledge to
increase local participation in
project implementation
G3.9: “provide orientation and
training for the project’s workers
and relevant people from the
Communities . . . building locally
useful skills and knowledge to
increase local participation in
project implementation
5.5: “Ensure women’s full
and effective participation
and equal opportunities for
leadership . . . ”
N/A
GL2.5: “the project generates net
positive impacts on the well-being
of women and that women
participate in or influence decision
making”
8.8: “Protect labour rights
and promote safe working
environments . . . ”
G4.5: “the project meets . . .
applicable laws and/or regulations
covering worker rights.”
G4.6: “assess situations . . . that
pose . . . risk to worker safety . . .
show how the risks will be
minimized . . . ”
G3.11: “the project meets . . .
applicable laws and/or regulations
covering worker rights.”
G3.12: “assess situations . . . that
might arise through the
implementation of the project and
pose . . . risk to worker safety.”
10.2: “ . . . promote the
social, economic, and
political inclusion of all . . . ”
N/A
GL2.6: (demonstrate) “that
Smallholders/Community
Members have fully and effectively
participated in defining . . .
decision-making . . . and the
distribution mechanism for benefit
sharing . . . ”
GL2.8: “demonstrate that . . .
(governance structures) enable full
and effective participation of
Smallholders/Community
Members in project decision-making
and implementation.”
GL2.9: “demonstrate how the
project is developing the capacity of
Smallholders/Community
Members . . . to participate
effectively and actively . . . ”
10.3: “Ensure equal
opportunity and reduce
inequalities of outcome . . . ”
GL2.2: “that poorer households . . .
are likely to benefit substantially . . .
”
GL2.3: “that any barriers or risks
that might prevent benefits going to
poorer households have been . . .
addressed . . . ”
GL2.4: “measures have been taken
to identify any poorer and more
vulnerable households . . . ”
GL2.5: “identify positive and
negative impacts on poorer and
more vulnerable groups . . . ”
GL2.4: “Demonstrate that the
project generates net positive
impacts on . . . all identified
marginalized and/or vulnerable
Community Groups . . . ”
GL2.5: “the project generates net
positive impacts on the well-being
of women . . . ”
GL2.6: (demonstrate) “that
Smallholders/Community
Members have fully and effectively
participated in defining . . .
decision-making . . . and the
distribution mechanism for benefit
sharing”
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Table A2. Cont.
SDGs
Addressed
SDG Targets Corresponding Criterion in CCB Standards
Edition 2 Edition 3
12.4: “achieve the
environmentally sound
management of chemicals
and all wastes . . . ”
N/A
B2.8: “Describe the possible adverse
effects of . . . fertilizers, chemical
pesticides, biological control agents
. . . ”
B2.9: “Describe the process for
identifying, classifying, and
managing all waste products . . . ”
13.1: “Strengthen resilience
and adaptive capacity to
climate-related hazards . . . ”
13.b: “promote mechanisms
for raising capacity for
effective climate
change-related planning . . .
”
GL1.4: “communities and/or
biodiversity to adapt to the probable
impacts of climate change.”
GL1.3: “assist Communities and/or
biodiversity to adapt to the probable
impacts of climate change”
15.1: “ensure the
conservation . . . of
terrestrial and inland
freshwater ecosystems . . . ”
15.2: “promote the . . .
sustainable management all
types of forest . . . ”
15.5: “reduce the
degradation of natural
habitats, halt the loss of
biodiversity . . . ”
B1: (including) “project must
generate net positive impacts on
biodiversity within the project zone
. . . ”
B2.2: “Document how the project
plans to mitigate . . . negative offsite
biodiversity impacts . . . ”
B2.2: “Demonstrate that the
project’s net impacts on biodiversity
in the Project Zone are positive . . . ”;
B2.3: “mitigate negative impacts on
biodiversity . . . ”
B2.4: “Demonstrate that no High
Conservation Values are negatively
affected . . . ”
15.8: “prevent . . . /reduce
the impact of invasive alien
species . . . ”
B1.3: “show that no known invasive
species will be introduced . . . ”
B2.5: “show that no known invasive
species are introduced . . . ”
16.4: “combat all forms of
organized crime”
G5.5: “Identify any illegal activities
that could affect the project’s . . .
impacts . . . describe how the project
will . . . reduce these”
G5.4: “Identify any illegal activities
that could affect the project’s . . .
impacts . . . describe measures . . . to
reduce these”
16.5: “reduce corruption and
bribery . . . ” N/A
G4.3: “Provide assurance that the
project proponent and any . . .
entities . . . are not complicit in . . .
corruption such as bribery”
16.6: “Develop effective,
accountable and transparent
institutions . . . ”
G3.9: “proponents must play an
active role in distributing key
project documents to affected
communities and
stakeholders”G3.10: “Formalize a
clear process for handling
unresolved conflicts and grievances
. . . ”
G5.2: “Demonstrate that . . . the
Free, Prior, and Informed Consent
has been obtained of those . . .
affected by the project . . . through a
transparent, agreed process.”
16.7: “Ensure responsive,
inclusive, participatory and
representative
decision-making”
G3.8: “Document and defend how
communities and other stakeholders
. . . have been identified and have
been involved in project design . . . ”
G3.6: “Describe the measures
needed and taken to enable effective
participation, as appropriate, of all
Communities . . . ”
16.10: “Ensure public access
to information . . . ”
G3.9: “proponents must play an
active role in distributing key
project documents to affected
communities and . . . hold widely
publicized information meetings . . .
”
G3.1: “Describe how full project
documentation has been made
accessible to Communities . . . ”
GL2.7: “Explain how relevant and
adequate information . . . has been
communicated to Smallholders . . . ”
16.b: “enforce
non-discriminatory laws and
policies . . . ”
N/A
G3.7: “ensure that the project
proponent and all other entities
involved in project design and
implementation are not involved in
or complicit in any form of
discrimination . . . ”
17.17: “promote effective
public, public-private, and
civil society partnerships . . .
”
G4.2: “If relevant experience
islacking . . . demonstrate how other
organizations will be partnered with
to support the project . . . ”
G4.2: “If relevant experience is
lacking . . . demonstrate how other
organizations are partnered with to
support the project . . . ”
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Figure A1. The number of Sustainable Development Goals addressed in the project design documents
of 25 REDD+ projects, compared to the number of SDGs that are monitored (=impact score 2) and
improved (= impact score 3), based on the project implementation reports.
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Abstract: Early project-level initiatives of ‘reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation’
(REDD+) have left a negative impression among many forest-dependent peoples (FDP) across the
tropics. As countries move towards national-level implementation and results-based payments, it is
timely to analyze the effects of ‘national REDD+’ on FDP. We use Guyana’s technically approved
United Nations Forest Reference Emission Level (FREL) submission and Opt-In Mechanism to assess
how fifteen indigenous communities with tenured forestland may financially benefit from national
REDD+, and evaluate whether, and to what extent, Guyana forms a best-case scenario. In addition,
we provide a first-time assessment whether field estimates of the average carbon density of mature
forests managed by fifteen forest-dependent communities (beyond rotational farming lands) equals
that of nearby unmanaged mature forest, as this could affect REDD+ payment levels. We conclude
that, notwithstanding some pending issues, Guyana’s national REDD+ program could be very
beneficial for FDP, even under a modest United States (US) $5 unit carbon price. We present economic
evidence to support forest governance change domestically in sovereign developing countries that
may ease FDP tenure and national REDD+ implementation. The average carbon density was locally
substantially less in FDP-managed forest, but had little effect on the overall carbon stock of the titled
forest area, and is considered modest when incorporating ecological and socioeconomic attributes.
Partnerships with FDP when combined with advances in remote sensing could have potential for
economic monitoring of forest emissions across the tropics.
Keywords: REDD+ financial benefits; indigenous carbon impact; land grabbing; tenure; social
safeguards; forest carbon calibration
1. Introduction
Reducing Emissions fromDeforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) aims to reduce emissions
from tropical forests while ensuring livelihoods of forest-dependent people (FDP) [1]. REDD+ was
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explicitly mentioned as amitigation option in the 2015 Paris Climate Accord, wheremost nations signed
an agreement to keep global temperature rise below 2 ◦C [2], encouraging tropical forest countries
to submit proposals for national REDD+ programs [3]. FDP inclusion in these processes, however,
has been peripheral at best [4–6]. The term “forest-dependent peoples” (FDP) has been defined in
various ways [7]. In the context of communities’ impact on forest carbon stocks of indigenous lands,
we define forest-dependent peoples as residents of communities that are spatially located within or in
close proximity to forests, which have de jure or de facto user rights, and which depend significantly
(though not necessarily exclusively) upon forests for residents’ livelihood needs.
The involvement of FDP with REDD+ around the world thus far has ranged from problematic
(e.g., [8]), to very negative [9,10], leading to a backlash from ‘no-redd’ civil and NGO movements
(e.g., [11,12]). Reported challenges of REDD+ pilots or demonstration projects with FDP include
lagging global finance for REDD+, tenure insecurity, non-mandatory forest safeguards [8], poor
adherence to Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) principles, and prioritizing carbon credits over local
interests [9,10]. Much of the REDD+ literature has converged on the belief that REDD+ cannot be
implemented without first resolving FDP tenure, in order to prevent land grabbing, regulate FDP
resource use restrictions, and ensure equitable REDD+ benefit sharing [13–16]. Although REDD+ is
intended for implementation at the national level [3], all REDD+ experiences to date are based on
sub-national initiatives [17], and there has been no assessment of the national implications for FDP.
Guyana was the first country to submit a comprehensive Forest Reference Emission Level (FREL)
proposal to the UnitedNations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which included
countrywide forest emissions, forest degradation due to logging, and countrywide variation in
the carbon density of its forests [18]. The submission was technically approved by the UN [19].
In addition to its FREL-submission, Guyana has developed an ‘Opt-In Mechanism’ for its indigenous
communities. The Opt-In Mechanism provides indigenous villages with titled lands (documented
legal ownership of the land, including forest, Section 2.1) the opportunity to use their forests as a part
of the national REDD+ program [20] (detailed in Section 2.2). Guyana thus provides a first example
and opportunity to examine the implications of national-level REDD+ for FDP, including its financial
benefits. We subsequently explore to what extent Guyana forms a best-case scenario due to the carbon
density of its forests, its High Forest Low Deforestation (HFLD) status, and FDP tenure.
FDP are regarded by many as the best forest stewards, based on observations that their lands
retain most forest cover in comparison to other forest uses, including fully protected areas (e.g., [21–23]).
However, this omits a core cause of deforestation and generally hesitant recognition of FDP forest
rights, which is that commercial forest uses (CFU, e.g., agriculture, mineral, and wood extraction)
provide revenue and add to a country’s gross domestic product, while FDP use does not. Neither
does ‘FDP retaining most forest cover’ imply that their forest (beyond rotational farming areas) retains
the carbon content of mature forest, even if a closed canopy cover is present, as people may log for
domestic or commercial purposes (labeled as ‘forest degradation’). If their mature titled forests do
hold significantly lower carbon stocks than unmanaged forests, this would have implications for levels
of future carbon payments to FDP. To address this, we assess the impact of 15 FDP communities on
surrounding mature forest in Guyana to determine the extent of their influence on forest carbon stocks.
In this paper we combine data from Guyana’s UN-FREL submission and Opt-In Mechanism with our
field measurements and remote sensing data on titled forest areas to examine how Guyana’s national
REDD+ program would affect FDP and evaluate the wider applicability of these results.
2. Study Area and Methods
2.1. Indigenous People and Land Rights
In 2012, there were nearly 80,000 indigenous people of nine ethnicities in Guyana [24], making up
10.5% of the national population. Locally named ‘Amerindians’, the nine groups live in approximately
146 indigenous communities, 96 of which have titled lands [25], which collectively occupies
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approximately 14% of the national forest area (2.6 M ha of 18.4 M ha, [26]). The first legal government
commitment to provide Indigenous land rights in Guyana was rooted in the fact that, at the time of
independence from British rule (1966), the Indigenous vote was important for the other two major
ethnicities (African Guyanese and Indo-Guyanese) [25]. It has, however, taken four more decades, with
the passage of the Amerindian Act [27], that there has been a systematic acceleration of indigenous
communities gaining title to traditionally inhabited lands. Under the Act, Amerindian communities
established at least 25 years and with more than 150 people can apply for title. The government
subsequently has six months to visit the community to gather relevant information, and another six
months for the Minister to make a decision, which, if the community disagrees, can be appealed in
court [27] (‘Part VI’). The title provides permanent full collective ownership of the land and its forest
resources by the community, as protected by the Constitution, but does not include rivers and 20-m
wide riverbanks. Belowground mineral resources remain state ownership, but a community (‘village’
when it has title) can deny access to (small and medium-scale) mining on its titled land [27] (‘Part VI’).
The titled land is owned equally by all residents of the community. While a household may occupy
an area for generations and the wider village will accept and respect that piece of land as theirs, the
household could not formally use this as an asset. Although rights to carbon stocks were not defined
in the 2006 Act, the government has acknowledged these rights by giving communities with titled
lands the choice of opting in or out of enrolling their forest in Guyana’s national REDD program and
to receive compensation from government under a REDD+ agreement (see Section 2.3) [20].
2.2. Guyana and REDD+
Guyana is classified as a High Forest-Low Deforestation (HFLD) country [28], with about 83.3%
of its area being covered by forest (18.4 M ha, [26]). HFLD was coined in 2007 by Da Fonseca et al. [28]
to denote a group of countries that were at risk of being omitted from a new framework for reducing
emissions from deforestation—those with high forest cover (>50% of land area in 2005) and low
rates of deforestation (below global average of 0.22% during 1990–2000) [28]. We return to HFLD in
Section 4.3.2. The national population is around 750,000 and Guyana is ranked 151th in the world
in terms of per capita gross domestic product [29]. The country has been at the forefront of REDD+
development since 2006, and it is a partner country of both the UN REDD+ Programme and the World
Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility [3,30]. In late 2009, Guyana signed a five-year bilateral
performance-based REDD+ agreement with Norway to facilitate REDD+ readiness and implement
low carbon projects [31,32].
2.3. Guyana’s Opt-In Mechanism Strategy
Concurrent with its UNFCCC submission, Guyana developed an ‘Opt-In Mechanism’ that
stipulates the conditions and benefits under which indigenous villages may be included in the national
REDD+ scheme [20]. The Opt-In Mechanism (OIM) was developed in consultation with indigenous
leaders nationwide that provided reviews to inform the documents, and is not yet finalized [20].
Opting in is the decision of individual villages: it is voluntary, reversible, and without a deadline or
consequences for other national development programs. If, after due Free Prior Informed Consent
(FPIC) villages decide to opt in, traditional activities, including swidden farming, are permitted to
continue. Emissions of village activities will be monitored, and the difference with the national
reference level will be used to determine the amount of payment each year per village (see below).
Transaction and implementation costs would be shared between government and village. Chiefly,
the government provides one-off initial support to villages for the OIM to become operational, while
subsequent running and monitoring costs would be covered by the village’s REDD+ earnings [20].
REDD+ revenues will not translate into direct payments to the village or its households, but are to
be used to finance projects that are included in the Village Plan. This plan is updated annually and
outlines the village’s vision for development, including the management of forest resources [27].
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Levels of annual payments to each village will be calculated in a similar way as at the national
level [18]. At the national level, the annual emission rate and the forest area of the country is used to
calculate payments, and these variables will be replaced by the annual emission rate of the individual
village and the carbon stock of its titled forest [20]. Consequently, a village’s REDD+ revenue will be
calculated as:
Annual revenue = (National Reference Emission Level − Community Emission Level in Yrx)
× Community’s forest CO2 stock in Yrx−1 × Carbon price (1)
The national reference emission level is based on the 12-year average of countrywide forest
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation during 2001–2012, expressed as a percentage of
the country’s total carbon stock, in carbon dioxide, CO2, equivalents [18]. As a simplified example,
a country with a 1,000,000 ha forest area, with a ‘carbon density’ of 200 tC ha−1, has a national ‘carbon
stock’ of 200 million tC, or 733 Mt in CO2 equivalents (the conversion factor C—CO2 is 44/12 = 3.667,
based on the atomic weights of carbon (12) and oxygen (16)). If the country deforested on average
3000 ha per year in recent history (3000 × 200 × 3.67 = 2.2 Mt CO2), its ‘historical emission rate’ is
0.3% (2.2/733). Any forest degradation, e.g., through logging, would similarly have to be converted
to CO2-equivalents, and added to the 2.2 MtCO2 from deforestation [18]. The annual community
emissions are similarly expressed as a percentage of the total carbon stock of the community’s titled
forest. The difference between the reference level and the community’s emission rate in a given year
represents the rate at which the community has avoided emissions as compared to the national baseline
rate. This is multiplied by the total forest carbon stock of the village’s titled forest (in tCO2) in the year
prior to the assessment, and by the carbon price (US$ per tCO2), to arrive at the amount of revenue
earned that year (Equation (1)). Section 3.1 provides an elaborated example.
Equation (1) shows there are two variables under influence of the communities; how much
carbon they emit each year (‘Community Emission Level’, CEL), and how much carbon they have on
their titled land (‘Community’ forest CO2 stock’, CFS). Guyana is still developing the methodology
to monitor annual community emissions, and is test-casing which emission sources to include by
balancing significance versus monitoring cost [26]. Since forest clearance for rotational farming or
shifting cultivation forms no ‘permanent conversion from forest to non-forest use’ (it is left to regrow
after some years of crop cultivation), Guyana does not categorize this as deforestation but as forest
degradation, for which emission factors are being developed [26]. In the absence of numbers on annual
community emissions, we enter low and high emission rates for CEL in Equation (1) to obtain the
range of REDD+ revenue the average village could expect if it opts in to the national REDD+ program.
Our field-assessment of the average carbon density of titled community forest could affect
the variable CFS, if found significantly different from the government’s preliminary estimate of
283.7 tC ha−1 (above + belowground carbon) for this region [18,33], and thereby the level of annual
REDD+ payment (Equation (1)). Guyana has thus far used the interim carbon price set by Brazil’s
Amazon Fund (US$5 per tCO2, [31]). We utilize the same carbon price in our analysis, and evaluate
carbon price trends in the Discussion section.
2.4. Study Sites
The carbon assessment of mature forests that were used by FDP, and of unused ‘control’ forests,
formed part of a larger study of human-wildlife dynamics in the context of socio-economic change,
and the feasibility of large-scale environmental monitoring by FDP (‘Project Fauna’, 2007–2011, [34]).
The assessment took place in Guyana’s Region 9, also known as The Rupununi, an area that is covering
approximately 48,000 km2 of both the Amazon and Essequibo watersheds in southwest Guyana
(Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Study area with savannah and forest cover, indigenous titled lands, and village and control
transects where biomass was estimated.
The Rupununi consists of a mostly flat-to-undulating landscape (~150 m above sea level, with
mountain peaks up to 1000 masl) of tropical forest with defined boundaries to natural grassland
savannah with scattered stunted trees, interspersed with small forest ‘islands’, and Mauritia flexuosa
L.f. palms along creeks (more details in [34,35]).
Approximately 40 communities are scattered across the study area, ranging in population from
around 60 to 1200, and predominantly located in lowland savanna close (<5 km) to the forest edge [34,35].
Nearly all the residents of the 15 villages that were included in this biomass study self-identified as
being indigenous (predominantly Wapichan and Makushi). The people rely on their forests for swidden
agriculture, building materials, small canoes, charcoal for clay brickmaking, firewood (typically slash
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from farms or dead wood in nearby forest), non-timber forest products (NTFP), and medicines [36].
Community-based forest management exists, but it is not well documented. In this sense it is more
informal and based on tradition rather than law. Major forest management decisions, such as timber
extraction and negotiation with the government and mining companies, are undertaken at the village
and district levels (representing the North, South Central, and South Rupununi districts). Smaller-scale
forest management and utilization, including most hunting and foraging activities, as well as small
scale timber extraction, occur at the household level. For the purposes of this paper, we assume the
community has made collective decisions over what kinds of activities are allowed across their lands.
2.5. Community REDD+ Revenue
Since annual emissions of individual villages were not available at the time of this study,
we entered low and high village emission rates for the variable ‘Community Emission Level’ in
Equation (1) to obtain the range of REDD+ revenue the average village could expect. We used ‘no
emissions’ as the hypothetical lowest rate (generating highest revenue), and ‘0.1%’ as the highest
rate. The latter rate was the maximum rate under the 2010–2015 Guyana-Norway agreement [31].
Under this agreement Guyana self-imposed a cap of 0.1% (instead of its reference level 0.242% [18]) to
show its commitment to mitigating climate change, beyond which it would receive no revenue [31].
The UNFCCC threshold was still under discussion at the time of Guyana’s UN-submission [18]. As a
further example, we present the revenue level when a community emits at the same rate as the national
historical rate (0.049%, [18]).
In accordance with Project Fauna’s agreement with partner villages (to protect the anonymity of
specific villages), here we provide mean regional results. Project Fauna has informed the individual
villages of the size of their forest area and total standing carbon stock, to allow for calculating the
revenue range of their specific village, an essential yet so far lacking piece of information for indigenous
villages to make an informed decision (in line with the principles of FPIC) whether or not to join
REDD+ (Overman and Fragoso, unpublished data).
2.6. Assessments of Carbon Stocks and Titled Forest Areas
Local indigenous technicians received three days of classroom and field training to assess biomass
in mature forest plots (i.e., excluding successional forests recovering from rotational farming) that were
located between 0 and 12 km around 15 villages, and at five control areas that were reported to be
free of any human activities, at least in the recent past, as confirmed by subsequent onsite technician
observations (‘undisturbed’, 15–40 km away from any village, Figure 1). Biomass plots in mature
forest were selected in a stratified random way, by making use of previously established transects for
the larger ‘Project Fauna’ study on human-wildlife dynamics. These transects had been inventoried
for vegetation types by trained local technicians, which allowed for selecting mature forest for the
biomass plots (for more details see [37]). Transect arrays around each village had been divided in two
concentric zones, ‘near’ (0–6 km from village center) and ‘far’ (6–12 km), with four transects, each 4 km
in length, within each zone [34]. Start point and bearing of the straight-line transects were randomly
generated, but placement was stratified by a minimum of 3 km distance between adjacent transects.
The 6 km boundary was selected as evidence has shown that most hunting activity, and thus most
walking activity in forest occurs within 5 km of villages, while the 6–12 km zone was established to
determine source-sink dynamics of hunted wildlife [35]. These forest zones were used to group plots
and obtain average biomass per zone (0–6 km, 6–12 km and 15–40 km (controls) from village centers).
Aboveground biomass of forests was estimated by the local technicians for trees ≥10 cm diameter
at breast height (dbh) in 564 plots of 10 m × 10 m on 111 transects (5.64 hectares, Figure 1), using the
regression equation for moist tropical forest of IPCC [38], multiplied by 0.5 to derive above ground
carbon densities. More details on the methodology, including the verification of technician estimates,
can be found in [37]. A total of 386 plots were located in the 0–12 km village zone, and 178 plots in
control areas. Above ground carbon stocks data for undisturbed plots and plots located within 0–12 km
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of a village center were compared statistically (ANOVA) after the data were log transformed using
the stats package in R [39]. Areas of forest within titled lands were derived from Landsat imagery
and raster counts of 30 × 30 m pixels in ArcGIS. The computation of forest areas did not allow for
distinction between mature and secondary forests [37]. This constitutes a risk for overestimating
carbon stocks from forest cover of titled areas, which is discussed in Section 4.2.
3. Results
3.1. Community REDD+ Revenue
Based on Equation (1) and the reported (above and belowground) carbon density for this region,
283.7 tC ha−1 [18,33], payment for the average village would fluctuate between US$166,000 and
$284,000 per year, depending on the community’s emissions each year (Table 1). The $166,000, for
example, is given by: (0.00242 − 0.00100) × 22,544 ha × 283.7 tC ha−1 × (44/12) × $5 (Equation (1)),
where 0.00242 represents the national reference emission level (0.242%, [18]), 0.00100 is a hypothetical
community emission level (0.1%), 22,544 ha is the area of titled forest for the average community,
283.7 tC ha−1 is the mean carbon density [18,33], (44/12) represents the conversion factor from C to
CO2, and $5 represents the carbon price.
Table 1. Gross annual Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+)
revenue for the average indigenous community (n = 15) and household equivalent under different
emission scenarios vs. current household income.
Emission Scenario EmissionRate
Annual Revenue (US$)
Average Community (22,544
ha Titled Forest, se. 2414)
Per Household
(Mean 80, se. 13.3)
National historical rate (2001–2012) 0.049% 226,300 2830
Maximum rate (beyond which payments may stop a) 0.100% 166,500 2080
No emissions 0.000% 283,750 3550
Mean annual household cash income estimates b 300–600
Costs of clear-felling 1 ha intact forest c 5201 54
a Under the 2010–2015 Guyana-Norway agreement, Guyana self-imposed a cap of 0.1% (instead of its reference level
0.242%, [18]) to show its commitment to mitigating climate change, beyond which it would receive no revenue [31].
The UNFCCC threshold was still under discussion at the time of Guyana’s UN-submission [18]. b Based on two
earlier estimates [40,41]. A recent estimate of $3079 [42] is considered a marked overestimation and disregarded [43],
authors’ comms. with village leaders. c Above and belowground live biomass, 283.7 tC ha−1 [18,33], times (44/12),
times $5. (‘44/12’ is the conversion factor from C to CO2 based on atomic weights: C = 12, and O = 16).
The range in gross REDD+ income for the average community (with 80 households) would equate
to between ~$2100 and $3500 per household per year. In comparison, available estimates of household
cash income were $300–600 per year (Table 1), while the minimum wage in Guyana was ~$2600 per
year in 2017 [44].
3.2. Community Carbon Impact
The aboveground living biomass component of mature forests without human activity in the
region (‘Undisturbed’, 15–40 km away from any village) contained an average 172.4 Mg (mega gram,
or metric ton) carbon per hectare (se (standard error) = 15.9, n = 178 plots, Figure 2, see also [37]).
Mature forests within a 12 km radius of the villages contained on average 17% less carbon per
hectare than Undisturbed forest (143.6 tC ha−1, se = 10.8, n = 386 plots, p-value = 0.002). Further
analysis revealed that the carbon impact is restricted to within a 6 km radius from villages, since the
mean carbon density of forests that were located 6–12 km from village centers was statistically not
different from that of more distant Undisturbed forest (170.5 vs. 172.4 tC ha−1, se = 15.9, n = 228 plots,
p = 0.111). The mature forests within 0–6 km from villages contained an average 39% less carbon than
Undisturbed forests (104.8 tC ha−1, se = 9.4, n = 158 plots, p < 0.001).
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Figure 2. Estimates of mean aboveground carbon density in forests without human activities
(‘undisturbed’), compared to mature forests around 15 indigenous villages in southern Guyana.
Landsat imagery analysis [37] revealed that, on average, 19.3% of communities’ titled forest
area was located within 6 km of the village (including an unknown area of fallow forest), implying
that at least 80.7% of indigenous titled forest areas had no measurable difference in stored carbon
when compared to undisturbed forests. This means that the indigenous titled forests in the Rupununi
contained on average at most 7.5% less carbon than forests untouched by people (39% × 19.3%). If,
for example, half of the 19.3% was fallow forest, then the mature titled forest contained on average
3.76% less carbon than nearby forest untouched by people.
4. Discussion
4.1. Indigenous Impacts on Forests
To our knowledge for the first time, we provided an estimate of the average impact that 15 indigenous
communities appear to have had over time on carbon stocks of adjacent mature forests beyond fallow
areas. The average 39% lower carbon density of the 0-6km forest zone appears high, as it implies that
more than a third of the biomass has been extracted from every hectare of mature forest within 6 km of
village centers (i.e., beyond savanna and rotational farming areas). However, as mentioned, this impact
is confined to less than ~20% of the titled forest area, which dilutes the overall impact on the titled
forest to less than 7.5%. In addition, apart from larger sample sizes improving the accuracy, there may
be potential selection bias around the choice of the 6 km boundary zone used to differentiate levels of
forest use and related carbon stocks. It should also be realized that 39% of the biomass in tropical forest
may be contained in just the 15 biggest trees per hectare [45], and that chainsaw logging has an inherent
overall efficiency of only 5–12% (i.e., for every board produced, the equivalent of 8–19 more boards go
up in CO2, [46–48], details in Supplementary Materials (Note S1)). There may have been several other
factors of unknown magnitude that can have influenced results, such as possibly lower carbon density
in natural forests bordering on savanna, cases where neighboring non-sampled communities use the
same forest area, et cetera. Given these factors, the observed difference in carbon density appears
modest for, on average, 75 year-old communities with 80+ households, the majority of whom are fully
dependent on forests for their livelihoods (more details in Supplementary Materials (Note S1)). In sum,
while the 39% difference was found to be statistically significant (p < 0.001), it appears confined to a
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small area which reduces the overall carbon stock of titled mature forest areas only slightly (below
7.5%) compared to nearby forest untouched by people, which may be negligable for carbon payments
under REDD+.
4.1.1. Carbon Density of Southern Guyana Forest
The preliminary mean aboveground carbon density reported by the government for the study
area (229.7 tC ha−1, [18,33]) was not supported by our study (172.4 tC ha−1 for Undisturbed forest,
Figure 2), even after adding carbon from 5–10 cm dbh trees (4.4 tC ha−1, adopted from [45]), which we
omitted: 176.8 tC ha−1. The difference is about a quarter less carbon per hectare (23%), which would
imply 23% less revenue for indigenous communities in this region (‘Community’s forest CO2 stock’,
Equation (1)). The observed lower carbon density of Undisturbed forest in the region is corroborated
by another biomass assessment across the North Rupununi that used the same methodology as the
GoG (166 tC ha−1, [49]), as well as by earlier assessments of the forests in southern Guyana [50]. Future
government-planned biomass estimations in southern Guyana will reveal whether thusfar reported
carbon densities for this region need adjustment.
4.1.2. Economic Pantropical Monitoring of Forest Emissions
Our Project Fauna study [34,37,51], and several others, e.g., [52–58], have shown that with
short training periods, FDP can acquire the skills to estimate biomass, follow systematic work plans,
handle GPS units, smartphones, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV, or drones) in the field, with
similar accuracy as professionals at much lower costs. This supports the suggestion in the literature
that more ground derived biomass data are needed from tropical forests to improve calibration of
remote sensing (RS) estimates for different forest types, which has been hampered by field costs
e.g., [59–63]. We describe how teams of local people with third-party verifiers could economically
provide such data. A further 6–12 fold field cost reduction may be possible if forest carbon densities
are derived from measuring only plot trees over 30 cm, or 20 cm, in diameter (approximately 83, resp.
155 trees per hectare, containing 75% resp. 85% of the carbon, instead of measuring all trees over 5 cm
(~1000 per ha) [45]).
Once the RS signatures of the different forest types are ground-calibrated, maps can be created
that more accurately describe the carbon density variation across tropical forests. This will improve
the accuracy of calculating emissions from satellite-detected areas of deforestation across forest basins.
When combined with rapid advances in RS technology (in both image data fusion and resolution
e.g., [61,64–68]) and tree gap emission factors [48,69], this could have potential for economic monitoring
of forest degradation emissions from logging across the tropics, remotely and objectively. Since global
logging emissions are significant [69], this aids the credibility and feasibility of the REDD+ mechanism
for climate change mitigation. Accurate countrywide monitoring of emissions by each forest concession
holder (e.g., registered mining and logging concessions, FDP titled forest) would also contribute to
transparent and equitable sharing of burdens and benefits of REDD+ among forest stakeholders.
4.2. National REDD+ and FDP
We found that Guyana’s approach towards implementing REDD+ nationally would produce
a large financial benefit to FDP, equating to a 3.5–12 fold increase in cash income for the majority
of households (Table 1). REDD+ would not only form a significant source of revenue, but has the
potential to provide a stable revenue source, for all of the country’s indigenous communities with
titled forest, independent of what other communities decide or emit, with funds to be allocated to
self-identified development priorities.
We underline that these are gross revenue estimates from which, as yet unfinalized [20], REDD+
costs due by the village will be subtracted (Section 2.3), which could be significant. While not entirely
overlapping with apparent communities’ costs in Guyana, a recent review of studies estimating
different REDD+ costs found ‘transaction and implementation’ costs averaging US$ 3.39 tCO2−1 (range
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$0.03–$20.93) [70]. None of the 60 studies however, analysed REDD+ costs at the national (country)
level (but used a ‘local empirical, global empirical, or global simulation’ approach), and the authors
warned that available estimates were inadequate, suggesting an important gap in the literature [70].
We further note that REDD+’s high benefit is in large part due to extremely low current FDP
levels of cash income ($300–600 yr−1), and that several policy issues still remain to be resolved
in Guyana (see Supplementary Materials (Note S2)). Also, our REDD+ revenue figures will be slightly
overestimated since our satellite imagery was unable to distinguish secondary from mature forest,
implying that all of the forest cover in titled areas was regarded as mature forest in calculations of
communities’ forest carbon stock. Recovering forest after swidden agriculture is, however, on average,
a small proportion of total titled forest cover [26].
4.3. How Exceptional Is Guyana?
The beneficial nature of Guyana’s national REDD+ program for FDP is in distinct contrast to
FDP experiences with many earlier REDD+ projects in other countries e.g., [8,17]. One reason is that
Guyana’s, UN-approved, national REDD+ mechanism functions quite differently from REDD+ at
the project level. For instance, national REDD+ is not subject to the structural difficulties of REDD+
projects (setting reference levels, national leakage, permanence [17]), since each country develops
its reference level based on historical countrywide forest emissions, which serves as the baseline of
normal emissions, per year. Any subsequent annual emissions below this base level reflect active
reductions, and are traded as carbon credits [18,71]. Guyana does, however, appear to have three
advantages over many other developing countries, which contribute to the level of positive outcomes
of national REDD+ for FDP: comparatively high forest carbon density, HFLD status, and secure FDP
tenure. We discuss these below.
4.3.1. Carbon Density
The reported average carbon density of Guyana’s forests (283.7 tC ha−1, [18]) is almost twice as
high as the densities that were reported by other Amazon countries (Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, [3]),
implying twice less revenue per avoided hectare of deforestation in these latter countries. High carbon
densities in Guiana Shield forests are consistent with research e.g., [72], although Guyana’s reported
value for the south part of the country may need some downward adjustment in update reports to
the UN (Section 4.1.1). Further, if carbon prices rise, due to the urgency of global emission reductions
(e.g., to $40–80 tCO2−1 by 2020, [73,74]), such price increases would more than compensate lower
carbon density forests in other countries.
4.3.2. High Forest Low Deforestation (HFLD)
Global REDD+ models aim to provide financial incentives to all tropical forest nations to join
REDD+ to avoid international leakage of forest emissions [71,75]. However, if payments were only
based on emission reductions, developing countries with historically low forest emission rates (HFLD
countries) would have little incentive to join REDD+. Instead, they could be persuaded to accept
offers from forest based industries that come under pressure in other REDD+ countries to operate
in their (HFLD) forest, resulting in not a reduction, but a relocation or ‘leakage’ of emissions, thus
invalidating REDD+ credits of the non-HFLD country [71]. In Guyana’s technically approved FREL
submission to the UN [18,19], the Combined Incentive approach of Strassburg et al. [71] is adopted
to develop a payment model. This model raises the reference level of HFLD countries as Guyana
above their historical rate [18], which can result in substantial annual REDD+ payments at current
emission rates [76]. These funds would enable Guyana to reward its FDP for emissions below the
national reference level, instead of demanding resource use restrictions for (‘result-based’) payments.
However, an argument should be made in favor of FDP as responsible forest users. Contrary to
some perceptions, FDP have been shown to be a minor contributor to countries’ total forest emissions,
not only in Guyana but also across continents [26,77–79]. We argue FDP would be an even smaller
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‘emission driver’ (source of emissions) if emissions were not expressed per driver but per household.
To illustrate, the average household working in the overall mining and logging sectors in Guyana emits
41, respectively, 20 times more CO2 from forest per year than the average FDP household (1% of the
country’s total forest emissions is emitted by 11,000 FDP households, while 91% of the total is emitted
by 23,000 jobs, i.e. households, in the overall wood sector and 13,000 jobs in mining [18,26,29,80,81]).
The low emission lifestyle of FDP, for generations, indicates there is very little potential for emission
reductions, i.e., results-based payments, with this driver, which would directly affect their livelihoods,
and hence breach the minimal ‘no harm’ REDD+ Safeguard. Instead, it strongly supports the notion
that FDP should benefit from REDD+ well beyond ‘no harm’, with establishment of solid and objective
FDP safeguards, i.e., containing a ‘monitoring, reporting and verification’ aspect.
By contrast, there would be much more potential gain for the country in reducing the emissions
of commercial forest uses (91% of total in Guyana [18]), which was recently found to generate large
overall net profit along private supply chains, shared ~99:1 with the resource-owning country [76]).
Commercial forest use (CFU) emissions may be reduced by ‘cleaning supply chains’ and moving
commodity production out of primary forest e.g., [82,83], and by ‘cleaning profit chains’ to fund better
forest management [76].
4.3.3. FDP Tenure
In the context of REDD+, settling FDP tenure rights has been described as an essential requisite
before REDD+ implementation, so as to avoid land grabbing, regulate FDP resource use restrictions,
and enable equitable REDD+ benefit sharing with FDP [13–16]. An assessment of Guyana’s
UN-approved FREL submission [76], however, indicated that land grabbing appears unlikely to
occur under national REDD+ because owning or acquiring standing forest would yield virtually no
annual forest rent, whereas logging or clearing standing forest will substantially cost the owner, if not
the state (see below). In addition, the frequently stated sequestration capacity of standing forest
does not pass REDD+’s additionality criterion (i.e., the CO2 removal or reduction would not have
happened without human effort/intervention). As such, the sequestration of standing forest is unlikely
to generate credits, while sequestration credits from re/afforestation or enhanced regeneration with
native species are small per hectare when compared to credits of avoided deforestation and degradation
(between $9–101 ha−1 yr−1 at a $5 carbon price [84,85]).
Further, while CFUs are often hailed in terms of progress, employment, or national development,
actual net revenue for a developing country can be quite small, e.g., $13 and 0.5 jobs per hectare
for selective logging, and $4100 gross and 2.8 jobs per hectare for alluvial gold mining in Guyana,
while costing $560, respectively, $5200 per hectare in foregone REDD+ revenue at $5 tCO2−1 [76].
Such figures make it harder for governments to grant commercial concessions on FDP lands, given
that CFUs are typically associated with large and long-term social and environmental disruption for
hundreds of citizens in FDP communities e.g., [86].
Lastly, higher carbon prices, such as the $40–80 required by 2020 stated by [73,74], may in
fact generate tenure security, when lost REDD+ income from commercial forest damage becomes
economically inhibitive for tropical forest nations (e.g., $41,000–83,000 ha−1 to deforest, and $4500–9000
to log a 284 tC ha−1 forest [71,76]).
Economic considerations and assessments in the context of national REDD+, as presented here
and in concurrent work [76], may provide domestic leverage for forest governance change beneficial
to FDP, since economic aspects often reflect the reality behind land use in the tropics [87]. Public
general awareness of the economics of current forest governance may aid government and electorate
decision-making in sovereign developing countries in a national REDD+ era, which would in all
likelihood be beneficial for FDP livelihoods.
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5. Conclusions
In contrast to many project-level experiences, our analysis shows that REDD+ implemented
nationally in Guyana could have large annual financial benefits for FDP with legal forest tenure,
equivalent to 3.5–12 fold increases in cash income for the majority of housholds. While legal forest
tenure is not common for many FDP in the tropics, and Guyana has some additional comparative
advantages (high forest carbon density, HFLD), we suggest that these advantages do not appear to
be essential for national REDD+ to have positive outcomes for FDP in other countries. Concurrent
work [76] suggests how policy can eliminate incentives to land grabbing, which is perceived to
be a main argument for FDP tenure. Restrictions on FDP resource use would also appear to be
unlikely as FDP emit little when compared to commercial forest emissions, and such restrictions
would directly breach UN social safeguard obligations. These and other presented lines of economic
evidence (e.g., modest net per hectare state benefits from CFU, extremely skewed private-public
sharing of net revenue on forest-based resources, inhibitive forest damage costs at rising carbon prices,
REDD+’s competitiveness with CFUs at $5 tCO2−1 [76]), may motivate forest governance change
domestically in sovereign developing countries in a national REDD+ era, and ease facilitating FDP
tenure. Advances in remote sensing, when combined with carbon ground calibration through FDP
partnerships, suggest large potential for accurate economic monitoring of tropical forest emissions
under a global REDD+ mechanism.
The average carbon density of mature forest managed by 15 indigenous communities in Guyana
appeared locally substantially less (39%) than that of nearby unmanaged forest. The lower carbon
density is however modest when considering ecological and socioeconomic attributes, and constitutes
a small (less than 7.5%) reduction in overall carbon stocks of titled forest areas when compared to
unmanaged forest, which may be negligable for carbon payments under REDD+.
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